University of Louisville

ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
8-2020

Practicing Pan-Africanism: West Indians and governance in
Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana.
Nicholas C. McLeod
University of Louisville

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd
Part of the African American Studies Commons, African History Commons, Intellectual History
Commons, and the Political History Commons

Recommended Citation
McLeod, Nicholas C., "Practicing Pan-Africanism: West Indians and governance in Kwame Nkrumah's
Ghana." (2020). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 3515.
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/3515

This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of
the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.

PRACTICING PAN-AFRICANISM: WEST INDIANS AND GOVERNANCE
IN KWAME NKRUMAH’S GHANA
By
Nicholas C. McLeod
B.A., Bucknell University, 2011
M.A., University of Louisville, 2016

A Dissertation
Submitted to The Faculty of
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In
Pan-African Studies

Department of Pan-African Studies
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky
August 2020

Copyright 2020 by Nicholas C. McLeod
All rights reserved

PRACTICING PAN-AFRICANISM: WEST INDIANS AND GOVERNANCE
IN KWAME NKRUMAH’S GHANA

By
Nicholas C. McLeod
B.A., Bucknell University, 2011
M.A., University of Louisville, 2016
A Dissertation Approved on

August 3, 2020

By the following Dissertation Committee
__________________________________
Dissertation Director
Dr. Tyler D. Fleming
__________________________________
Dr. Theresa Rajack-Talley
__________________________________
Dr. Kwame Essien
__________________________________
Dr. Charlton Yingling

ii

DEDICATION
For Omari.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my mentors and dissertation co-chairs, Dr. Theresa Rajack-Talley
and Dr. Tyler Fleming for their support, direction, and trust in me to carry out this unique
study. The project could not have been completed without them.
I must also extend my deep appreciation to the other committee members, Dr. Charlton
Yingling, and Dr. Kwame Essien. The guidance and rigorous feedback of these scholars
maintained the historical integrity of this study.
I owe a great deal of thanks to Dr. Joy Gleason Carew for granting me access her late
husband, Jan Carew’s, personal papers, and for supporting his inclusion in this study.
The research for this dissertation was conducted in archives in Ghana, Trinidad and
Tobago, Guyana, and the United States. I would like to thank each archivist for the care,
guidance, and support they provided during my fieldwork.
I must express my gratitude to the faculty and graduate students of the Department of
Pan-African Studies for providing the environment of free-flowing ideas, dialogue, and
support in which this dissertation was written.
Finally, to my family for their love, prayers, and sacrifice to give me the educational
opportunities that brought me to this point.

iv

ABSTRACT
PRACTICING PAN-AFRICANISM: WEST INDIANS AND GOVERNANCE
IN KWAME NKRUMAH’S GHANA
Nicholas C. McLeod
August 3, 2020
After gaining independence from England, Kwame Nkrumah, the first President
of Ghana, was transparent in his embrace of the entire African diaspora and actively
recruited a number of Pan-African West Indian intellectual-activists, who mentored and
advised him as a student in London, to help build Ghana as a Pan-Africanist state.
Among these West Indian intellectual-activists were George Padmore, W. Arthur Lewis,
T. Ras Makonnen, and Jan Carew. For these West Indians the appeal of Ghana was
neither symbolic nor ceremonial, but rather an opportunity to achieve the ultimate
objective of the Pan-African movement, a free and self-governed African continent.
In Ghana their Pan-Africanisms transcended its use as an ideology for political
mobilization and consciousness and became praxis in governance as they contributing to
the nation-building process of the first Sub-Saharan African nation to gain independence.
In addition, examining the contrasting notions of diaspora, ethnicity, and identity that
these West Indians encountered in Ghana, this dissertation illustrates that the West Indian
influences on Kwame Nkrumah and Ghana were profound and critical to the nationbuilding process in the realms of political strategy, economics, institution building, and
media.
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INTRODUCTION
As the interwar years came to a close in the mid-1940s, the world found itself in a
state of transition. Europe had been brought to its knees by the World Wars and the
United States and the Soviet Union had emerged as the leading world powers. The Black
liberation struggle found itself in transition as well. By this time Black activists and
intellectuals were migrating to Europe from the far reaches of European empires in the
West Indies, Africa, and the United States. Unified by their common experiences of
colonialism, racism, second class citizenship, and for many of them a socialist class
analysis, these activist intellectuals developed a diasporic consciousness that would give
way to the next phase of the Pan-African movement. All of this culminated in the 1945
Manchester Pan-African Conference, where for the first time African and West Indian
attendees came together not as individuals but as delegates from organizations
representing the masses of African workers, who determined that the colonial working
classes must be the vanguard in the battle against imperialism.1
This generation, informed by their anti-colonial aspirations and a Pan-African
consciousness then left the metropole to lead and participate in African liberation
movements for independence in Africa and the West Indies. Many of these PanAfricanists made their way to Ghana in the years of the Gold Coast Revolution or
following Independence to serve as advisors and officials in Kwame Nkrumah’s
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Peter Olisanwuche Esedebe. Pan-Africanism: the Idea and Movement, 1776-1991. (Washington (D.C.):
Howard University Press, 1994), 144.
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administration in hopes of building up Ghana to be the base of Pan-African liberation.
Nkrumah was extremely transparent in his embrace of the entire African diaspora and
realized that he and the people of Ghana needed a variety of skills to help build the
nation. The new Prime Minister of Ghana did not sit and wait for volunteers to come,
instead, he actively sought out who he believed to be the best individuals to assist, many
of whom he had worked with during his activist years in London. Among these
individuals were George Padmore, W. Arthur Lewis, T. Ras Makonnen, and Jan Carew.
They all came with the desire to help build upon the foundations of the first Sub-Saharan
African nation to gain independence in any way possible, with the ultimate goal of
placing their Pan-Africanism into in order to free the African continent.
Background and Arising Issues:
As the first sub-Saharan African country to seize independence following the
Second World War, Ghana occupies a prominent position within the histories of PanAfricanism. Its history, symbols, and leaders were latched onto by those in Africa and
within the African Diaspora as a beacon of African redemption and the realization of a
Pan-African dream. This dissertation analyzes the influence of West Indian intellectualactivists on Kwame Nkrumah and Ghana’s first republic (1957-1966). Starting with the
resurgence of the Pan-African movement prior to World War II and continuing through
the post-independence era, this research explores the ideologies and skill sets that this
select group of West Indians impressed upon Nkrumah and deployed in Ghana.
This dissertation furthers our understanding of Pan-Africanism and post-colonial
politics by connecting African history to the growing scholarship concerning Black
Internationalism. Winston James’ Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia (1998),
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demonstrates how West Indian activists helped shape both American and British radical
movements of the early twentieth century, which raises the question of the place of
Africa within these Black movements, which have always been transnational in nature.
Furthermore, while scholars have produced several texts examining transnational
exchanges and influences of African Americans, the dearth of West Indian and African
collaboration in Black Internationalist discourses have become evident. Though recent
works like Robert Trent Vinson’s, The Americans Are Coming! and Kevin K. Gaines'
African Americans in Ghana demonstrate how Diasporic movements often became
intertwined with those in Africa, much work remains to be accomplished. As such, this
dissertation places Ghana at its center, and builds on Africanist historiographies
concerning African intellectuals, anti-colonialism, and nationalism, to emphasize how
these West Indian intellectual activists’ skills and ideas were received and implemented
by Nkrumah and the Ghanaian nation-state.
Research Objectives and Hypothesis:
This dissertation internationalizes Ghana’s independence movement, and it
interrogates why Ghana, as a Pan-African project, was so significant and appealing to
these West Indians who could have joined anti-colonial movements in their British
Colonial homelands. Trinidadian intellectual George Padmore mentored Nkrumah and
helped him conceptualize how a post-independent Ghana should theoretically operate.
St. Lucian native and Nobel Laureate economist, W. Arthur Lewis, was sought after by
Nkrumah to construct the plans for economic development in Ghana. Through the
building of Pan-African institutions and the managing of the Ghanaian media, Guyanese
intellectual activists, Ras Makonnen and Jan Carew sought to put Pan-Africanism into
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practice on the ground level for the Ghanaian masses. The fact that these individuals
chose to contribute to Ghana’s development when the decolonization efforts in the West
Indies were gaining momentum speaks to Ghana’s symbolic importance. This conveys
not only to the power and magnetism that emanated from Ghana but also to its larger
importance in global Pan-African circles. Furthermore, the fact that these intellectualactivists grew disenchanted with the Nkrumah regime also elucidates how Ghana’s PanAfrican allure was limited.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the praxis of Pan-Africanism.
Emphasizing the role of West Indian intellectual-activists in the advancement of PanAfricanism as an ideology and movement in the interwar years, as well as their vital role
in placing the theory of Pan-Africanism into practice in governing and shaping Ghana.
This is done by highlighting: (1) the roles of Padmore in influencing ideological and
political trajectory of Kwame Nkrumah and governance in Ghana; (2) Lewis’ influence
on the design of Ghana’s economic development plans; (3) Makonnen’s role in
overseeing of the building of state institutions in furtherance of Nkrumah’s Pan-African
Policy; and (4) Carew’s contributions to Pan-African media outlets in Ghana and his
advising of Nkrumah prior to being overthrown in February 1966. The dissertation also
explores the ideologies and views that Padmore, Lewis, Makonnen, and Carew impressed
upon Nkrumah and brought with them to Ghana. Making use of the memoirs,
biographies, and authored texts of the West Indian intellectual-activists that migrated to
Ghana following independence, their reasons for coming to Ghana; their struggles in
Ghana; and their reflections on the meteoric rise and fall of the Nkrumah regime are
examined.

4

Situating the analysis of these intellectuals within the larger historical narrative of
Ghana’s first republic, this study ultimately contends that the West Indian influences and
interactions with Kwame Nkrumah and Ghana, as a Pan-African project, were profound,
lasting, and critical to the nation-building process in post-colonial Ghana. Furthermore,
history requires a point of view that includes an interpretive form that contemplates the
meaning of history.2 As such this dissertation produces an intellectual historical narrative
that analyzes the socio-economic conditions and political context that prompted and
resulted from the influences of the West Indian intellectual-activists.
Significance:
Whereas other studies have highlighted historical figures visiting, in dialogue
with, or operating in activist capacities in transnational contexts, what sets this research
project apart from other Black Internationalism scholarship is that not only it highlights
the presence of West Indian intellectual-activists in Ghana, but also how and why they
contributed to and directly shaped nation-building and governance. At a time when
anticolonial and independence movements throughout the West Indies were furiously
peaking, these West Indian intellectual-activists chose to relocate to West Africa and
participate in the building of a Pan-African nation-state. For them, notions of a PanAfricanism and a global Africa, which included the entire African diaspora, was not
simply an intellectual or philosophical exercise but a tangible one. For them, Ghana, not
the West Indies, presented this possibility.

2

Gaye Tuchman. “ Historical Social Science: Methodologies, Methods, and Meanings,” in The
Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. (Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), 306.
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George Padmore, W. Arthur Lewis, T. Ras Makonnen, and Jan Carew constitute a
continuation of the legacy of British West Indian intellectual-activists , such as William
Finlason, Francis Grant, and T.E.S. Scholes, who contributed to the anti-colonial struggle
in the Gold Coast in the nineteenth century. Unlike the majority of individuals discussed
in Gaines’ study, these intellectuals mentored Nkrumah during his time as a student in
London and were actively recruited to work in the Ghanaian government. As a result,
they found themselves in coveted positions, having direct access to Nkrumah, with the
ability to influence Ghana’s nation-building process in the realms of political philosophy,
economic development, Pan-African institutions, and media. Thus, the ideologies,
immediate reactions, and reflections on the social conditions of the nation and the
ideological direction of Nkrumah’s administration are vital components that have yet to
be adequately discussed in Ghana’s historical narrative.
Historiography
Post-Colonial African History:
The historical impact of colonialism and decolonization manifested in the rise of
the Nationalist school of history in which historians like Ali Mazrui, Cheikh Anta Diop,
and Basil Davidson sought to refute the notion that Africans never had a “real history” of
their own by highlighting the achievements and integrity of pre-colonial African cultures
and civilizations.3 These historians sought to differentiate themselves from the “imperial
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Chancellor Williams. The Destruction of Black Civilization: Great Issues of a Race from 4500 BC to 2000
AD. (Chicago: Third World Press, 1987); Martin Bernal. Black Athena: Afroasiatic Roots of Classical
Civilization, Volume I: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece, 1785-1985. (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1987); Cheikh Anta Diop. Civilization or Barbarism. (Chicago: Chicago Review Press,
1991); Diop, Cheikh Anta. The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality. (Chicago: Chicago Review
Press, 1989); Jackson, John G. Introduction to African Civilizations. (Mansfield Centre, CT : Martino
Publishing, 2015)
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historians” of the past.4 The most prolific of these scholars was Guyanese historian
Walter Rodney, whose seminal text, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa remains to this
day as an example of impeccable scholarly research. In an age when historians were
researching slavery, pre-colonial Africa, and reclaiming ancient Kemet, it was Walter
Rodney who turned our attention back to colonialism, capitalism, and Europe’s role in
underdeveloping Africa, politically, socially, and culturally. As European scholars were
placing the blame of Africa’s underdevelopment on the stereotypical inferiority and
primitive nature of Africans, Rodney asserted that the true explanation lay in
understanding the relationship of exploitation between Africa and the developed capitalist
nations of Europe.5 Employing a historical materialist method, Rodney’s scientific
approach to studying the historical impact of colonialism reminded historians that the
only positive aspect of colonialism was decolonization.
Historians of Africa also began to center the experiences of Africans themselves
in their constructions of African historical narratives. In his text African Perspectives on
Colonialism, Adu Boahen emphasized the necessity of referencing African sources and
knowledge systems by arguing that African historians must deliver historical portrayals
of African colonialism from the perspective of Africans, as opposed to the common
practice of historians merely providing histories of Europe in Africa. In doing so,
historians began to examine the complex African ideologies, institutions, and political
processes that mobilized anti-colonial movements.6 In his pioneering text, Nationalism
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K. Onwuka Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and
Political History of Nigeria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956) and Frederick Cooper. “Conflict and
Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History.” The American Historical Review 99, no. 5 (1994):
1516-1545.
5
Rodney. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), 14.
6
J. F. Ade Ajayi, “ The Continuity of African Institutions under Colonialism,” in Emerging
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in Colonial Africa Thomas Hodgkin stressed the necessity of studying African political
institutions in the same fashion as British, French, and American institutions. For
Hodgkin African nationalism needed to be approached as a historical movement that is
necessary and characteristically African. Building upon this were studies like Toyin
Falola’s Nationalism and African Intellectuals, which illustrates how processes of
construction and reproduction of African nationalist thought shaped the production of
knowledge and politics in Africa since the nineteenth century. Pairing biographical
accounts of key African intellectuals with their relationships to missionaries; colonial
powers; state formations; and African nationalism, Falola examines the varying
intellectual orientations of key figures of African nationalist movements.7
A common thread among these studies of post-colonial Africa is the prominent
role of Kwame Nkrumah and Ghana. Basil Davidson and Trevor Jones were early
contributors to the historiography of Ghana’s independence.8 Their texts provided the
foundation for the monotonous meteoric rise and fall frameworks that shaped Ghana’s
post-colonial history for decades. In recent times historians began to study Africa with
socio-historical methodologies, which required them to situate their studies in larger
global or social contexts. Social histories also allowed for societies in Africa to be
studied from several different vantage points beyond the general European and African

Themes in African History, edited by Terence O. Ranger (London: Heinemann Educational, 1968), 189200; Basil Davidson. The Liberation of Guinea: Aspects of an African Revolution. (Harmondsworth,
Penguin, 1969); Ali Mazrui, Kwame Nkrumah, and A. A. Afrifa. “Towards a Pax Africana.” Science and
Society 33, 1 (1969), 101-104.
7
Toyin Falola. Nationalism and African Intellectuals. (New York: University Rochester Press, 2001)
8
Basil Davidson. Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah. (New York: Praeger,
1974); Trevor Jones. Ghana's First Republic 1960-1966: The Pursuit of The Political Kingdom. (London:
Methuen & Co Ltd, 1976)
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perspectives of previous scholarship.9 This approach allowed for more studies of the
intersections of newly formed nation-states, identity, nationalism, and ethnicity to
emerge.10 Instead of confining their historical narratives to colonial officials and
prominent anti-colonial agitators, studies like Jean Allman’s The Quills of the Porcupine,
Richard Rathbone’s Nkrumah & the Chiefs, and Jeffrey Ahlman’s Living Nkrumahism
began to highlight under-discussed conditions of decolonization, namely that anticolonial movements were not always monolithic and united, but were rather fragmented
with several groups vying for their political interests to be prioritized.
Global Africa:
While social history approaches have greatly expanded the scope of how Africa’s
history is constructed, in recent decades African history has taken not only a transnational
but a transoceanic turn. Building on the pioneering works of historians like John
Thornton, David Northrup, A.G. Hopkins, and Joseph E. Inikori, Africanists began to
read more widely on both Africa and its diaspora, to explore comparisons and linkages
within the African continent and with the diaspora, to draw on evidence from the African
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Emmanuel Akyeampong. Drink, Power, and Cultural Change: A Social History of Alcohol in Ghana, c.
1800 to Recent Times. (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996); Emmanuel Akyeampong. Between the Sea
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(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001); Benjamin Talton. Politics of Social Change in Ghana. (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and Ray, Carina E. Crossing the Color Line: Race, Sex, and the Contested
Politics of Colonialism in Ghana. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015)
10
Jean Marie Allman. The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana. (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); I. Tashjian, and Jean Allman. ‘I Will Not Eat Stone.’A Women's
History of Colonial Asante. (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2000); Richard Rathbone. Nkrumah & the
Chiefs: the Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-60. (Athens: Ohio State University Press, 2000); Kelly
Askew. Performing the Nation: Swahili music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2002); Leroy Vail. ed. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. (Oakland, CA:
University of California Press, 1991); Terence Ranger. “ The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa.” in
Perspectives on Africa: A
Reader in Culture, History, and Representation, edited by Roy Richard Grinker and Christopher B. Steiner.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 597-612; Luise White. The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi.
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009)
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diaspora to answer questions about the homeland and to write for audiences beyond other
Africanists.11 Furthermore, while this shift to the diaspora is a recent occurrence in
approaches to African history, globally historians of African descent had already been
diligently constructing the history of a global Africa.
In his article, “‘But a Local Phase of a World Problem’: Black History’s Global
Vision, 1883-1950.,” historian Robin D. G. Kelley, recalls his astonishment in
discovering the extent to which Black scholars, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, were constructing transnational histories that examined the international contexts
in which people of African descent have operated.12 Indeed for nearly two centuries
historians of various levels of training produced transnational and comparative
scholarship on issues of slavery, citizenship, Black intellectual traditions, the dangers of
American nationalism, imperialism, modernity, and identifying with “a larger black
world in which New World Negroes were inheritors of African as well as European
civilizations.”13 In doing so, these scholars were conducting research from a
transnational perspective and conceiving of an “African Diaspora.”
The term “African diaspora” was coined by George Shepperson and Joseph E.
Harris at the 1965 meeting of the International Congress of African Historians in
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John Thornton. Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800. (Cambridge
University Press, 1998); David Northrup. Africa's Discovery of Europe. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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Perspectives on United States History: A Special Issue (Dec., 1999), 1046; Vincent Carretta, ed.,
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Century (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013); Adam Potkay and Sandra Burr, eds., Black
Atlantic Writers of the 18th Century. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995)
13
Kelley. “‘But a Local Phase of a World Problem,’” 1050.

10

Tanzania.14 Historian, Patrick Manning suggests that “The 'African Diaspora', as an
object of study, centers on populations descended from and at a distance from
populations of the 'African continent' or 'African homeland'.”15 While initial research
emphasized historically created populations rather than racial essences or regional
continuities, the study of political, social and cultural connections among these
population emerged.16
Historical research on the African diaspora produced studies including migrations
of free Africans in many eras; slave trade; slavery and emancipation; migratory patterns;
the formation and retaining of cultures among African peoples in the diaspora;
precolonial and colonial society on the African continent; and the impact of colonialism
in Africa.17 Typically framed by racial paradigms of the west, racial essentialism became
integral to transnational histories of the African diaspora, thus giving rise to philosophies
of Afrocentricity, nationalist historians, and new methodological approaches to
constructing historical research.18 Additionally, the emergence of Pan-Africanism
discourses added a political agenda to African diaspora histories, as more global thinking

14

Kim D. Butler. “Clio and the Griot: the African Diaspora in the Discipline of History." in The African
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15
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spurred interest in interrelated histories, ongoing relationships, and shared concerns. The
most recent iteration of African Diaspora history has emerged in the discourse on Black
Internationalism. Such is the tradition of scholarship and research that this dissertation is
located within.
Defining Black Internationalism:
From the days of George Washington Williams in the later nineteenth century,
historians of Black history have sought to place Black history in a global context.
Whether they were countering the scientific racism, reconstructing a glorious African
past, or trying to contribute to the formation of a collective identity of "peoplehood"
based on blackness, these historians always wrote in direct opposition to European
imperialism. James T. Campbell’s text Middle Passages demonstrates that notions of a
“Black Internationalism” or “Black Internationalist consciousness” were not first
conceived of by contemporary scholars of history. Campbell uses the lives of prominent
African American male figures such as Martin Delany, Bishop Henry McNeil Turner,
and W.E.B. Dubois to explore the positioning of the African continent as the homeland
and epicenter of racial identity for African Americans in the later nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
The early twentieth century gave way to the largest mobilization of Pan-African
resistance the African diaspora has ever seen. During this time Blacks in Harlem were
identifying with their counterparts in London, Ethiopia, Havana, and Paris, as their
collective struggles began to be viewed in international contexts.19 This notion of Black
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Marc Matera. Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in The Twentieth
Century. (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015); Gilroy, Paul. There Ain't No Black in the
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experiences, cultures, and identities transcending the national boundaries laid by
European imperialist reflected a Black Internationalist consciousness among the Black
masses. Although it cannot be denied that Pan-Africanism and nationalism were at the
foundations of several Black and African movements of the twentieth century, scholars
have begun to recognize that in order for Pan-Africanism, collective Black identities, or
even the concept of an African diaspora to be articulated, its adherents must possess a
Black Internationalist consciousness. As a result, contemporary historians have
acknowledged Black Internationalism as a vital characteristic of Black radicalism, PanAfricanism, Anti-Colonialism, and even the Civil Rights movement.20
Political theorist, Carl Schmitt defines “true” internationalism as “international
movements which transcend the borders of states and ignore the territorial integrity,
impenetrability, and impermeability of existing states”21 Furthermore, in addition to
being a political philosophy, radical epistemology, and institutional practice that
functions not only to establish linkages between different Black populations, Caribbean
scholar, Michelle Stephens suggests that Black Internationalism is a desire for racial
Manchester University Press, 2003), 153; Hakim Adi. West Africans in Britain 1900-1960: Nationalism,
Pan-Africanism and Communism. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1997); Minkah Makalani. In the Cause
of Freedom: Radical Black Internationalism from Harlem to London, 1917-1939. (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2011); Hakim Adi. Pan-Africanism and Communism: The Communist
International, Africa and the Diaspora, 1919-1939. (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2013); Félix
F. Germain. Decolonizing the Republic: African and Caribbean Migrants in Postwar Paris, 1946–1974.
(Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2016); T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting. Bricktop's Paris: African
American Women in Paris between the Two World Wars. (Albany, NY: Suny Press, 2015); Hayes
Edwards. The Practice Of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black Internationalism.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Reiland Rabaka. The Negritude Movement: WEB Du Bois,
Leon Damas, Aime Cesaire, Leopold Senghor, Frantz Fanon, and the Evolution of an Insurgent Idea.
(Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015)
20
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Radicalism, and Transnational Solidarity. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018)
21
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freedom and unity stemmed from Black subjects findings themselves asking deeper
structural questions of the political world around them.22 As such, Black Internationalism
questions not only how blacks can create linkages within the race but also what systems
and forces that divided and created the African diaspora in the first place. Ultimately,
Black Internationalism analyzes racial subordination as a part of systems that function on
a supranational scale and requires communication and the formation of alliances across
political and national boundaries.23
Launching a Black Internationalism Discourse:
Scholars have been conducting transnational research on Black intellectuals’ use
of Pan Africanism as an anti-colonial project through the theoretical framework of Black
Internationalism decades. In recent scholarship, the Black Internationalist analysis of the
African Diaspora was launched by Paul Gilroy’s text, The Black Atlantic, which to
reexamines the problems of nationality, authenticity, ethnicity, and historical memory
through a transnational and intercultural lens to understand the modern Black experience.
Michael O. West’s From Toussaint to Tupac was the first study that explicitly focused on
the concept of Black Internationalism, in which it is defined as the consciousness of the
interconnection of Black struggles across man-made boundaries. West’s text also makes
clear is that the discourse on Black Internationalism projects a peculiar reflection of the
implications of European imperialism and modernity, as the scholarship has organically
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progressed into analyses of the transnational Pan-Africanist relationships that manifested
and fostered particularly in the twentieth century anti-colonial struggles and resistance.
One of the most popular assessments of Black Internationalism is the typical
analysis of the linkages between African American social movements and the anticolonial struggles in the West Indies and in Africa. Historians like Penny Von Eschen
and Brenda Gayle Plumber sought to refute the notion that African Americans remained
preoccupied with the domestic civil rights struggle and possessed a limited interest in
foreign affairs. They highlighted African American responses to events such as the
Italian Invasion of Ethiopia, the Pan-African Congress movement; the efforts of the
Leninist influenced Council on African Affairs (CAA) led by Paul Robeson; the Bandung
conference, and fluctuating desire to be associated with Africa among African
Americans.24 These texts illustrate Pan-African linkages in how Africans Americans
internationalized the conversation on racism and anti-colonialism in order to augment the
Black freedom struggle in the United States.25
Black Internationalism and the West Indies:
Black internationalist scholarship could not overlook the significance of the West
Indies blacks to twentieth-century social movements.26 Winston James’ Holding Aloft
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the Banner of Ethiopia, attempts to remedy the erasure of the West Indies and West
Indians in Black Internationalist discourse by assessing the causes of the widespread
involvement of West Indian figures in the Black radical movement in the United States
during the early twentieth century. Filling the void left in Gilroy’s analysis of the Black
Atlantic, James ultimately concludes that the West Indian presence in radical American
social movements resulted from West Indian peoples' prior experience in radical politics
in their home countries; their racial majority status within West Indian societies; and their
shared feeling of educational and cultural superiority to their white tormentors.
Considering the United States’ position as the dominant world power in the
western hemisphere, scholars began to examine transnational solidarities and cooperation
between Black West Indians and African Americans.27 Frank Andre Guridy’s Forging
Diaspora: Afro-Cuban and African Americans highlights the centrality of these crossnational linkages and ultimately demonstrates that Afro-Cubans viewed the issue of racial
inequality not as simply a national question but also as one that pertained to themselves
and African Americans as members of a collective transnational colored race.28
Demonstrating the influence of the West Indies on American politics is Lara Putnam’s
Radical Moves, in which the experiences of Black West Indian migrant workers as they
formed transnational identities and networks throughout the West Indies, Latin America,
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and the United States, and shaped immigration policy the United Stated in the early
twentieth century.29
Black Internationalism and Africa:
Studies of Black Internationalism have only recently begun to engage the African
continent.30 One of the ways scholars have approached this topic has been through
tracking how ideologies and philosophies from the diaspora have traveled to and
influenced the African continent. Andrew Zimmerman’s Alabama in Africa demonstrates
a peculiar moment of intersection between Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee
philosophy, the German colonization of Togo, arguing that Tuskegee’s industrial
education “became a veritable orthodoxy of colonial administration and international
humanitarianism.”31 Washington’s Tuskegee philosophy sought to equip impoverished
blacks with the principle and trade skills for economic self-determination and
independence, which is why it’s principles were embraced throughout Africa and served
as a call to action for Marcus Garvey.
The massive influence of Marcus Garvey on the African continent is highlighted
in the work of Robert Trent Vinson and Adam Ewing.32 Vinson’s The Americans Are
Coming!: Dreams of African-American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa,
29
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examines Garveyism in South Africa and the prominent idea that Garveyism prophesied
that the UNIA and American Blacks were divinely ordained to regenerate Africa. The
influence of Garvey on Africa is broadened by Adam Ewing’s The Age of Garvey, which
posits Garveyism not as an ideology but as a method for organic mass politics that
manifests as a coherent and malleable set of liberation strategies that were applied to
local struggles in Liberia, Nigeria, Gold Coast, South Africa, and Kenya. These texts set
themselves apart in the discourse, as they demonstrate how prominent figures and Black
political consciousness traverse national borders, and that ideologies traveled and were
applied to localized conditions as well.
The second approach to studies of Black Internationalism in Africa has explored
the history of returnees and expatriates from the African diaspora. Nemata Amelia
Blyden’s West Indians in West Africa 1808-1880: The African Diaspora in Reverse,
initiated the recent exploration of West Indian returnees to the African continent.33
Themes of memory, cultural retention, anti-colonialism, and the reverse migrations of
formerly enslaved Africans, the Tabom, were examined in Kwame Essien’s BrazilianAfrican Diaspora in Ghana: The Tabom, Slavery, Dissonance of Memory, Identity, and
Locating Home. Charting the retention of the Tabom’s own cultural identity as well as
their participation in and influence on the social, political, and cultural framework of
colonial and post-colonial Ghana, Essien’s text furthers the discourse on the challenges
and complexities of diaspora, ethnicity, and identity that returnees brought with them and
encountered in Africa.34 These themes of the reverse migrations to the African continent
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have been furthered Kevin K. Gaines, Seth M. Markle and more recently Monique A.
Bedassee, as the challenges and complexities of cultural identity, diaspora, ethnicity, and
belonging that returnees brought with them and encountered in Africa are highlighted.35
Issues in Black Internationalist Historiography:
The histories of Pan-African anti-colonial projects are well traversed, especially
in the recent rise of Black Internationalist scholarship. The goals of the anti-colonial
movements and transnational solidarities of the interwar years were aimed at
decolonization and independence with the goal of freeing and restoring Africa to join the
rest of the modern nations of the world. Furthermore, Ira Dworkin’s Congo Love Song:
African American Culture and the Crisis of the Colonial State and Nicholas
Grant’s Winning Our Freedoms Together: African Americans and Apartheid, 1945–1960
reflect new scholarship on the historical experiences and relationships fostered between
African Americans, the rest of the diaspora and the African continent. However, the
scholarship has done little to advance understandings of Pan-Africanism beyond its use as
a mobilizing ideology of solidarity for anti-colonialism, as Pan-Africanism is routinely
characterized as a movement of the early twentieth century, dominated by the
personalities of Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Dubois. Furthermore, the discourse on the
dialogues, ideologies, and identities traversing national boundaries between Africa and
the West Indies through the prism of Pan-Africanism is still in its infancy.
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The majority of studies of Black Internationalism have sought to place Black
history and identity in a global context, and there are several observations to be noted.
Winston James was correct in his argument that radicalized West Indians were at the
center of many of the Black social movements of the twentieth century, as there is no
shortage of West Indian historical figures within the discourse. Still, the discourse has
confined the West Indian presence to the Americas, Harlem, and Europe. Only recently,
has it endeavored to examine the West Indian presence in Africa. Also, Black
Internationalist scholars have yet to sufficiently interrogate the concept of Diaspora and
its nuances, particularly in terms of the racial essentialism and difference. While
essentialism is necessary to a certain extent in articulating diasporas, the differences that
emerge from varying historical experiences, social structures, migrations, languages, and
cultures must also be explored in our analyses of the African diaspora.
While issues of racism, colonial resistance, migration, and transnational networks
have been explored, Black Internationalist scholarship has yet to consider the difficulties
people of African descent faced in governance after gaining independence. The nationbuilding process presents several conditions and challenges that Black Internationalist
discourses have not engaged, such as the historical discourse on nations, nationalism,
tribalism, and ethnicity. Furthermore, where the Black Internationalist scholarship finds
its shortcomings, Africanist scholars have begun highlighting these difficulties in postcolonial histories. Scholars such as Leroy Vail and Kelly M. Askew have pushed back
against the Eurocentrism of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, which excludes
conditions in Africa in its contention that nationalism is both a singular phenomenon and
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a cultural artifact, and also positions print media as the primary catalyst to developing
national consciousness in the modern era.36
In addition to the struggles of nation-making and nationalism, is the issue of PanAfricanism clashing with African Nationalism in post-colonial African states. Prior to
independence, African nationalism was less about establishing shared identities and
belongingness. Instead, the sole ideology of African nationalism was anti-imperialism.
Following independence Ghanaian elites came to view these West Indians as direct
competition rather than their brothers and sisters that returned to aid in building the
nation. As a result, Nkrumah found himself in a compromising position, between
satisfying his countrymen and his diaspora kinsmen, which caused his loyalties to be
questioned at times. This conundrum presents an opportunity to engage notions of
sameness and difference as it relates to the articulating, sustaining, and even dissolving of
the diaspora. This is vital to this study of Ghana as the Ghanaian citizenry did not always
agree with the Pan-African aspirations of Nkrumah and or the presence of the West
Indian intellectual-activists he recruited.
As such, the discourse is ripe for the study of Black Internationalism that
interrogates the intersecting conditions, interactions, and ideological exchanges between
African and the West Indian intellectual-activists that led the Pan-African movements in
the diaspora and contributed to African liberation on the continent. Additionally,
considering the larger Pan-African project that was Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana, the Black
Internationalism discourse has yet to furnish an in-depth analysis of the ideologies,
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influences, and contributions of West Indian intellectual-activists in the first sub-Saharan
African nation to gain its independence.
This dissertation demonstrates that Pan-Africanism and its use to mobilize Africa
and the African Diaspora proved to be an effective anti-colonial political ideology.
Without question, Pan-Africanism was embraced and demonstrated from Trinidad – the
nation from which Pan-Africanism emanated from the beginning of the twentieth century
–; to Black Communist internationalists in Cuba; and to radical Black feminist
internationalism in post-World War Two London.37 Through these networks of
intellectualism and activism, Pan-Africanism was placed at the center of all analyses of
the globalized European imperialist social structure. However, once independence was
achieved, and as these intellectual-activists left the metropoles for independent nations,
the dubious relevance, pragmatism, and necessity of Pan-Africanism in nation-building
processes revealed the ideology’s varying conceptions and manifestations, as well as its
shortcomings. My dissertation moves beyond the use of Pan-Africanism as a mobilizing
ideology for anti-colonial resistance and revolt and places emphasis on how West Indian
intellectual-activists – George Padmore, W. Arthur Lewis, T. Ras Makonnen, and Jan
Carew – placed Pan-Africanism into practice for the next phase of the movement,
governance in post-colonial Ghana.
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Methodology
Conceptual Framework:
Historians have examined Pan-Africanism through its assessments of its
proponents, as a movement, ideology, or as a consciousness focusing particularly on the
potential of its outcomes. In the case of Ghana and Nkrumah, studies of Pan-Africanism
are typically limited to Nkrumah’s contributions to promoting the ideology and rhetoric
linking Ghana’s independence to the rest of the continent. Still very little has explored
the various ways in which Pan-Africanism was placed into praxis in governance, which
was the ultimate goal of the Pan-African movement. Examining Ghana as a continuation
of the Pan-African movement this dissertation uses an Afro-West Indian epistemological
standpoint and historical methods to conduct a socio-historical analysis of governance
and Pan-Africanism in Ghana. Using this Afro-West Indian epistemological standpoint,
Ghana’s nation-building process is examined through the perspectives and experiences of
these West Indian intellectual-activists recruited by Nkrumah to work in Ghana.
This West Indian epistemological framework builds upon James E. Turner’s
concept of Africana epistemological frameworks, which produces more accurate
findings, understandings, and conclusions about the socio-cultural and politico-economic
realities of African descended.38 Furthermore, Serie McDougal’s assumptions of the
Africana epistemological paradigm: the experiences of people of African descent are
worthy of study; African people have unique and distinctive cultural and historical
experiences; the best way to understand African people is from their own perspectives;
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people’s world views determine what constitutes a problem for them and how they
approach solving them; the fundamental substance of all reality is spirit; and that the
ultimate goal of Africana studies must be the empowerment and liberation of people of
African descent, are specifically applied to the experiences of West Indians working in
the Ghanaian government following independence.39 As such, this Afro-West Indian
epistemological frame of reference places the Afro-West Indian experience at the center
of this dissertation in order to conduct research that emanates from the perceptions and
experiences of the West Indian intellectual-activists being examined.
Methods:
Methodologically this dissertation merges three historiographies including
African History, Caribbean History, and the now robust historiography of Black
Internationalism. The African historiography is privileged because this project is a study
of West Indian intellectual-activists in Ghana’s independence and nation-building
process. These intellectuals, all from the British West Indies, are examined in the context
of their experiences in Ghana. Furthermore, while there is a strong political component
to the project, it is also a social history. The social history component is found in the
examination and analysis of the social factors behind many of the opinions, assumptions,
and worldviews that these intellectuals brought with them to Ghana. This includes the
socio-historical, political, and cultural contexts that influenced their own ideologies,
lifestyles, and decisions to travel to Ghana. Additionally, the socio-cultural conditions in
Ghanaian society that contributed to the assumptions, perspectives, and reactions of
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Ghanaians to the presence of these West Indians that emigrated to their nation are
analyzed.
The socio-historical approach to history requires the historian to situate his or her
findings in the larger global or social context, which in this study involves the use of a
number of theoretical positions to interpret social phenomena in Ghana including: PanAfricanism, Socialism, African Nationalism, Diaspora, and Ethnicity.40 This approach
necessitates both an inductive and deductive approach that shifts analysis from general
applications of established theories, to testing the validity, implementation, and
implications of these theories in the contexts of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, and these West
Indian intellectual-activists . Within the social history framework, it is necessary to
acquire sufficient and contextualized background information on the people or society
being studied. This dissertation does so by applying primarily archival methods for
collecting data.
Sources of Data:
This dissertation examines four different West Indian intellectual-activists –
George Padmore, W. Arthur Lewis, T. Ras Makonnen, and Jan Carew – who were
instrumental in the formation, maintenance, and legacy of Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana.
Each of these intellectuals was selected for the unique perspective and worldview that
they brought to Ghana. The diversity in their ideologies and contributions are essential to
this dissertation, as it stresses not only the unifying components of this group but also the
points at which they diverge. While they all came from the West Indies, studied abroad,
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and had their racial consciousnesses developed in the racialized social structures of the
United States and Britain, their roles, approaches, contributions to Ghana’s government
and Pan-African institutions were marked by their varying abilities. For example, there
was Padmore the ideological theoretician of Ghana’s political and economic
philosophies; Lewis the scholar of development economics and Economic Advisor to
Nkrumah; Makonnen the multitalented businessman and institution builder; and Carew
the artist, editor, and Advisor to Nkrumah’s Publicity Secretariat. These varying
perspectives and skillsets are used as entry points to analyze the influences, contributions,
and local interactions of these West Indian intellectual-activists in Ghana.
I draw data from primary and secondary documents. The primary sources consist
of first-hand accounts voiced in memoirs, oral histories, letters, treatises, newspapers,
magazines, speeches, government documents, novels, and poems. The secondary
documents for this project are derived from the historiography of studies of PanAfricanism, Black Internationalism, West African history, British Caribbean history, and
post-colonial literature.
Limitations:
The primary limitation that presents itself in this dissertation is the absence of the
contributions of West Indian intellectual-activist women, which necessitates the inclusion
of a gender analysis of Ghanaian society. While this reflects the nature of politics and
gender relations of the era, Black women from the West Indies, albeit not as intimately as
their male counterparts, were indeed influential on Nkrumah and contributors to the nationbuilding process in Ghana. Another limitation that manifests is a preoccupation with the
Accra Evening News, because of its significance to Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention
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People’s Party. Since the Evening News served as the mouthpiece of the Nkrumah
government, this dissertation draws more on its contents than any other state media press.
Finally, in this dissertation’s focuses on the West Indian experience in Ghana following
independence, another limitation arises in the lack of an in depth examination of the
colonialism in both the West Indies and Ghana, both of which would contribute to the
socialization and politicization of the West Indian intellectual-activists, Nkrumah, and the
oppositional forces in Ghana.
Chapter Outlines:
Since this dissertation is contributing to the discourse of Black Internationalism, it
is fitting that the study’s initial chapter begins in the African diaspora, specifically
London, England. This chapter explores the origins of the Pan-African movement as
well as the influence of West Indians on the concept, from coining the term to founding
the movement at the turn of the twentieth century. In addition to underscoring the
significance of the city of London to Pan-Africanism, the chapter also assesses the
multifaceted contributions of George Padmore, W. Arthur Lewis, and T. Ras Makonnen
to revitalizing the Pan-African movement following the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. The
chapter also introduces Kwame Nkrumah and examines his initial encounters with the
Pan-African movement at the Manchester 1945 Pan-African Congress, where African
independence became the primary objective of the movement.
George Padmore is the focus of the second chapter. It explores the formation of
his relationship with Nkrumah in London. After assessing Padmore’s reconciling of
socialism and Pan-Africanism, the chapter also examines the political education
Nkrumah received under the tutelage of Padmore before he returned to Gold Coast. The
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chapter also examines how Padmore advised Nkrumah as he secured independence and
continued to do so as Ghana’s Advisor to the Prime Minister on African Affairs. In
addition to helping formulate Ghana’s Pan-African Policy, the chapter explores
Padmore’s reception by the Ghanaian nationalists working in Nkrumah’s government,
where his status as a “non-African” is examined, alongside the competing notions of
diaspora, tribalism, and racial essentialism.
The third chapter provides a unique exploration of this era of Ghanaian history as
it examines the contributions of Noble Prize-winning economist, Sir W. Arthur Lewis.
First, Lewis’ origins in St. Lucia and his journey to becoming one of the premier scholars
of Development Economics in the 1950s are examined. Next, Lewis’ contributions to the
Pan-African movement through his work in the League of Coloured Peoples are detailed,
as both his activist work and his reputation in British academic circles made him a highly
sought after by Nkrumah. Lewis’ time as Nkrumah’s Chief Economic Advisor with also
be closely examined to demonstrate his extensive contributions to spurring economic
development and industrialization in Ghana. The chapter also highlights the deterioration
of Lewis’ relationship with Nkrumah as the economist’s pragmatism began to clash with
the vanity and economic gambles that Ghana’s Prime Minister chose to take to place
Ghana among the developed nations of the world. Furthermore, this chapter along with
Padmore’s are considerably longer than the others, as they examine their contributions
and influences on both pre and post-independence Ghana.
The fourth chapter explores the contributions of the British Guianese Pan-African
purist, T. Ras Makonnen. It first assesses Makonnen’s work in Britain, where he
demonstrated a distinguished business acumen and expertise in management. These
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skills, placed on display in the Pan-African movement, were later used by Nkrumah in
Ghana. In addition to highlighting the multitude of ways Makonnen contributed to
institution building and Nkrumah’s Pan-African Policy through the African Affairs
Centre, the chapter initiates an examination of Nkrumah’s consolidation of power with
himself as well as his efforts to implement socialism in Ghana, which Makonnen suggests
never fully took hold.
The final chapter focuses on the contributions and observations of the Ghanaian
society by Jan Carew in the final days of Nkrumah’s regime. After examining his PanAfrican activism and authorship in London, the chapter assesses Carew’s time as editor
of the African Review magazine, as well as his service as Advisor to the Publicity
Secretariat of the now recluse Nkrumah. Carew’s initial observations of Ghanaian society
serve as the foundation of the analysis of the discontent among the Ghanaian masses from
the nation’s worsening economic situation, corruption, disillusion with Ghana’s PanAfrican Policies, and Nkrumah’s despotic turn via authoritarian legislation. Finally, the
chapter explores the fall of Nkrumah, the direct causes of the military coup, as well as the
Pan-African efforts that facilitated Carew’s escape from military custody.
This dissertation demonstrates how Padmore, Lewis, Makonnen, and Carew
constituted the best of a generation of British West Indian intellectual-activists who
greatly influenced the trajectory of Kwame Nkrumah and Ghana. These intellectuals
serve as an entry point into interrogating the common understandings of the various
socio-historical conditions, political ideologies at work in Ghana, as well as their impact
on the Ghanaian masses and their implications for Ghana’s first republic. Emphasizing
the role of West Indian intellectual-activists in the advancement of Pan-Africanism as an
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ideology and movement in the interwar years, this dissertation it contends that West
Indians were essential to governance and the shaping of post-colonial Ghana, particularly
influencing the ideological and political trajectory of Kwame Nkrumah and the Ghanaian
Government; the design of Ghana’s economic development plans; the building of state
institutions in furtherance of Nkrumah’s Pan-African Policy; and Pan-African media
outlets. Furthermore, I argue that the influence and contributions of Padmore, Lewis,
Makonnen, and Carew to post-colonial Ghana exemplified the next phase of the PanAfrican movement as the ideology was placed into practice in governance and the
building process of a free African nation-state.
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LONDON, PAN-AFRICANISM, AND THE SEEDS OF INDEPENDENCE
Since its inception, London, the British imperial metropole, was not only the
center of colonial operations and the seat of power in the world but also the major site of
imperial protest for the colored and colonized regions of the world. As British colonial
subjects, many of these students began to migrate to London to continue their education.
In Britain their shared conditions as subjugated people politicized and radicalized many
of them. Ironically, as these colonial educated students, came to London to study
colonialism and gain the necessary skills to improve the living conditions in their
homelands, they also discovered the means to dismantle the colonial system all together.
As they explored the merits of Marxism and sought to reconcile their class analyses of
the colonial system with their racialized oppression, Pan-Africanism emerged as an
organizing principle and ideology to promote international cooperation, solidarity, unity
among African people. This chapter examines the intertwined histories of PanAfricanism and the city of London, and argues that the shared oppression of people of
African descent and the abandonment of Ethiopia in 1935, necessitated Pan-Africanism’s
use to mobilize, organize, and insert the voices of Black discontent into the political
discourse surrounding British colonialism. Also, through an examination of Black
protest in London during the early decades of the twentieth century, the chapter argues
that West Indians have always been at the fore leading, shaping, and directing the
trajectory of the Pan-African movement.
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Black Protest in the Imperial Metropole:
As a dominant world power in Europe during slavery and colonization, Britain –
and London in particular –maintained a special place as a prominent site for the
expression of African protest and discontent. In the eighteenth-century London witnessed
the early abolition efforts of the formerly enslaved Olaudah Equiano, and Ottobah
Cugoano’s Sons of Africa organization, which campaigned in 1780’s London for an end
to Britain’s participation in the trans-Atlantic trading of enslaved Africans. Shortly
thereafter, Britain exercised its power in dictating the flow of global commerce by
outlawing Trans-Atlantic slavery and began policing the Atlantic and the Indian oceans.
During this time, in London, a runaway slave from the British colony of Jamaica, named
Robert Wedderburn published The Horrors of Slavery. In his early nineteenth-century
text, Wedderburn exposed under-discussed brutal aspects of the institution of slavery
such as the rape of his mother, from which he was born, and the inhumane punishment
practiced in the West Indies. The wealth derived from the cruelties of slavery allowed the
British to dominate trade in West Africa, India, and the West Indies, leading to Britain’s
Industrial Revolution. Industrialization equipped the British with technology and
weaponry that significantly shifted its interactions and relationship with the African
continent, leading to its eventual colonization following the Berlin Conference of 1884.41
By the turn of the twentieth century, the numbers of people of African descent in
the British metropole steadily rose as West Indian and African students and seamen
began to pass through London on a regular basis.42 Having recently passed the bar
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examination, a Trinidadian barrister named Henry Sylvester Williams sought to continue
the legacy of Black protest in London. Inspired by T. Thomas Fortune’s suggestion that
“an association of the Africans and the descendants of Africa, from all parts of the world”
was necessary, Williams founded the African-Association in October 1897 with the aim
of encouraging unity amongst the African race and highlighting and informing public
opinion of the various injustices in Britain’s West Indian and African colonies.43
Concerned with the welfare of all people of African descent, Williams filled the
association's offices and committees with law students and lawyers from the West Indies
and Africa, and eventually gained the membership of prominent African Americans such
as Booker T. Washington. Shortly, thereafter a Pan-African Conference took place in
July 1900.44 At the conference discussions focused on slavery, colonialism, racism, and
reparations, which ultimately produced an “Address to the Nations of the World,” which
condemned all forms of racial oppression against people of African descent across the
globe.
The measures taken by Williams at the turn of the century served as defining
moments for the global struggle against racism and the European colonialism for two
reasons. First, Williams’ calling of the Pan-African Conference of 1900 is unquestionably
the formal beginning of the Pan-African movement and set the stage for London’s
continued significance as a space of African diaspora activism. Second, the formation of
the African Association to the deteriorating economic conditions in the West Indies and
the violence and racism of European colonialism in Africa, were indicative of how the
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Pan-African Movement would develop in the early twentieth century. Williams’ vast
network of West Indians in London and Paris aided in expanding the scope of the
budding Pan-African movement. This is perhaps best demonstrated in his relationships
with Haitian politicians Benito Sylvian and Antenor Firmin, who facilitated Williams’
correspondence with Booker T. Washington, who supported, assisted in organizing, and
promoted the Pan-African Conference in the United States.
In attendance at the 1900 conference was a young African American scholar
named W.E.B. Du Bois, who would go on to organize four Pan-African Congresses that
took place over the next two decades. While these congresses were accommodationist in
nature and ultimately ceremonial meetings of the educated elites of people of African
descent, Du Bois is recognized for revitalizing Pan-Africanism in the wake of the First
World War. This has caused many scholars to overlook the efforts of H. Sylvester
Williams and regard Du Bois as the “Father of Pan-Africanism.” As a result, the role of
African Americans as the driving force of Pan-Africanism is perhaps overstated in
scholarship and among historians of Black Internationalism discourse. What is clear is
that H. Sylvester Williams established Pan-Africanism as a recognizable term for the
consolidation of transnational networks for collective organizing for liberation endeavors
in the African Diaspora. Subsequently, Williams's efforts and example would be
continued and amplified three decades later by a generation of West Indian intellectualactivists in London, whose critical analysis, agitating, and advising would spark the final
assault of European colonialism and be vital wielding Pan-Africanism as an ideology for
nation-building.
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Following the decline of H. Sylvester Williams’ Pan-African Association shortly
after the 1900 conference, organizations like the African Progress Union and the National
Congress of British West Africa continued to advocate for the rights of Blacks in London
and the colonies.45 In the early twentieth century, there were very few blacks, especially
Black women, in London unless they were professionals, students, or dockworkers from
Africa and the West Indies. As the First World War brought more Black students,
laborers and military men to London, it necessitated political organization.46
Accordingly, London, where trans-Atlantic and imperial networks of people, ideas,
culture, and perspectives converged, quickly became a locus of Black resistance to
racism, colonialism, and empire. The result came in the concentration of Black
intellectuals and activists in London establishing several new organizations and
publications with the aim of serving the needs of people of African descent and to
pressure the British government to enact reforms in the colonies.
Along with the W.E.B. Du Bois-organized the Pan-African Congress movement,
the 1920s featured an unprecedented surge of Pan-African solidarity and organizing. This
era also witnessed the meteoric rise of Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement
Association (UNIA) which amassed the largest Black movement the world had ever
seen.47 By the 1930s, Blacks in Harlem were identifying with their counterparts in
London, Freetown, Havana, and Paris. This notion of Black experiences, cultures, and
identities transcending the national boundaries laid by European imperialism reflected a
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Pan-African consciousness among the Black masses. As a result, when Benito Mussolini
mounted an invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, Blacks in Africa, the United States, West
Indies, and London, despite their own meager circumstances during the Great
Depression, rallied to the aid of Ethiopia and wrote “the most glorious chapter the history
of pan-Africanism and international Black solidarity.”48
By the early 1930s the West African Student Union (WASU), League of
Coloured People (LCP), and the Negro Welfare Association (NWA) dominated the Black
political landscape in London. In 1925 Ladipo Solanke, a Nigerian law student, founded
WASU and established its own Wasu journal and the Aggrey African student hostel,
which housed the majority of African and West Indian students living in London at some
point in their studies. WASU served as a voice for anti-colonial opinions and protest in
London and had branches in Africa, Brazil, the West Indies, and the United States.
Although it was comprised primarily of African students, WASU was heavily influenced
by the Pan-Africanism emanating from the West Indies at the time, particularly that of
Marcus Garvey, who mentored the group early on, financed the launch of its journal, and
even transferred the lease on his London home to WASU when he left London in 1928.
Eventually, WASU became arguably the most important pressure group on African and
colonial issues in London. Such was the reach and influence of WASU in the late 1920s
that Amy Ashwood Garvey, regarded WASU and Solanke as the “successors of Mr.
Marcus Garvey.”49

48

Winston James. Holding Aloft the Banner Of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism In Early TwentiethCentury America. (London: Verso Books, 1998), 259.
49
Matera. Black London. (2015), 29.

36

Similarly, West Indian leadership manifested again in founding of the LCP n
1931 by Harold Moody, a Jamaican physician, and served as a militant organization of
Negro workers that highlighted colonial matters, and protested racism and the color bar in
the British metropole. While the LCP’s membership was not racial exclusive, including
white British and South Asian members, Moody maintained that it first and foremost
championed Black unity and concerned itself with advocating for people of African
descent around the world, particularly on issues of discrimination in housing and
employment, and the plight of the children of interracial working-class families in
Britain.50 Comprised of African and West Indian seamen based in London, The NWA
was founded in 1931 initially because of the British communist party’s failure to follow
the Communist International (Comintern) and the International Trade Union Committee
of Negro Workers’ (ITUCNW) initiatives to address the issue of anti-colonialism in
Africa and West Indies.51
Although its officers and constituents were overwhelmingly Black communists
from the West Indies, The NWA often collaborated with anti-colonial organizations in
West and East Africa. This trans-oceanic collaboration was the culmination of H.
Sylvester Williams’ work, as Pan-African networks in London and the empire were
solidified and transcended political ideologies. The converging political interests and
shared conditions of oppression of these West Indians and Africans ultimately led to the
membership of these organizations often overlapping in the early 1930s. They
exchanged their respective publications, as well as participated in each other's
conferences, protests, forums, and social events. While these organizations often had
50
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varying perspectives and ideologies (i.e. Communism, African Nationalism, or Colonial
Reformism) they shared similar political goals and there was a persistent presence of
West Indians among their leadership. As these trans-oceanic collaborations and networks
persisted through the early decades of the twentieth century, the rise of fascism in Europe
and an imminent Second World War were met by a Pan-African united front that had yet
to be seen in the Black liberation movement as the storied African nation of Ethiopia
encountered its greatest hour of need.
The Ethiopia Crisis Shifts Pan-Africanism to the Left
Ethiopia has maintained a special appeal to people of African descent and Europe.
Emperor Menelik II’s victory over of Italy’s initial invasion in 1896 with the Battle of
Adwa enriched the global interest as it established the nation a formidable independent
state and in that instance, dispelled the notion, at least for Ethiopia, of Africans being
barbarians and insignificant in matters of the modern world. Following the Battle of
Adwa, European nations rushed to sign trading treaties, offered aid to modernize the
nation, and Ethiopia went on to join the League of Nation shortly after its founding. For
people of African descent, Menelik’s victory over Italy fortified the collective fascination
of this storied African nation and its monarchy that had never been conquered in history.
Psalms 68:31: “Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands
unto God” was one of the most widely quoted Bible verses of in the African diaspora,
and the triumph of this biblical Africa nation, assured the validity of this biblical
prophecy. In the 1930s interest in Ethiopia was revived when Haile Selassie I was
crowned Emperor and “King of Kings of Ethiopia.” The lavish coronation received
international acclaim and was attended by royals and dignitaries from across the globe.
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For people of African descent, the coronation of an African monarch that traced his
lineage back to Solomon spurred the Rastafari movement in Jamaica and reinforced the
legitimacy of the nation’s past veneration in the Ethiopianism movement and the rituals
and cultural performances of the UNIA. Indeed, Ethiopia symbolized the pinnacle of
African independence and resistance to European imperialism.52
In the early twentieth century, Ethiopia was a source of hope and inspiration for
several radical Black Nationalist, Pan-African, and African Nationalist movements
seeking an end to colonialism, and racial oppression experienced by people of African
descent. The invasion of Africa’s last independent nation by Mussolini’s fascist Italian
regime Africans incited an emotional reaction of distress among people of African
descent around the world. Mussolini’s invasion and eventual occupation of Ethiopia in
1935 represented the completion of Europe’s conquest of Africa. Italy’s fascist invasion
and occupation of Ethiopia brought the last stronghold of independence in Africa alone to
face: the use of mustard gas, the bombing of Red Cross hospitals and ambulances, the
execution of captured prisoners without trial, the Graziani massacre, the killings at Däbrä
Libanos monastery, and the shooting of “witch-doctors” accused of prophesying the end
of fascist rule.53
The inaction of the League communicated to people of African descendent that
they alone would have to stand with and if possible fight alongside their Ethiopian
brothers and sisters in the war against Italy. In the United States, African Americans
were eager to travel to Ethiopia to join their Africa brothers in the war against Mussolini
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and fascism. In the West Indies, riots broke out in the British colony of St. Kitts.
Africans on the continent and in the diaspora witnessed Ethiopia, a member of the
League of Nations, subjected to failed toothless sanctions imposed on Italy by the
League; the Hoare-Laval compromise that would claim Ethiopia as an Italian colony; and
Britain’s recognition of Italy’s conquest in May of 1936.54
As the European powers united in their inaction against Italy, this display of PanEuropeanism was interpreted by Black peoples as a concerted attack against Blacks
everywhere. In London, where the color bar had relegated blacks to second class citizens,
Africans and West Indians looked on as Europe and the rest of the world allowed the
sovereign nation of Ethiopia to be conquered. With the credibility of the League of
Nations in question and a new world war approaching, growing unrest occurred
throughout the colonies. Mussolini’s invasion pushed Africa to the forefront of all
political debate in Britain. Passing through London in 1935 on his way to study in the
United States, a young Kwame Nkrumah, future Prime Minister of Ghana and largest
proponent of Pan-Africanism in the post-war years, saw a newspaper announcing,
“MUSSOLINI INVADES ETHIOPIA,” and remembers that it felt “as if the whole of
London had declared war on me personally.”55 Little did he know that during his time in
the United States his future friends, mentors, and advisors were mobilizing black political
organizations in London for a Pan-African united front to support Ethiopia and eventually
against the colonialism structure as a whole.
Revitalization and Rebirth:
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The crisis in Ethiopia along with the ensuing Second World War proved to sever
the relationship between many Black Marxists and the Comintern, as the Soviet Union’s
foreign policy began to reflect the insincerity of appeals to the Black workers of the
world. For many Black Marxists, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was the turning
point that ended their involvement with the Communist movement. Five years later, the
ultimate betrayal of Communism came in the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939, which led
several Black Marxist intellectuals to experience great intellectual turmoil causing them
to re-examine the fundamental Marxist texts and the formulations of theories.56
Cedric Robinson suggests that Black Marxist intellectuals viewed fascism as a
blood relative of slavery and imperialism, which were all global systems rooted in
capitalist economies and racist ideologies.57 Soviet Russia’s failing to aid Ethiopia
pushed many Black communists beyond the ideas of Marx and Lenin toward a deeper
analysis of the colonial power structure and methods for global black resistance. In the
end, the contradictions exhibited by Russia’s foreign policy could not be forgiven by
many Black radicals. Many Black Marxists refused to trade their British or French
colonial masters for Russian ones. Instead they turned their focus completely to the issues
of African peoples and an embracing of Pan-Africanism. This shift away from
communism led to a large influence of communist principles on Pan-Africanism that
marked a new era of the Pan-African movement.
Among these Black Marxists was the prominent Trinidadian journalist and
“ideological commissar of Black radicalism,” George Padmore. Padmore formally ended
his service with the Communist International in 1934, and he found himself in London
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where he quickly involved in local politics. Speaking at a political meeting in Gray’s Inn
Road, Padmore made an unlikely encounter with an old friend, C.L.R. James. Now
regarded as the magisterial, world-historical intellectual of the twentieth century
anglophone Caribbean,58 James attended the event at Gray’s Inn Road only to find that
Padmore was his friend from Trinidad, Malcolm Nurse. By this time, James had been
living in London for three years and had become a prominent speaker on the global Black
condition and an outspoken leader of the emerging Trotskyist movement among
communists in Britain.
In 1935, as head of the Finchley/Hampstead branch of the International Labour
Party, James traveled the British Isles appealing to the workers of Europe to rally behind
the Black population of Ethiopia. He found that British socialists were spilt on the issue
of Ethiopia. Part of the ILP leadership opposed direct action in support of Ethiopia
because the cause was not socialist but rather a nationalist issue. On the other hand, some
believed that promoting working-class sanctions would cultivate a psychology of war
against fascist Italy. Neither of these approaches centralized Ethiopia nor the issue of
race to directly support of the plight of Ethiopia. James had already been at odds with the
British left, as many British socialists had begun advocating for an internationalization of
the colonial administration or an inter-imperialism to ease competition for resources and
territory between the major powers of Europe. These proposals, like the Berlin
Conference of 1884, were tantamount to an internationally coordinated form of
imperialism and ratification of the color line on a global level.
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This “collective imperialism,” according to Matera, demonstrated a widening gap
between British communists and socialists, who “attributed war and economic
exploitation to capitalism, of which imperialism was but an epiphenomenon,” and the
Black intellectuals in the British metropoles who centralized imperialism as “the driving
force behind an increasingly monopolistic form of capitalism and the most resolute
barrier to cross-cultural cooperation and socialism.”59 It was apparent that the major
European nations, as well as European communists and socialists, were willing to
sacrifice Ethiopia and possessed very little interest in confronting colonialism. As
European communists and socialists abandoned anti-imperialism for anti-fascism, Black
intellectual-activists argued that anti-imperialism was inextricably linked to anti-fascism.
For James, a universal intellectual whose social analysis was driven by the constraints
imposed by both racial and capitalist structures, the Ethiopia Crisis and the turmoil within
communist circles left him to conclude that “Africans must win their own freedom, [and]
Nobody will win it for them.”60
As a result, in July 1935 James enlisted Padmore to help revitalize the PanAfrican movement with the formation of the International African Friends of Abyssinia
(IAFA) “to assist by all means in their power in the maintenance of territorial integrity
and political independence of Abyssinia.”61 With two West Indians forming the IAFA
leadership, their use of the term “African” in the organization’s name reflected the
organizations (and their own) commitment to Pan-Africanism and the centralizing of
Africa in their identity. While Africans such as Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya) and Mohammed
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Said (Somalia) were among the IAFA’s initial members, the rest of leadership was
overwhelmingly West Indian, with James as chairman, T. Albert Marryshaw from
Grenada as vice-chairmen, Amy Ashwood Garvey as treasurer, and finally Padmore and
the Guyanese entrepreneur Ras Makonnen completing the executive committee. An old
friend of Padmore’s from his time as a student at Howard University, Makonnen had
recently arrived in London after being deported from Denmark for his own outspoken
views. Unimpressed with the existing African and West Indian political organizations in
London, describing them as “very mild,” Makonnen and the IAFA formed a new cohort
of Black intellectual-activists that quickly called for a Black united front among
organizations in Britain.
Once again, London had become an epicenter for anti-colonial and anti-fascism
for British colonial subjects as it had for H. Sylvester Williams and the African
Association in 1897. Britain was, according to Makonnen, “really in ferment – seething,
in fact, like an African pot.”62 In London, the British commitment to individual liberties
allowed African and West Indian intellectual-activists to enjoy a freedom of expression
unavailable in the colonials. As a result, they were able to form radical organizations in
Britain, which were regularly ignored by authorities. Such freedoms of speech,
organizing, and agitation were unthinkable in the colonies, where authorities regularly
violently repressed radicalism and resistance in any form. As more African and West
Indian students, intellectuals, activists, and artists from Africa and the West Indies passed
through or settled in London, the emergence of London’s Black neighborhood of Soho
with its jazz clubs, restaurants, and lounges became an important site for Pan-African
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activity. African American musicians jammed with Black London house bands, songs
supporting anti-imperialist movements were performed, and transatlantic networks were
formed. It was mostly here that African and West Indian students, intellectuals, and
activists debated the issues of the day and forged political alliances.
This new Pan-African locale proved vital to the IAFA, as it established its
headquarters at Amy Ashwood Garvey’s International Afro Restaurant on New Oxford
Street. Not only did Ashwood Garvey’s establishment serve as a formal space for
organizing and planning for the IAFA, it also reflected the linkages to and ideological
continuation of the Pan-Africanism heralded by the Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro
Improvement Association. From its inception, the IAFA pledged to support the Ethiopian
to maintain its independence, denounced Mussolini’s fascism and demanded that the
League of Nations intervene. Marking a sharp departure from the reformism of Dubois’
1920’s Pan-Africanism, the radicalism of the IAFA and its members called “upon all
Africans and people of African descent all over the world to…pledge themselves to assist
Abyssinia in her struggle by all means at their disposal.”63 According to James, we
“wanted to form a military organization which would go to fight with the Abyssinians
against the Italians.”64 While Ethiopian representatives in London dissuaded them from
military action, the IAFA spearheaded a “Hands Off Abyssinia” movement in London,
that propelled a spike in radicalism and Black political organizing. The crisis in Ethiopia
pushed Black consciousness in London towards Africa, and united Africans and West
Indians “against what they saw as the common front of imperialism.”65
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By the fall of 1935, Ethiopia became a rallying point in London as the renamed
International African Friends of Ethiopia (IAFE) regularly partnered with the WASU, the
LCP, and the NWA. Just as membership of these preexisting Black organizations
regularly overlapped, Padmore, Makonnen, and Kenyatta were known to frequent LCP
meetings and the WASU’s Aggrey House to recruit African and West Indian students for
membership. Such cooperation came to a head when the IAFE, WASU, LCP, The Somali
Association, and NWA that welcomed the exiled Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I to
London in 1936. While Selassie was cool on the idea of Pan-Africanism, by contending
that Ethiopians were a “mixed Hamito-Semitic people” and not “Negros,” this moment of
Pan-African unity in London should be regarded as the forming of that Black united front
that Makonnen had been calling for.66 Beyond this instance, these organizations
collaborated regularly, speaking at each other’s rallies and publishing articles in each
other’s journals. After African American scholar Ralph Bunche declined to speak at an
LCP fundraiser for Ethiopian refugees, Padmore assumed the responsibility in his place
and presided over the event. Writing in the LCP’s journal, The Keys, James attributed the
rise in radicalism among British colonial subjects to the betrayal of Ethiopia stating:
“Africans and people of African descent, especially those who have been poisoned by
British Imperialist education needed a lesson,” and in the Ethiopia Crisis “They got it.”67
Ultimately, the Ethiopia crisis led to further radicalization among these
organizations and its members. For many of these organizations Mussolini’s invasion
was tantamount to a racial war and led to them openly criticizing the hollowness of
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Britain’s diplomatic maneuvering. The Italian invasion and Britain’s lack of response to
it, exposed the illegitimacy of British colonial rule as well as the moral and spiritual
bankruptcy of West Civilization. Sharing these sentiments was the seemingly
conservative, St. Lucian economist W. Arthur Lewis, who had risen through the ranks of
experts on colonial economics in Britain. Lewis, a Fabian socialist and long-time
member of the moderate LCP, also joined the IAFA and noted that Britain’s perceived
appeasement and collusion with Italy’s invasion had destroyed “faith in white
government, and to make them more willing to take their fate in their own hands.”68 As a
result of the lessons from the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the toothless response by
the League of Nations, the Pan-African politics of African and West Indians in London
now became fixated not on reforming the colonial system but rather solely on bringing
about its destruction.
Pan-Africanism as an Anti-Colonial Movement:
The Ethiopia Crisis united several organizations in Britain; however, like this
moment in history, the IAFE did not last for long. Like the Pan-Association decades
earlier, the IAFE dissolved due to internal disagreements that ultimately resulted in
C.L.R.’ James’ resignation from its ranks. Police reports from late 1935 suggest that
simultaneous to James's departure, Padmore began forming a new organization called
either the Pan-African Brotherhood or the Pan-Afro League.69 This organization
eventually came to be known as the Pan-African Federation for the Defence of Africans
and People of African Descent. Although members of the IAFE provided a seamless
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transition by quickly joining Padmore’s organization, the Pan-African Federation (PAF)
struggled financially and achieved very little at this moment in time. At a PAF meeting
in April 1937, they discussed the necessity of an African Bureau and Journal for
exchanging information regarding African problems and African liberation.
Padmore, James, Jomo Kenyatta, and Sierra Leonean trade unionist, I.T.A.
Wallace-Johnson, who had collaborated and frequently corresponded with Padmore
during his time in the Comintern, were elected to a planning committee. The result was
the formation of a new groups called the International African Service Bureau (ISAB),
which quickly stocked its leadership with Padmore as its chairman, Wallace-Johnson as
general-secretary, Makonnen as fundraiser and treasurer, and Kenyatta and Amy
Ashwood Garvey in leadership roles. C.L.R. James also came on board as editorial
director of the IASB’s publications the African and the World, the African Sentinel, and
the International African Opinion.70 W. Arthur Lewis, although still a graduate student at
the London School of Economics also advised the IASB on matters of colonial
economics. James suggests that the IASB was assembled able to operate on such a large
scale primarily because of “Padmore’s encyclopedic knowledge of Africa, of African
politics and African personalities, [and] his tireless correspondence with Africans in all
parts of the continent.”71
While the IASB emphasized the duplicity and savagery of European imperialism
and grew directly from the Ethiopian crisis, its interests and concerns applied to the
broader African world. The collective outrage and protests in response to Ethiopia
demonstrated the necessity of strengthening these trans-oceanic networks and optimizing
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the flow of information on current events in Africa and the diaspora. As such, the
organization’s purpose, according to James, was to assist “by all means in our power the
uncoordinated struggle of Africans and the people of African descent against the
oppression from which they suffer in every country.”72 Reflecting on the recent turn
towards Africa within Black activism, the predominantly West Indian organization
fashioned itself as African to solidify their Pan-African identity.
This Pan-African identity transcended national borders and ethnic divisions in
favor of a racial essentialism sustained by the ongoing oppression and
disenfranchisement derived from the colonial system. The focus for the bureau,
according to Makonnen who also wrote the organization’s constitution, was to stress
cooperation and “to emphasize service to people of African descent in as many ways as
possible – education economic co-operative and political.”73 Imperative to this was the
bureau’s ability to link the struggles taking place in Britain’s “tropical empire” – a term
to encompass British colonization in Africa and the West Indies (as opposed to nonBlack colonies and dominions like Canada, Australia, India, Hong Kong?)– in order to
create a viable analytical framework for a collective stream of Pan-African
consciousness.
Living up to its motto of “EDUCATE – CO-OPERATE – EMANCIPATE:
Neutral in nothing affecting the African Peoples,” the IASB’s became a Pan-African
institution dedicated to collecting and disseminating information about the struggles of
the African Diaspora across the globe. In an advertisement appearing in the leftist
journal Fact, the IASB billed itself as “primarily an African organization, run by
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Africans…[that] serves as a clearinghouse of information” on matters affecting people of
African descent. It supplied speakers to organizations, convened meetings and
discussions, published pamphlets, books, and memoranda “anti-imperialist in character
and outlook.”74 A decade earlier, Marcus Garvey’s The Negro World newspaper served a
similar purpose in keeping the African world informed on current events in the West
Indies, Africa, and even the local intra-racial squabbles in Harlem. The IASB found
itself building upon this legacy of service to African people as it filled the void left by the
decline of Garvey and his UNIA. Whether deliberate or not, the West Indian street
corner orator tradition of the 1910s and 1920s Harlem was invoked by Padmore, James,
and Makonnen, who were all known to frequently address audiences at Hyde’s Park and
Trafalgar Square. In these public speeches the London public witnessed Padmore now an
anti-Russian Pan-African socialist, James the Marxist theorist, and “the unconquerable”
Makonnen known to begin his speeches by brazenly calling for “war” because was “the
only way we are going to get our rights.”75
While the IASB was internationalist and socialist in scope, it distinguished itself
from the rest of the European left by contending that among all people of African descent
possessed “a common bond of oppression, and as the Ethiopian struggle has shown, all
Negroes everywhere are beginning to see the necessity for international organization and
the unification of their scattered efforts.”76 The bureau’s demonstrations, lectures,
publications, and forums were geared towards Black workers as they highlighted trade
union strikes in the West Indies, cocoa planters boycotts in Nigeria and Gold Coast, and
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protested repressive legislation as well as the confiscation of progressive literature that
had been rampant in the colonies for decades. Despite Makonnen’s fervent opposition to
communism, the IASB attracted several young Black intellectuals in Britain who held
Marxist values. The leftist members of the IASB, who also held positions in nationalist
and labor movements throughout African and the Diaspora, such as Coloured Workers
Association; the All-Seamen's Union in Sierra Leone; The Kikuyu Central Association in
Kenya, became familiar with ideals of Pan-Africanism through the bureau’s study
groups. Although the IASB’s communist rhetoric at times strained its working
relationships with other Black organizations in London, they were usually able to
reconcile their differences and agree on the necessity of equality and self-determination
for all colonial people.
Such was the case in the spring of 1938 when the IASB collaborated with the
LCP and NWA to protest the British Parliament and the Colonial Office for their
handling of recent strikes, mass protests, and police brutality in Trinidad, Jamaica, and
Barbados. Due to the IASB’s past demonstrations in support of the cocoa strikes in the
Gold Coast and British Colonial Office feared that worker unrest in the West Indies could
eventually spread to Africa. Seizing upon the situation, the IABS printed a pamphlet
entitled The West Indies Today, in which they advised the dockworkers and oil and sugar
plantation workers to build up powerful trade unions and urged the worker to realize that
their economic struggles could not be divorced from their political aspirations.77
The bureau labeled the conditions surrounding and British response to the strikes
in the West Indies as “Colonial Fascism,” and considered the situation to be a clear
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“warning against future occurrences of a similar in nature in any other section of the
Colonial Empire.”78 Following a protest, the IASB’s executive committee passed a
resolution demanding the immediate release of incarcerated labor organizers in the West
Indies, and colonial reforms in the form of land settlement schemes, improved housing,
banning of child labor, and above all, a fully democratic constitution. These demands,
along with similar resolutions from the LCP, led to Parliament to form a West Indian
Royal Commission to investigate the economic and social causes of the disturbances in
the West Indies. This was due to the disturbances and unrest in the tropical colonies
seemingly making their way to London, where the IASB was not only radicalizing the
Black population but also gaining sympathizers in white leftist organizations and colonial
subjects from India and Asian nations, with their own colonial experiences.
As the Commission readied its investigation, the IASB, NWA, and the LCP
presented it with a memorandum on the “economic, political, and social conditions in the
West Indies.” More specifically the groups demanded the rescinding of all sedition
ordinances as well as the right to form trade unions, a ten million dollar housing scheme,
free primary and secondary education and the establishment of a West Indian university,
removal of racial discrimination in the colonial civil service, and various of social welfare
measures.79 Co-authored by a joint committee of the three organization that included
Padmore, James, Lewis, and Makonnen, the report connected the current disturbances in
the West Indies to outrage prompted by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia suggesting that
“when the rape of Ethiopia has given a great stimulus to growing Negro consciousness, it
is not a question of rebellions if, but rebellions unless, democratic government is
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granted.”80 Makonnen contended that if there was going to be a commission
investigating the trade union conditions in the West Indies “we were determined to
submit a manifesto…that did not restrict itself to one small fragment, but showed what
was happening in West Africa as much in the West Indies.”81 This memorandum
reflected the centrality of print culture within Pan-African activity in London, as well as
how imperative it was for the intellectual and organizational groundwork taking place in
Europe to be linked to the radical and grassroots movements taking shape in the colonies.
Padmore, Makonnen, and Lewis were outspoken in London print media,
conferences, demonstrations, and their own texts highlighting the failures of colonial
economic policy, the fascism of the colonial administrations, and the illegitimacy of
British rule in Africa and the West Indies. In a September 1938 pamphlet printed by the
IABS, entitled Europe’s Difficulty Is Africa’s Opportunity, the bureau called upon people
of African descent across the world “to organize yourselves and be ready to seize the
opportunity when it comes.”82 The time would soon come as a trans-Atlantic print
culture in the form of books, pamphlets, and journal publications, especially the
emanating from London served to link the imperial and trans-Atlantic networks, thus
realizing the IASB’s aim of serving as an information dissemination bureau.83
James left the IASB in late 1938 when he left London to join the social struggle in
the United States. While the bureau had lost its chief theoretician, the IASB pressed on
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and eventually became the pivotal link between all the Black organizations in Britain. In
the early 1940s Padmore and the bureau linked the current crusade against Hitlerism with
colonial freedom. Advocating for self-determination, freedom, and equality as
inalienable rights of all people “regardless of the stage of their social and cultural
development,” the bureau seemingly anticipated the Atlantic Charter. As IASB, LCP,
and WASU members increasingly attended each other’s meetings and demonstrations,
published one another’s journals, and planned international conferences for Black
organizations, an overarching organization for the Black organization of the British
empire to voice their collective demands and initiatives was deemed necessary.
As a result, in 1944 Padmore dissolved the IASB in order to rehabilitate the PanAfrican Federation and to organize the Manchester Pan-African Congress. Continuing the
Pan-African movement started by H. Sylvester Williams, the Pan-African Federation’s
main objectives were: To promote the well-being and unity of African peoples and
people of African descent throughout the world; To demand self-determination and
independence of African peoples; The total abolition of all forms of racial discrimination;
and To strive to co-operate between African peoples and others who share our
aspirations.84 Furthermore, this pairing of Pan-African objectives with the trade union
and colonial nationalist movement connections of its members proved central to the PanAfrican Federation’s organizing of the Manchester Pan-African Conference of 1945. In
addition to the hostilities and Black outrage spurred by Italy’s fascist invasion of Africa,
the British government’s weakening grip on its colonies, and a war-torn London, the
result of the ensuing second world war, Britain was left still to reckon with the fact, as
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James later stated: “the black-intellectuals had not only arrived but were significant
arrivals.”85
Black in the Home of Empire
In addition to the radical intellectual-activists like Padmore, James, and
Makonnen, the 1930s saw the arrival of African and West Indian students entering British
universities, where they challenged and drove change in the fields of history, economics,
the social organization of colonial societies. Upon their arrivals in London, many of
these black students, who may have initially thought of themselves as “British
intellectuals,” quickly came to see themselves as members of a global black community.
Over time, their endeavors took on a Pan-African character that tended to transcend their
own initial personal aspirations. Among them were W. Arthur Lewis, Eric Williams,
Jomo Kenyatta, Peter Mbiyu, Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikwe, and Kofi Busia. Like
the Pan-Africanists of the previous three decades, these students formed a new educated
elite.
The influence of radical organic intellectuals and activists like Padmore, James,
and Makonnen, however, was able to temper elitism and mentor this next generation of
Pan-Africanists. Together, they engaged in debates that considered the real-world
applications of the theories broached in academic spaces as well as Pan-Africanism itself.
Often the products of British colonial educations, these Africans and Caribbean students
in London often studying law, medicine, or anthropology transcended the barriers of the
academy to critique and build upon the social analyses and philosophies surrounding
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colonialism, socialism, and freedom to create material demands for independence from
the British Empire.
As the political demands of African and West Indians were intensified in the
1930s, so too was the research of Black intellectual activists with perspectives that
criticized and advanced the often narrow and mediocre scholarships directing colonial
studies scholars of the time. Often the products of British colonial educations, these
Africans and West Indian students in London often studying law, medicine, or
anthropology would transcend the barriers of the academy to critique and build upon the
social analyses and philosophies surrounding colonialism, socialism, and freedom to
create material demands for independence from the British Empire. Accordingly, as the
political demands of African and West Indians swelled in the 1930s, so too did the desire
for intellectual-activists with perspectives that criticized and advanced the often narrow
and mediocre scholarships directing colonial studies scholars of the time.
As a result, a colonial Black intelligentsia was cultivated via this network.
Together, they pressured the British government and academy for substantive reform and
contributed to the scholarship concerning colonial affairs and the conditions throughout
the colonies. Forming the basis of a new class of nationalists/anti-colonial intellectualactivists, many of these students leaped at the opportunity to contribute to and eventually
dominate “an expert community which might better guide colonial policy.”86 Already
engaging in rigorous public debates on the future of the colonies and of British
colonialism, many of the free-flowing ideas exchanged in these Black activist spaces
subsequently entered the British academy. By the nature of their colonial upbringings,
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encounters with the British color bar, and vibrant political scene in London, these African
and West Indian scholars found themselves at the forefront of the drive to expand the
field of colonial studies.
Eventually, changes came in the form of new lectureships, courses, curriculum,
and professorships with the purpose of driving intellectual engagement of colonial
reform. The expertise required in these academic settings equipped these Black
intellectuals with the theoretical tools and perspectives that informed their political
claims and demands. Ironically, this generation colonial educated students, many future
leaders of independent Black nations, came to the capital of the British empire to study
colonialism and discovered the means to dismantle it. For many of them, there was a
constant struggle to present their research as scientific studies as opposed to anti-imperial
propaganda. Although many like Eric Williams (The Williams Thesis), Jomo Kenyatta
(Facing Mount Kenya), and W. Arthur Lewis (The Duel-Sector Model) persisted and
thrived in academic settings, others of this generation like Kwame Nkrumah found their
calling not in their scholarship but in their activism.

Nkrumah Enters the Movement
Arriving in Liverpool in the fall of 1945, Nkrumah was a student from the Gold
Coast who had recently completed his studies at Lincoln University. Meeting him at the
Euston Station was nonother than George Padmore. Although the two had never met in
person, Padmore held a letter from his old friend, C.L.R. James, who wrote him a letter of
introduction to a young African student named Francis Nkrumah. According to James,
the student was not overly impressive, nor were there any expectations for him, but James
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asked Padmore to do what he could for him in London.87 Now going by Kwame, he
arrived with the intention of becoming a barrister or enrolling at the London School of
Economics for a Ph.D. in Anthropology with a dissertation topic focusing on
“Knowledge and Logical Positivism;” however, this would not last long as Nkrumah
quickly fell under the mentorship and tutelage of Padmore. It made sense that James sent
Nkrumah to Padmore, as he was a seasoned organizer and agitator in Pan-African and
socialist networks throughout London and the world. Upon meeting him, Padmore took
Nkrumah not to eat or to the WASU hostel where he found him lodging, but to a railroad
union meeting to introduce him to the members of the Pan-African Federation. Operating
in activist settings was not new to Nkrumah.
Nkrumah’s studies in religion and philosophy at Lincoln University were
accompanied by his discussions of radical socialism, imperialism, and colonialism from
CLR James. The two men met in 1941 and in two years developed a student/teacher
relationship that would last for decades. It was through James, according to Nkrumah,
that he “learned to how an underground movement worked.”88 Already one of the
foremost Black Marxist theorists and scholars of the era, James took Nkrumah under his
wing and introduced him to the radical Pan-African and socialist network of activistsorganizers in Harlem and Philadelphia. According to James, all who met Nkrumah were
struck with his intellectual energy and acuteness, as well as his capacity to very quickly
establish good relations in whatever company he found himself.89

87

Marika Sherwood. Kwame Nkrumah: The Years Abroad 1935-1947. (Legon, Accra, Ghana:
Freedom Publications, 1996), 114.
88
Kwame Nkrumah. Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. (New York: Nelson, 1957), 44.
89
C.L.R. James, “Homage to Kwame Nkrumah.” Monthly Report: The Institute of Black World., Dabu
Gizenga Collection On Kwame Nkrumah, box. 128-19, folder. 416.

58

Recalling this time, Nkrumah stated: “I made time to acquaint myself with as
many political organizations in the United States as I could. These included the
Republicans, the Democrats, the Communists, and the Trotskyites.”90 Nkrumah’s aim
was to learn the techniques and strategies of the organization for his eventual return home
to the Gold Coast, which led to him to establish bonds with the likes of anti-colonial
activists like Nnamdi Azikwe and Claudia Jones. Although he rarely formally joined
organizations, Nkrumah regularly attended meetings with organizations of the Council on
Affairs, the Committee on Africa, the Ethiopian Students Association, NAACP, the
Committee on African Students, and the UNIA. By the later 1930s, Nkrumah was
already a socialist and reading Marx, Engels, and Lenin for answers to the colonial
question and the problem of imperialism. But Nkrumah admitted that while their
philosophies sparked his revolutionary ideas and activities, the book that did more than
any other to fire his enthusiasm was Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey. While
Nkrumah’s ideals of African Nationalism were heavily influenced by his former teacher
James Aggrey, it was his introduction to Marcus Garvey’s philosophy of “Africa for the
Africans” that had the most profound influence on the centrality of Africa in the Black
freedom struggle as well as his aspirations for an independent United States of Africa.91
Nkrumah and the West Indian Influence:
The West Indian community had a profound influence on Nkrumah from the
moment he arrived in the United States. As a student at Lincoln, Nkrumah spent his
summers in Harlem, where he lived with West Indian families and had a West Indian
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girlfriend. Through his girlfriend, Edith, and his mentor CLR James, Nkrumah found
himself immersed in West Indian social and political circles. Though he never danced at
parties, he regularly attended West Indian social events here he would opt to converse on
the struggle for independence in Africa. In addition to this, he regularly attended
meetings of the Blyden Society, the UNIA, and the West Indian National Council. What
all of these organizations have in common is that they were all West Indian oriented
social and political organizations that were concerned with the welfare of all blacks in
America.
If one were to operate in any political capacity in Harlem at this time, they would
have to engage the strong West Indian community that had been putting down roots there
for decades. By the 1930s, a third of the Black professionals and nearly a fifth of
Manhattan’s Black population were foreign-born and there were thirty West Indian
mutual aid/benefit associations, as well as several social, literary, and sports clubs.92 As
such, Nkrumah’s time in Harlem, which coincided with the street corner orator culture
that featured regular addresses from Richard B. Moore, Cyril Briggs, Marcus Garvey, and
even Padmore. This setting profoundly shaped Nkrumah’s views on Pan-Africanism,
anti-colonialism, race, and nationalism prior to his journey to London.
What is clear is that Nkrumah’s connections in the West Indian community in
Harlem, particularly CLR James, were directly responsible for his entry into the PanAfrican movement in London. Had it not been for James’ vast network, Nkrumah’s
transition to activist circles in London may not have been so smooth. Writing to Padmore
in 1945, CLR James stated that: “George, this young man is coming to you. He is not
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very bright, but nevertheless, do what you can for him because he’s determined to throw
Europeans out of Africa.”93 James recognized that while Nkrumah had a flair for
applying Lenin’s ideas on imperialism to his Pan-African sentiments, he still had much to
learn. Thus, James presumably hoped Padmore was the ideal person for James to send
him to, as his experiences as a journalist, organizer, and his interactions with the Soviet
Union provided him with a network of global Africa and understanding of socialism that
was unparalleled at the time. This was to be one of the great political associations of the
twentieth century, as few at this time could have guided Nkrumah’s political
development better than Padmore.
In London, Padmore had arranged for Nkrumah, like most African students in
London at the time, to stay at the West African Student Union (WASU) Hostel until he
found permanent lodging. For a Black person in war-damaged London, finding
permanent housing accommodation was no easy task. Nkrumah eventually found
accommodation in the Tufnell Park area of northwestern London, which was about one
mile from Padmore’s flat in the Primrose Hill Garden neighborhood. It was in Padmore’s
small kitchen that Nkrumah refined his analysis of colonialism and imperialism and
received the education on the practical side of mass organizing that would prepare him to
achieve his aspirations for independence in the Gold Coast. Spending “much time” sitting
at Padmore’s “wooden table completely covered by papers,” Nkrumah discussed politics,
strategy, and tested the strength of his ideological positions with Padmore as well as
Padmore associates passing through or living in London at the time.94
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Among these thinkers was Padmore’s close friend and now General Secretary of
the Pan-African Federation, T. Ras Makonnen. Nkrumah, now withdrawn from his
anthropology program and pursuing a law degree, was actively discouraged from his
academic pursuits. According to Makonnen, “we pooh-poohed the idea” of Nkrumah
becoming a barrister. He further adds, “being a rebel was as good a profession as
any…Lawyers take a constitutional approach… when one met him [Nkrumah], one could
see that he would become some kind of leader; he had the mark on him.”95 This advice
was pivotal to Nkrumah’s development as he later discovered, upon his return to Ghana,
that anti-colonial movements needed fulltime organizers that were free able to devote all
of their time to mobilizing the people and securing independence. Furthermore, this
same acute charisma, intellectual energy, and charm noticed by C.L.R. James in
Nkrumah, quickly became evident, as his relationship Padmore’s provided a seamless
transition into the activist network in London and facilitated Nkrumah’s mainstream
introduction to the Pan-African movement.
Inspired by those like Garvey, Padmore, James, and Makonnen before him,
Nkrumah initially intended to use his time in London to start a “fearless and militant
newspaper” for the Gold Coast, that would promote African nationalism and
revolutionize journalism in West Africa.96 However, by August of 1945, Nkrumah found
himself “involved in manifold activities,” such as participating in demonstrations and
meetings called by WASU and PAF, addressing meetings of the Coloured Workers
Association, and using his position as regional organizer of the Pan-African Congress to
introduce himself to the prominent the Gold Coast nationalists of the time. Within the
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year Nkrumah served as Vice-President of WASU, Secretary-General of the West
African National Secretariat, and had already started his own “secret society,” called The
Circle.97
Among the many young African and West Indian student activists in London,
Nkrumah must have stood out, as he was named Regional Secretary of Pan-African
Federation shortly after he arrived in London. Serving in this capacity, Nkrumah was
immediately brought on by Padmore to aid in organizing the Pan-African Congress in
Manchester, which was set to take place just four months after Nkrumah’s arrival in
Britain. Seizing the moment, Nkrumah now the Regional Secretary of the PAF, began
using his new position to strengthen his relationships with nationalists in the Gold Coast
through his PAF announcements and invitations for the proposed Pan-African Congress
later that year.98
Manchester, 1945: A Meaningful Pan-African Congress
When Amy Jacques Garvey and Harold Moody, founder of the LCP, approached
Du Bois in 1944 about organizing the Pan-African Congress of 1945(erroneously called
the fifth Pan-African Congress), their efforts resembled that of earlier Pan-African
congresses in 1919, 1921, and 1927. These earlier Pan-African Congresses were largely
limited to a privileged elite whose tactics were more accommodationists (requesting
racial equality and reform in the colonies) as opposed to taking firm anti-colonial stances
and demanding an end to colonialism and independent self-government. The earlier
congresses were led and organized by an elite class who believed the educated Africans
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in the diaspora had a special role to play in the liberation of Africa because of their
education and access to political power. In essence their proximity to whiteness.99 By
1945, these beliefs were not shared by the socialist leanings of Pan-African activists such
as Padmore, James, and I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson, had been in direct contact, reporting on
and mobilizing the workers of Africa and the diaspora for over a decade now.
At this time the elder statesman Du Bois, had no real ties to trade union and labor
movements in the West Indies or the African continent, as most of his contact was
confined to the elite class of African and West Indian intellectual-activists and diplomats
living in the United States and Europe.100 As such, Du Bois was generally out of touch
with the Pan-African movement, which was progressing at the local levels through
strikes, boycotts, peaceful protests, and even riots. As a result, it was fitting that Padmore
and the Pan-African Federation organized the Manchester Congress, because of their
direct links to these grassroots organizations and nationalist movements.
The shift from the paternalism of the earlier Pan-African movement was marked
by the emergence of African leadership and initiatives characterized by a collective of
nations that would speak for themselves. More importantly, Pan-Africanism would be
exercised through militant anti-colonial movements within the colonies as opposed to the
European political forums of earlier Pan-African activism. This new generation of PanAfricanists, viewing colonialism as a child of capitalism, fascism, and imperialism, now
made their Pan-African connection not only with race but also by linking the shared
struggle of the exploited colonial laboring classes for the resources of Africa. Reflecting
on the revolutionary mentality of these young Pan-Africanists and future nation-leaders,
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the Pan-African Federation assumed the legitimacy of anti-colonialism and their quest for
independence. Furthermore, they saw independence not something to be debated or
patiently waited for, but rather as an as imminent outcome. This approach capsized the
earlier strategies of Pan-Africanism that positioned the educated elite and more powerful
African Americans as the stewards of Africa.
Initially, Du Bois expressed his disagreement with the plans of Padmore and the
Pan-African Federation; however, through an exchange of letters, Du Bois and Padmore
were able to have a meeting of minds and foster a close political collaboration that would
continue in their shared mentorship of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana. Through this
correspondence, Padmore was able to convince Du Bois of the necessity of linking PanAfricanism to the nationalist labor movements in the African and West Indian colonies.
Du Bois admitted that he was so out of touch with the rest of the African world that he
had underestimated the sense of urgency among Africans and West Indians and their
readiness for freedom.101 By this time it was not the UNIA’s Negro World nor the
NAACP’s Crisis magazine that was intimately in tune with the collective plight of people
African descent, rather it was the Pan-African Federation, previously the IASB, that built
up an unparalleled network disseminated updates to the African world. Padmore drove
the point home telling Du Bois that “Today the African masses, the common people of
are awake and not blindly looking to doctors and lawyers to tell what to do.”102 Those
participating in this congress would not be bourgeois professionals of past congresses,
but rather from the workers' organizations, peasant associations, labor parties, and
nationalist organizations from the colonies. In the end Du Bois found the new socialist
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influenced Pan-Africanism in London resonated with his own ideas about politics and
economics, and he endorsed the Pan-African Federation’s plans for the congress.
Furthermore, the decision to hold the congress in Manchester also reflected the
significance of Communism to Pan-Africanism. In organizing the congress, the PanAfrican Federation intentionally took advantage of the World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU) conference being held in London. This particular WFTU conference was
expected to feature unprecedented participation of West-African delegates and African
trade unionists from the British colonies, which ultimately caused the Pan-African
Federation to agree to hold the Pan-African Congress in Manchester as opposed to Paris.
Manchester was also fitting as it was the site of the founding of the Pan-African
Federation in 1944. Makonnen had relocated to Manchester where he had already
established a number of restaurants, which instantly solved the issue of the color bar.
Additionally, through local contacts, Makonnen was able to secure Chorlton Town Hall
as a venue for the congress. There was also, according to Henry Lee Moon, director of
Political Action Committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), a large
interest from colonial labor groups for the congress to take place in Manchester. Moon
confirmed the Pan-African Federation’s prediction that African and West Indian
participants in the WFTU expected to return for this Congress and felt that they could
represent their organizations both at the Labor meeting and at the Pan-African
Congress.103
Additionally, correspondence between Moon and Du Bois demonstrated the
apprehension that the older generation of Pan-Africanists held towards the Congress
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because of its socialist undertones and focus on labor. Moon suggested that Moody
doubted the wisdom of relating the Congress to the labor movement and believed “that
there should be no correlation between the Pan-African Congress and any other
organization or movement.”104 It must be remembered that it was Moody who initially
proposed the Congress to Du Bois, and his uneasiness regarding the labor focus of the
Congress further demonstrates the departure from the more conservative earlier
congresses. In spite of Moody’s apprehension, the 1945 congress went on to feature
eighteen colonial trade unions and twenty-five cultural and political organizations. While
the French and Arab North African colonies were lacking in representation, it was still
the first time that Africa was adequately represented at a Pan-African Congress.
Officially commencing on October 15, 1945, the congress was presided over by
Du Bois and Peter Millard, the President of the Pan-African Federation. Taking place at
Chorlton Town Hall, the venue was outfitted with the national flags from Ethiopia, Haiti,
and Liberia, the only three predominantly Black nations possessing their own
independence at the time. Topics discussed featured condemnations of the colonial
systems, the hypocrisy of the Atlantic Charter, racial discrimination, and above all
independence. “Imperialism in North and West Africa” was the subject of discussion on
the second day of the congress. It was here that Nkrumah, serving as co-political
secretary with Padmore, made his mainstream debut on the Pan-African and African
nationalist scene. Nkrumah outlined the political and economic conditions in these
regions and attributed the cause of the major problems that had manifested there to
colonialism. Sessions on Southern and Central Africa where conducted by Peter
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Abrahams and Marko Hlubi, while Jomo Kenyatta delivered an official report on East
Africa. Makonnen, secretary of the PAF, was given the responsibility of providing a
report on “Ethiopia and the Black Republics,” which accused the British government of
plotting with Italy to expand its empire into Ethiopia. The report on the west Indies was
delivered by Padmore, who outlined the history of the Caribbean from Columbus’ first
encounter with the region up unit the Emancipation Act of 1833.
The five days of discussions culminated in the adoption of several resolutions and
demands including immediate independence in all European colonies; comprehensive
constitutional, economic, and social reform; the introduction of modern social legislation,
old-age pensions, national health, and compulsory free education at elementary and
secondary school levels.105 In addition to this, the congress included in their demands a
unified condemnation of capitalist imperialism to the United Nations; formally opposed
the racial discrimination at the root of legislation in the Union of South Africa; and
identified with the struggles of their “brothers” in the United States for full citizenship.
The Congress also challenged the Colonial powers to honor the principles of democracy
espoused in the Atlantic Charter, specifically its third clause that claimed to respect the
rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and
desire to see the sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who had been
forcibly deprived of them. The mention of the rights of self-government of all people
spoke directly to the anti-colonial struggles taken up by the Pan-African movement
emanating from London.
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Finally, the Congress declared that while they believed in the Positive Action of
peace, as victims of European violence and slavery, their last resort for achieving
freedom would appeal to violent force, even if it destroyed themselves and the world.106
Reiterating how imperative workers and farmers were the anti-colonial struggles, the
Congress also issued a “Declaration to the Colonial Workers,” imploring them to
organize and reminding them that: “Your weapons – the Strike and the Boycott – are
invincible!”107 Nkrumah claims to have written one or two of the resolutions; however,
scholars suggest that the resolutions were more likely written by Padmore and veteran
intellectual-activists in attendance from London.
This Pan-African congress also differed from past meetings for a number of
reasons. First, because for the first time African and West Indian participants came not as
individuals but as delegates from organizations representing the masses of African
workers. No longer was the Pan-African Congress movement under the direction of
middle-class African American intellectuals with little to say on the African and West
Indian workers. Second, Amy Ashwood Garvey addressed the congress and emphasized
the significance of women as a topic of discussion, reminding the majority male
delegations that “for some reason very little had been said about the Black
woman…[whom] have been shunted into the social background to be a child-bearer.”
Finally, the Congress suggested that “there is but one road to effective action – the
organization of the masses. And in that organization the educated colonials must join.”108
The unequivocal demands and harsh criticisms of the Congress were augmented by the
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Congress’ emphasis on the necessity of the struggle for independence to take place, not in
the European metropole, but in the colonial homelands. A clear departure from the
accommodation approach to past Congresses was demonstrated in the Manchester
Congress’ view that independence must be fought for in the colonies and for the first an
appeal to use force to achieve freedom was proposed.
Following the Manchester congress, Du Bois was named the president of the PAF
along with Nkrumah serving as the Secretary of the Working Committee. Serving as a
Congress official and now a secretary of the PAF, Nkrumah quickly gained a high profile
in Pan-Africanist circles. Charged with establishing a new headquarters for the PAF and
maintaining correspondence with delegations from the Congress, Nkrumah began signing
PAF documents as the Secretary of the Federation’s International Secretariat. In his
initial communications, Nkrumah asked that all organizations and individuals that
participated in the Congress now officially affiliate themselves with the PAF, and
pledged to “do everything in my power to make this organization an effective weapon in
the fight for Colonial Freedom and Justice.”109 With Du Bois as a ceremonial president,
Nkrumah, who had been included in private strategy meetings and deliberations leading
up to the Pan-African Congress, with the PAF. Equipped with Padmore’s contacts,
counsel, and his own increasing Nkrumah was poised to place his own organizing and
agitating skills on display.
The following year, the Pan-African Federation, organized a petition to the United
Nations stating that the Federation’s aim was to establish freedom and political autonomy
for African peoples. The petition also asserted that the Pan-African Federation “had far-
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reaching and increasing influence among negroes and has especially brought people of
negro descent in the Americas into sympathy with their African brethren.”110 In essence,
this petition emphasized the linking of the anti-colonial struggles Africans in the West
Indies and the African Continent to the struggle for Civil Rights of Africans in the United
States. The United Nations and the world were now on notice that Pan-Africanism was
stronger than ever, and the issue of colonialism would have to be reconciled in the near
future.
In the early twentieth century, London stood as the epicenter of the Pan-African
resistance for the colonial world. London was a place where the varying identities of
people of African descent, mostly from the British colonies, converged and were linked
by their shared experiences with colonial rule, color bar in London, the betrayal of the
Comintern and national labor parties, as well as the fascist invasion of Ethiopia that was
seemingly sanctioned by the European powers. Pan-Africanism became the only viable
political ideology for the splintered Black organizations in London to combat the multiple
demonstrations of Pan-Europeanism on display in the early twentieth century.
The failures, illegitimacies, and betrayals of communism, socialists, and British
colonialism reinvigorated the Pan-African movement in London, where the British
government ironically saw the ideology taken up, revolutionized, and deployed as a
critical analytical framework by intellectuals educated in colonial institutions. PanAfricanism had been an idea, a theoretical framework, and a source of hope, but now the
time for ideas had passed. This cohort of intellectual-activists had similar experiences
with colonial rule and in London. Padmore, James, Lewis, and Makonnen had used Pan-
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Africanism as the basis for their speeches, criticisms, propaganda against the colonial
system, and for mobilizing people of African descent on an international scale. As
colonial officials feared, the unrest in the West Indies and Africa had been linked,
dialogued with each other, and organized for a coordinated assault on the colonial
system. There was nothing left to propose, reform, or illuminate for colonial
administrations, the League of Nations, or the Comintern. With independence on the
horizon and Kwame Nkrumah primed to lead a revolutionary movement against British
colonialism in the Gold Coast, the time had come for Pan-Africanism to be more than an
idea. The time had come for Pan-Africanism to become praxis.
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GEORGE PADMORE, PAN-AFRICAN SOCIALISM,
AND THE CONTOURS OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM
In 1934 when George Padmore resigned from his position as a member the
Communist International’s Higher Council, he maintained that his resignation took place
on his own accord, and that “the real question involved [was] one affecting fundamental
democratic rights of the Negro peoples in their relationship with the revolutionary
movement and therefore of vital importance not only to the twelve million Negroes in the
United States but to the two hundred and fifty million Blacks in Africa and other colonial
lands.”111 Padmore was sure to take his contacts from Africa and the diaspora with him
after he resigned and rededicated his anti-colonial objectives to the Pan-African
movement. In doing so, Padmore facilitated the resurgence of the Pan-Africanism for the
final assault on European colonialism.
As a result of his prominence in London activist circles, Padmore became a
mentor to a generation of Pan-Africanist that came of age during the Inter War years.
Among these young Pan-Africanist was Kwame Nkrumah, who served as Padmore’s
understudy in London and relied upon his counsel in the Gold Coast as he secured
independence from British Colonialism and laid the foundations for Ghana’s Pan-African
Policy to liberate the rest of the African continent. Through an examination of
Padmore’s tenure with the
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Soviet Union, mentorship of Nkrumah, his strategies for navigating the British Colonial
Government and Ghanaian opposition to Nkrumah to achieve independence, and his
contributions to ideological direction of post-colonial Ghana, this chapter argues that
Padmore was the vital to the success of Ghana’s independence, as well as Nkrumah’s
most influential advisor as Ghana became a base for Pan-African liberation.
Pan-Africanism or Communism?:
The Pan-African Movement that emerged in the 1930s was first and foremost an
anti-colonial movement. In the wake of the great depression and with another world war
on the horizon, many Black intellectual-activists in London found their defining ideology
in the critical analysis of socialism. While the philosophy of Communism was developed
by Karl Marx, a German, it was Nikolai Lenin, the father of Bolshevism and the leader of
the Russian Revolution, who appropriated Marxism and extended it to include the
millions of racial minorities, peasants, and non-Russian nationalities of Asia, particularly
China. It was this sense of racial equality and anti-colonialism that attracted many
African intellectuals to Russian Communism. Black Marxists were quickly recruited
from the African Diaspora to study in Russia and to join the Communist Parties of
Britain, the United States, and France under the guise of a political ideology that
espoused racial equality and true democracy for a world revolution. One of these Black
intellectuals was Trinidadian journalist, organizer, and Pan-Africanist, George Padmore.
Born Malcolm Ivan Nurse in 1902, Padmore, joined the Communist party while
pursuing his undergraduate degree in the United States. Under the name “Padmore” he
went on to speak on communist platforms, serve as a revolutionary journalist writing for
several communist press outlets, and established himself as a skilled organize, recruiting
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several West Indian and African students (mainly from British dependencies) into the
party. Showing great promise in his work with the Communist Party in the US, Padmore
was recruited to work in Moscow in 1929, where he quickly rose in the ranks of the
Communist International and was made the head of the Negro Bureau of the Red
International of Labor Unions (RILU), secretary of the International Trade Union
Committee of Negro Workers (ITUCNW), and by 1931 he served as editor of the Negro
Worker magazine.
The International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUCNW) was
established by the RILU in 1930 with the main objective of providing “a picture of the
life and struggles of the Negro workers” to establish revolutionary trade unions
throughout African, the West Indies and elsewhere.112 For Black communists at this
time, the ITUCNW and its journal, the Negro Worker, reflected the potential that many of
them saw in the Comintern. Analyzing and linking the day to day problems of Black
workers, the Negro Worker was widely distributed in the English and French colonies of
West Africa, South Africa, Brazil, and The United States.
By 1932 Padmore began to slip from the Comintern’s control as he began to
pursue more independent organization initiatives that went far beyond the initial plans for
the ITUCNW. Instead of parroting Marist theory, Padmore published articles and reports
that covered labor movements, strikes and uprisings, and organizations established
throughout colonies in Africa and the West Indies. Within a year of heading the Negro
Worker, Padmore had far exceeded expectations when he reported to the Comintern that
he had expanded the international contact list of the ITUCNW from a mere sixty contacts
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to “thousands of new connections” in Africa including the Gambia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria, South Africa, Belgian Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika;
in the West Indies including Jamaica, Haiti, Barbados, Trinidad, Grenada, St. Lucia, the
Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Guyana, Panama, Honduras; and hundreds of contacts in the
United States, England, England, and France. Most of these contacts were established
through Padmore’s extensive and unauthorized travels through West Africa as well as
through written correspondence with trade unions and local organizers in these nations.
He also disregarded Comintern protocol as he began sending independent organizers to
Africa and the West Indies who were not communists to help radicalize Black workers.
By using Comintern resources to fund his pursuits in organizing blacks regardless of
class or political affiliation, Padmore had begun organizing a Pan-African network for
future action.
Subsequently, Padmore found that national communist parties were reluctant to
aid Black communists in nations across Europe and the United States. His growing
frustrations with the Comintern eventually led him to question its policies, their
effectiveness, and Moscow’s ability to compel local parties to take anti-colonial work
seriously. Furthermore, while Padmore had extended the reach and influence of the
Communist International among Blacks as far south as South Africa and as far west as
British Guiana, he would eventually be expelled from the Comintern because of his
“nationalist deviations.”113 Being constantly reprimanded for his narrow focus on “The
Negro Question” and turning the ITUCNW into a de facto Pan-African division of the
Comintern, Padmore resigned from the Comintern and took his contacts from Africa and
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the diaspora with him. In spite of his smearing in communist print media, Padmore
maintained that he had, in fact, resigned from the Comintern on his own accord, and that
“the real question involved [was] one affecting fundamental democratic rights of the
Negro peoples in their relationship with the revolutionary movement and therefore of
vital importance not only to the twelve million Negroes in the United States but to the
two hundred and fifty million Blacks in Africa and other colonial lands.”114
In addition to his struggles working within the upper levels of the Comintern,
Padmore and several Black Marxists faced what he called, “Imperial Socialism,” as they
found that many European communists opposed anti-colonialism and embraced the
necessity of European colonialism to their own economic survival.115 In his text PanAfricanism or Communism, Padmore quotes German socialist, Dr. Eduard David in 1928
who argued: “Europe needs colonies she does not even have enough. Without colonies
from an economic point of view, we shall sink to the level of China.”116 For David,
Europe’s reliance on its colonies for economic survival transcend the Lenin Thesis’ call
for crippling western domination through an all-out assault on colonialism, which was the
source of their economic dominance and necessitated inhumane racial oppression,
particularly in Africa and the West Indies.
The fact that Dr. David’s comments were endorsed by members of Communist
parties in Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal, all prominent colonizers of Africa and
the West Indies, suggested that national communist parties had no interest in remedying
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European colonialism, or what Marx described as the “profound hypocrisy and inherent
barbarism of bourgeois civilization.”117 Furthermore, at the root of all of Padmore’s
politics was his mission to realize a free and independent Africa. This collective disregard
for anti-colonial struggles amongst national communist parties and their inability of
national and local communist parties to rid themselves of their racial chauvinism caused a
number of Black communists to drift away from Communist organizations, opting to
form their own socialist organizations concerned specifically with the welfare of people
of African descent.
The second major issue that arose for Padmore emerged on the subject of the
Soviet Union’s foreign policy leading up to World War II, particularly on the question of
anti-imperialism and Stalin’s budding alliance with imperialist western nations against
the rising current of fascism. Prompted by the rise of fascism in Germany the
disagreements with the Comintern who differentiated between the imperialism of Britain,
France, the United States and the fascist imperialism of Germany, Italy and Japan. For
Padmore, these countries embodied the evils of capitalism, imperialism, and racism that
people of African descent had been subject to in modern history. In response to this
request, he pointed out that neither Germany nor Japan had colonies in Africa, and that
the USA, where he attended university in the Jim Crow South, was the most raceprejudiced country in the world.
To acquiesce to these two ideological stances of the Comintern for Padmore, was
tantamount to sacrificing the fundamental interests of his people and the ongoing
liberation movements taking place in Africa and the West Indies. This was a betrayal
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with which he could not identify himself. Padmore refused to trade his European
colonial masters for Russian ones and was left with no choice but to sever his connection
with the Communist International in 1934. After risking his life to retrieve his contacts
of revolutionary movements in Africa and the diaspora from the Hamburg, Germany
office of the ITUCNW, Padmore made his way to London where the revitalization of the
Pan-African movement and the final assault on colonialism was set to take place.
First Encounter: Padmore, Nkrumah and the Manchester Congress
From the moment Padmore arrived in London he became active in political
organizing. Padmore was rather liberated in this new capacity as he was able to organize
and strategize for African liberation without the restraints placed upon him by the
Comintern. In a short time, Padmore found himself at the center of Black political
organizing in London and became one of the most widely known revolutionary
journalists throughout the British empire. Because of this, Padmore quickly became a
mentor for African and West Indian students studying in London. Of the young
generation of futures leaders under Padmore’s tutelage, by far, his most prized student
was Francis Nkrumah. Upon his arrival in London, Nkrumah, according to Peter
Abrahams, “was concerned with one thing, getting power and getting it quickly.”118
Nkrumah came to London with passion and ideas, but no concrete knowledge of
how revolutionary movements for power were organized and facilitated. According to
CLR James, Nkrumah would not find a better teacher than Padmore, as he was one of the
most highly educated and experienced political figure in the world,” having worked with
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the Communist in the United States, the Third International in Moscow, and founding his
organizations in London.119 For this reason, Nkrumah spent “endless hours discussing
colonial issues” with Padmore gaining a political education on the techniques of
organizing. These discussions with Padmore would last into the early hours of the
morning in the company of activist intellectuals like T. Ras Makonnen, Jomo Kenyatta,
CLR James, Peter Abrahams, and Richard Wright. Through this group, Nkrumah was
introduced to the London activist scene and proved himself an over ambitious yet
competent intellectual-activists, which prompted Padmore to bring Nkrumah on as a key
organizer for the Manchester 1945 Pan-African Congress.
The congress focused primarily on Africa, anti-colonialism, and unity, all of
which directed the trajectory of Pan-Africanism in its aftermath. Emerging from the
Congress as the Secretary of the Working Committee of the Pan-African Federation,
Nkrumah, now going by Kwame, had acquired a high profile and became a prominent
name among the vast network of Pan-Africanist, trade unionists, and African nationalists.
Noting that the conference featured the largest attendance of representatives from African
in the history of the Pan-African Congress movement, C.L.R. James noted that finally,
Africans became to assume the roles of leadership that had previously belonged to West
Indians.
Nkrumah corroborated James’ observation shortly after the Congress when
according to his account, he had been approached by several politically active Africans
living in London at the time to establish and organization with the focus of putting “into
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action the new Pan-African nationalism, with particular reference to West Africa and
with the object of calling a West African National Congress and of directing the program
of self-government for the West African colonies, British as well a French.”120 The result
was the founding of the West African National Secretariat (WANS), with the primary
objective of maintaining contact, coordinating, educating, and supplying information on
current matters to various political bodies, farmers organizations, cooperative societies,
educational, cultural and other progressive organizations in West African to realize a
West African front for a United West African National Independence. Now calling for
unity, the liquidation of the colonial system in West Africa, and with support in West
Africa, the United States, Britain, and France, Nkrumah made use of his new contacts by
holding a joint conference with WASU on “Unity and Independence of All West Africa”
in 1946, and making plans for an All-West African National Congress to take place in
Lagos, Nigeria in 1948.
While Nkrumah suggests WANS was birthed from the deliberations of the
Manchester Congress, Padmore disagreed with three components of the organization.
First, the organization’s focus on West Africa, in Padmore’s view, was regionalism and
tantamount to tribalism, which he believed ultimately worked against the aims of PanAfricanism to free the entire continent. For Padmore, whatever was birthed from the
Congress should embrace the entire continent of African and not a particular sub-region;
however, Nkrumah believed West Africa as a unit was more manageable. Second, within
WANS, Nkrumah found his secret society, called “The Circle,” in which members of the
members took blood oaths of secrecy as well as loyalty not only to Pan-Africanism or
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African liberation but also to formally accept the leadership of Nkrumah himself.
Nkrumah saw himself as a man of destiny and purely believed in the role he would play
in the liberation of Africa. Within the Circle, lay the seeds of Osagyefo/Nkrumaism, the
personality cult that he would later develop in Ghana, which Padmore carefully
monitored in his struggle to contain Nkrumah’s growing vanity. In addition to this was
the fact that Nkrumah began to neglect his duties as Secretary of the Pan-African
Federation following his involvement with WANS and the Circle, which Sherwood
suggests were mere vehicles to promote his ego and personal ambitions.
Third, Padmore believed WANS to be too sympathetic to communism and viewed
Nkrumah’s growing association with the Communist Party of Great Britain and British
left-wing labour politicians such as Arthur Creech Jones, Rita Hinden, and Fenner
Brockway, as a possible ploy by communists to influence West African politics for their
own ambitions.121 Subsequently, WANS was heavily influenced by the Marxism of the
Communist Party of Great Britain, and held an objective of establishing a “Union of
African Socialist Republics.”122 Padmore’s own experiences with the opportunism of the
USSR and its sole desire of appealing to people of African descent merely to bolster their
numbers caused his abhorrence of communism. Padmore’s concerns were not unfounded,
as his concerns about European communists and his notion of “Social Imperialism” were
corroborated at a Labour Party and Fabian Colonial Bureau conference on colonialism in
January 1946. The Fabian Society was socialist organization that sought to reform
British society through gradualism and democratic means rather than through revolution.
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Following a speech given by Nkrumah, Rita Hinden, the Bureau’s secretary stated: ‘when
Mr Nkrumah said “we want complete independence” it left me absolutely cool… British
socialists are not so concerned with ideals like independence and self-government, but
with the idea of social justice. When British socialists look at the Eastern Europe of today
they as whether independence is itself a worth-while aim.’123 Also, the discovery of
communist pamphlets and the absence of literature on Pan-Africanism in the WANS
headquarters, along with its member forming an African sub-committee within the
Communist Party of Great Britain, a rift a was created between Padmore and Nkrumah
that would persist until his death.
Nonetheless, Nkrumah and WANS continued working with Padmore and the PanAfrican community. They publicized each other's meetings and events, their publications
feature the other’s writing, and Nkrumah even protesting the colonial government’s
confiscation of Padmore’s book, How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire in the
Gold Coast. For Padmore’s part, as Nkrumah’s notoriety grew in Britain and African
Nationalist circles, he continued to mentor and work closely with Nkrumah. Because of
his work with WANS, the Pan-African Federation, the 1945 Manchester Pan-African
Congress, and his position as “associate and contributing editor” of the Pan-African
Federation’s publication, Pan-Africa, Nkrumah quickly became a prominent figure in
international socialist, trade union, Pan-African, and anti-colonial circles. As a result, in
September 1947, Nkrumah received a letter from the United Gold Coast Convention
(UGCC), inviting him to serve as its General Secretary with a salary of one hundred
pounds a month and a car.
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After initially acquainting himself with the Gold Coast political landscape,
Nkrumah found himself ideologically opposed to the notion of a “movement backed
almost entirely by reactionaries, middle-class lawyers and merchants.”124 This prompted
him to consult his mentor Padmore who advised Nkrumah to accept the offer from the
UGCC. Nkrumah left for the Gold Coast on November 14, 1947, and to his surprised
was received by the immigration officers with warm enthusiasm and an apparent
reputation that preceded him. Now home for the first time in over a decade, Nkrumah
had the opportunity to use the political education and organizing skills that he received
from his mentor Padmore, as well as from his experiences in London and the US into
practice, notwithstanding the challenges that were ahead of him in the Gold Coast. In
doing so Nkrumah placed himself in the tradition of Pan-African Gold Coast Nationalists
that preceded him, like Kobina Sekyi and J.E. Casely Hayford. The more prominent of
these men, Casely Hayford, was regarded by Padmore as “undoubtedly the greatest
national political leader and social reformer West Africa had yet produced” and “a sort of
John the Baptist, preparing the way for younger nationalist leaders like Kwame
Nkrumah.”125
Padmore’s Organizing Model in The Gold Coast
Padmore’s influence on Nkrumah was immediately placed on display in the Gold
Coast, as he deployed three organizing techniques and political concerns to build a
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nationalist movement and secure political power as the next phase of Pan-Africanism in
Ghana. As discussed in the previous section the organizing techniques used by Padmore
and observed by Nkrumah were the inclusion of the broad masses, a focus on education
of the youth on Pan-African socialism, and the promotion and propaganda on Positive
Action. There were also three political concerns in which the two had certain nuanced
disagreements: (1) nationalism, tribalism, and regionalism; (2) personality cult and
Nkrumaism; and (3) the usages of communism for African liberation. The concerns
posed the largest challenges Nkrumah would face as he attempted to achieve
independence in Ghana, while emphasizing Pan-African unity as fundamental to the
movement.
In the Gold Coast, Nkrumah entered a British colony with a strong culture of
political activism and nationalism that had been dominated and conducted primarily in
the interest of Traditional leaders and the African educated elites, specifically wealthy
lawyers and entrepreneurs. Since these professionals and businessmen were too busy
with their professional endeavors, Nkrumah was recruited to devote his proven
organizing skills to building a strong nationalist movement in the Gold Coast on a
fulltime basis. Before his arrival, the leaders of the UGCC, many of whom were
educated in Britain, envisioned ending colonial rule, with themselves naturally assuming
the positions of leadership formally held by British colonial administrators. Although
Nkrumah initially opposed the social makeup of the UGCC, he quickly changed the focus
of the organization and its movement, as he immediately set out to create a broad national
movement, based on the theoretical knowledge and pragmatic tactics that he learned
during his time abroad with Padmore and other Pan-Africanists.
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Upon his arrival in December 1947, Nkrumah found that the UGCC had about 13
branches, consisted of African elites, like J.B. Danquah and Ebenezer Ako Adjei, that
“got together, talked, wrote and published a few documents, but the mass of the
population did not seem to them the people who should be the basis of the political
party.”126 As a result, Nkrumah set about transforming the UGCC into a strong
nationalist movement based on the organizing model he witnessed among the Padmore
and the West Indians leading the Pan-African movement in London. Similar to
Padmore’s emphasis on organizing a broad membership that transcended class
identifications, so too did Nkrumah in his deliberate restructuring of the UGCC.
Noticing that the organization “lacked any kind of program or mass organization,”
Nkrumah expanded the UGCC’s appeal beyond the interests of the Gold Coast elites, but
to include the farmers, petty traders, drivers, artisans, school teachers, clerks, and market
women throughout the entire territory of colony. He sought to build a mass movement,
revise the UGCC’s objectives, restructure the organization’s infrastructure, and
consolidate the colony’s youth under the UGCC.
Focus on the Youth:
Just as Padmore worked consolidate the African and West Indian student
organizations and the various Pan-African organizations in Britain under the Pan-African
Federation, Nkrumah, sought to derive the energy for his nationalist movement from the
Gold Coast’s youth. This resulted in the amalgamation of a number of youth societies in
Gold Coast under the UGCC, as a de facto youth section, called the Committee of Youth
Organizations (CYO). This youth element within the UGCC brought with them a radical
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and progressive approach to anti-colonial politics. The amalgamation of the youth
organizations also served to broaden the Gold Coast’s nationalist movement. Also,
independent schools were established to strengthen the nationalist movement by
providing ideological and political education for the broad masses. The schools were
formed following the expulsion of several students and teachers in the city of Cape Coast
for striking in protest of the arrests of Nkrumah and other political leaders in July
1948.127 The news of the foundation of these UGCC independent schools dozens of
schools were founded and operated out of party branches in the southern Gold Coast.128
Furthermore, Nkrumah established 500 UGCC branches throughout the colony within six
months of his return home. These successful nationalist initiatives did not jive well with
the rest of the UGCC leadership.
Following Nkrumah’s arrest due to his role in an ex-servicemen’s demonstration
and a boycott of European goods, that led to the 1948 riots in the Gold Coast, a rift was
created between Nkrumah and the rest of the UGCC’s Working Committee. During his
detainment, British colonial authorities accused Nkrumah of being a member of the
communist party and interrogated him on his political views. Nkrumah maintained that
while he subscribed to some of their views, he was never a member of the party, rather he
was a Pan-Africanist and Marxist socialist that desired self-government and West African
unity.129 The UGCC leadership had been skeptical of these same rumors surrounding
Nkrumah, as his aspirations for West African unity during his time with WANS and the
use of the term “comrade” concerned them from the outset. Although Nkrumah astutely
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assured them that he “believed in TERRITORIAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
solidarity,” the UGCC remained ambivalent towards Nkrumah, hoping to use him to
achieve their own goals in fear of what he might achieve without them.130 Ultimately, in
the month following his detainment, the UGCC leadership demanded Nkrumah’s
resignation accusing him of being a communist and denouncing the youth that Nkrumah
had brought into their ranks as malcontents and agitators.
Nkrumah’s resignation caused a split between the UGCC and the CYO, which led
to a mass exodus this radical element out of the party and the formation of Nkrumah’s
Convention People’s Party (CPP) in June 1949. The emergence of the CPP reflected a
clear departure from the UGCC’s gradualist, conservative approach to anti-colonialism in
the Gold Coast that called for “Self-government within the shortest time possible.” The
older establishment representing the chiefs, the wealthy merchants, and educated elites in
the Gold Coast, witnessed Nkrumah take with him the extensive system of branches that
he had amassed during his short tenure. Standing in direct ideological opposition to the
UGCC, the CPP represented an impatient radical party that rejected the
accommodationist approach of their elders and demanded: “Self-Government NOW!”
The formation of the CPP also represented, to the UGCC, a political betrayal by
Nkrumah, whom they financed and invited into their movement, only to have him use
their resources to amass his party.
The Masses Choose Nkrumah
Now with his party, and in his homeland, Nkrumah was equipped with the
unrestricted means to carry out his plans for self-government.
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He wasted no time

implementing the populist movement model that he had observed in London. Central to
the CPP was its focus on building a movement for the masses. The CPP quickly became
the “commoner’s party,” creating a space for the interests of the semieducated, illiterate,
working masses to be represented in national politics. The CPP quickly grew into a
populist-nationalist movement comprised of the urban and rural, elite intellectual class and
the working masses – farmers, petty traders, drivers, artisans, school teachers,
dockworkers, and market women.131 Reflecting on the resolutions of the Manchester 1945
Congress’ call for the African masses to lead the fight for African liberation, CPP looked
upon the masses as autonomous citizens that were capable of making their own rational
choices and representing themselves.
The Gold Coast masses made their intentions clear in November 1949 when
Nkrumah, in association with the Trade Union Congress, convened the Ghana
Representative Assembly. The first of its kind, the assembly was attended by an estimated
80 thousand people with representatives from over fifty organizations, including trade
unions, co-operatives, farmers’ organizations, educational, cultural, women’s, and youth
bodies.132 The only groups of Gold Coast society that were not in attendance were the
UGCC and the chieftain councils. To complement this mass mobilization, Nkrumah drew
on Padmore’s teachings by accompanying the founding of his political organization with
its propaganda vehicle. Just as the ITUCNW had the Negro Worker, and the Pan-African
Federation had Pan-Africa, the CPP had the Accra Evening News. Nkrumah established
the Evening News in September 1948 to act as the chief voice of the masses and critic of
British colonialism in the Gold Coast. Having observed the use of print media by West
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Indian intellectual-activists like Garvey, Padmore, Lewis, and Makonnen, Nkrumah
considered the written word to be an essential component of the political struggle, and he
intended for the daily newspaper to be “the backbone of the party,” as it became the most
effective means of mobilizing the nation and broadcasting the movement’s demands and
agenda.133
Positive Action:
In his text The Gold Coast Revolution, Padmore stated that the CPP represented a
continuation of “the Manchester Program.”134 Nowhere was this demonstrated better
than in the Nkrumah’s call for “Positive Action,” which he characterized as the
“legitimate and constitutional means by which we can cripple the forces of imperialism in
this country.” Emphasizing their natural and inalienable right to self-determination,
Nkrumah listed among the tactics of Positive action: Legitimate political agitation,
newspaper and education campaigns, and “as a last resort, the constitutional application
of strikes, boycotts, and non-co-operation based on the principle of absolute nonviolence.”135 Having derived this tactic from the resolutions of the Manchester 1945
Congress, Nkrumah promoted Positive Action as the party’s most effective tactic for
asserting their demands. Positive Action was for alarm not just for the elites in the
UGCC but also for the chiefs and especially the British colonial administration. He
demonstrated the validity of this claim in January 1950 when he called for Positive
Action after a series of failed discussions between the CPP and the colonial government
for constitutional amendments.
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While the campaign of nation-wide general strikes, boycotts, and noncooperation
was short lived, the colonial government declared a state of emergency, Nkrumah and
other CPP leaders were swiftly tried and sentenced to prison for promoting an illegal
strike, the Accra Evening News was closed and banned. These events caused Nkrumah
and the CPP ’s popularity to spike, as their incarceration demonstrated that they were
willing to sacrifice everything for the movement. Nkrumah spent 14 months of what he
called “extreme boredom” in prison. During this incarceration, he wrote instructions for
party members on toilet paper, primarily concerning efforts to restart the Accra Evening
News and prepare for the approaching general election. Even with his incarceration,
Nkrumah received 22,780 votes out of 23,122 in the Accra constituency.136 Beyond that,
the February 1951 election saw the CPP become the majority party within the Legislative
Assembly. Such success at the ballot box resulted in Nkrumah being released from
prison two days after the election and being invited to begin his tenure as the Gold Coast’
Leader of Government Business. The victory in the 1951 general election represented the
first qualitative victory for the people of the Gold Coast, as they now had perhaps the
most representative government the nation had ever seen and Nkrumah had successfully
brought the less favored sections of the colony (farmers, fishermen, market women,
clerks, teachers) into political participation.
In June 1951, Nkrumah embarked on a trip to the United States, where his alma
mater, Lincoln University, had awarded him an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws.
Addressing the American audience at Lincoln, Nkrumah chose not only to express his
gratitude for the honorary degree but also to outline the objectives and principles of the
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CPP . After ceremonially denying being a communist and asserting the necessity of selfgovernment in the Gold Coast, Nkrumah reiterated his Pan-African roots by evoking the
recently deceased Marcus Garvey. As Nkrumah exalted his hero, he suggested, “There
never was a better period for the ‘Back to Africa’ movement of Marcus Garvey than
today. Let Negro scientists and technicians and teacher flow in ever large numbers to the
Gold Coast to help build the new Gold Coast, yea, the new Ghana–a New Africa.”137 In
one of his first international speeches since being elected, this appeal to the African
diaspora for assistance in building the Gold Coast demonstrated not only the influence of
Garvey on Nkrumah’s thinking but also reflected a plan that was already set in motion.
En route to Lincoln, Nkrumah stopped in London for two days and found himself once
again sitting at George Padmore’s kitchen table and consulting with his former mentor on
the political landscape both in Britain and Ghana. Padmore had been paying close
attention to the political unrest in the Gold Coast and was ready to answer Nkrumah’s
call for assistance in the next stage of Pan-Africanism.
A Clear Choice For Padmore
What Nkrumah had been able to do in the Gold Coast in such a short period was
no small feat. Few political movements have been as efficient in carrying out their
objectives as was Nkrumah in his initial years in the Gold Coast. Upon his arrival, he
wrote out a list of objectives to execute as he built up the Gold Coast’s nationalist
movement and presented them to the leaders of the UGCC. Nkrumah envisioned three
phases of the revolution: (1) coordination and consolidation of all the various
organization under the UGCC; (2) demonstrations throughout the country to test
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organizational strength through political crises; and (3) convening a Constitutional
Assembly of the Gold Coast people to develop a Constitution of Self-Government and
Positive Action. Nkrumah, in just 27 months, had executed each of his objectives “down
to the comma,” and as CLR James observed it was “a revolution of our times.”138 While
the Colonial Office in London and the colonial administration in the Gold Coast looked
on in confusion, George Padmore looking on from London was thoroughly impressed by
what Nkrumah had been able to do, calling it an extension of Manchester and “PanAfricanism in Action.”139
From London Padmore continued his work with the Pan-African Federation,
supporting and following the political developments of nationalist movements in Africa
and the West Indies. As it concerned Africa, Padmore kept a close eye on Nnamdi
Azikiwe’s (Zik) Nigeria and Nkrumah’s Gold Coast, both of which appeared, in the years
following the Manchester Congress, to be primed to commence the campaigns for
independence throughout the rest of the continent. By 1951, the political landscapes in
Nigeria and the Gold Coast were traveling in opposite directions. While Nkrumah was
mobilizing a mass nationalist movement based on presenting a unified Gold Coast,
transcending class, ethnic, and religious divides to demonstrate the colony’s preparedness
for independence, Nigeria was as divided as ever.
Plagued by political affiliations based on regionalism and ethnic sub-nationalism,
the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 solidified these divisions by providing a federal
system of three regions, each with its regional assembly that elected members to a central
House of Representatives. These regional assemblies caused political parties to
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emphasize cultural and ethnic identities in their organizing, and ultimately emphasis was
placed on ethnic sub-nationalism rather than national interests.140 Additionally, while the
constitution provided for the first general election in Nigeria, the colonial government
ensured that the House of Representatives was regionally controlled to preclude
encroachment from a mass nationalist movement.
In Nigeria, the British Colonial administration sought to capitalize on regionalism
and ethnic divisions to prevent what had taken place in the Gold Coast. With Azikiwe
failing to capture support beyond the Igbo areas, and the entire colony afflicted with the
cancer of tribalism, Padmore stated “That’s why I have concentrated on Nkrumah. For he
is the only one who can apply a Marxist analysis to the given tribal situation.”141 Only
two years later Padmore wrote in a letter to Nkrumah that “Brother Zik and Awolowo
have sold Nigeria down the river…. These Nigerians are a rotten lot! Tribalism had eaten
into their very souls.”142 In Padmore’s eyes the federalism approach applied in Nigeria,
which worked against the formation of an efficient centralized government, stood in
direct opposition to his Bolshevik inspired approach to revolution, which emphasized a
strong party with a clear program that appealed to a broad constituency that derived its
leadership from individuals that could rally the people and effectively articulate their
demands with authority and confidence. For this very reason, Padmore threw his support
and full commitment behind Nkrumah and the Gold Coast, as the CPP had amassed a
nation-wide movement based on colonial solidarity and was on a clear path to
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successfully secure independence through its constitutional reforms through the strong
leadership of Nkrumah.
As a result, the 1951 election solidified Padmore’s position that it was the Gold
Coast, as opposed to Nigeria or any of the West Indies colonies, that would lead the way
towards independence. From this point on Padmore would closely advise Nkrumah, the
future Prime Minister on the political strategies applied for attaining Self Government in
the Gold Coast. Padmore understood that politics, like war, is not a science but an art,
that is determined not only by subjective factors, but objective conditions of a given
situation. For Nkrumah and the Gold Coast, the objective condition was that ultimately
the discretion to exercise and eventually transfer power in the colonies.143 This basic fact
was at the foundations of Padmore’s approach to advising Nkrumah on British politics,
which he confessed to having a fascination for.

Padmore as Nkrumah’s Agent in London
In the 1950’s Padmore became a regular in attendance for sessions of the British
House of Commons, and for members of the British Parliament, a prominent individual
to turn to for information on the complex issues arising in the colonies. Furthermore, the
CPP ’s victory in the Gold Coast prompted Padmore to again offer his network or
contacts to Nkrumah, this time not only in the form of trade unions and anti-colonial
activists but rather MPs in London, like Fenner Brockway, that was sympathetic to their
cause of decolonization and self-government. These MPs, especially in the Labour Party,
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would prove vital to Nkrumah in the coming years as he made his case for selfgovernment and independence.
Promoting Positive Action, and Nkrumaism:
Ever the revolutionary journalist, Padmore understood the significance of
metropolitan attitudes and public opinion as it concerned the national psychology of the
British race, which he believed were a necessity for gaining self-determination in the
colonies. Observing the British response to the violent process of anti-colonialism that
manifested in the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya, Padmore reiterated the pragmatism of
Positive Action as a non-violent and legitimate tactic for gaining self-government. This
was predicated on Padmore’s observation that the British were “fundamentally a lawabiding people and the minute they have that colonial politicians advocate violence in
settling their disputes, they alienate whatever sympathy their British friends may have for
their cause.”144 As a result, Padmore undertook the duty of shaping Nkrumah’s image to
the international press as a leader of the people, a true revolutionary, and a man that never
turned a deaf ear to anyone in need. Thus, as the Mau Mau were being portrayed
bloodthirsty savages terrorizing white settlers in Kenya, Padmore prioritized the portrayal
of the endeavors of Nkrumah and the CPP in the Gold Coast as a demonstration of the
ability of colonial peoples, Africans at that, to constitute ‘modern’ societies.
Understanding the universality of European civilization and cultural values as the central
organizing principle of colonialism, Padmore understood that the transfer of power would
be found in the ability to organize, and acquire political power through constitutional
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means, thus dispelling the stereotypes of barbarism and savagery used to justify the
colonial system.
With Nkrumah forming his government and independence on the horizon,
Padmore now had the political opening he was searching for in Africa. In April 1951
Padmore flew to the Gold Coast for three months to attend the first meeting of the new
Legislative Assembly and Nkrumah’s installation as Leader of Government Business
cover the aftermath of the colony’s first general election for international newspapers.
Padmore lived with Nkrumah and was immediately at work shaping Nkrumah’s
government and party structures. In the brief trip, Padmore helped to organize CPP
headquarters and the editorial office of the Accra Evening News. At Nkrumah’s request,
Padmore also organized the newly formed Department of Foreign Affairs, and not only
created a study syllabus for its members, but he also drafted an outline of the diplomatic
procedure for the Department.
On this trip, Padmore demonstrated that he would be vital to the development of
Nkrumah’s political philosophy based on socialist principles. He even had plans for a
Department of Political Education, which he intended to “prepare the leading cadre along
the lines of Socialist outlook.”145 During this trip, Padmore toured the country,
addressing CPP members reiterating first, that self-government and economic
development needed to progress together, and second that “From now on it is the plebian
masses, the urban workers, artisans, petty traders, market women, and fishermen, and the
clerks, the junior teachers and the vast farming communities in rural areas who are the
makers of Gold Coast history.”146 Upon his return to London, Padmore compiled his
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notes, interviews, and observations of the Gold Coast into a text entitled The Gold Coast
Revolution, which traced the history of nationalism in the Gold Coast from the Asante
Confederacy through the victory of the CPP in 1951.
Following this trip Padmore now acted as Nkrumah’s official representative in
London, “running errands between here and the continent” for Nkrumah, giving updates
on debates in the House of Commons and providing clippings of British newspapers and
magazines. Additionally, Padmore made use of his journalist background as he staged a
campaign for self-government in the Gold Coast, writing articles on CPP and publishing
Nkrumah’s speeches in the British press.147 From his own experience, Padmore
understood that the British press would not “publish anything about the Gold Coast or
any colony unless there is a riot’ and that as long as Nkrumah and the CPP continued “to
be respectable statesmen instead of trouble-makers, the English press will have forgotten
you.”148 Furthermore, to maintain the relevance of Nkrumah and the Gold Coast and to
sway British public opinion, Padmore cast Nkrumah as a charismatic leader that appealed
to not only the chiefs and aristocrats but to the working masses as well to advance the
interests of all “rich or poor, high or low, white or black.”149
Unity, Opposition, and the Dyarchic Partnership
The period between 1951 and 1954 was a period of apprenticeship governance
characterized by cooperation and compromise between Nkrumah and the British colonial
administration as they worked toward the inevitable transfer of power. Historian Ama
Biney called this era the “Dyarchic Partnership,” reflecting the power-sharing between
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Nkrumah and the CPP, and the colonial governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, and the
adoption of a seeming accommodationist disposition to procedures of British colonial
governance. Accepting the significance of acquiring political power through what the
British viewed as legitimate constitutional means, Padmore’s pragmatic political strategy
was demonstrated in Nkrumah’s introduction of the “Tactical Action” strategy to the
CPP. Introducing the new strategy to the CPP in February 1951, Nkrumah reiterated “the
danger and difficulties” that were ahead of them as they took their place in the
Legislative Assembly and stressed the vitality of pressuring the colonial system from
both within and without.150 Tactical Action would feature a transition from the rhetorical
and overt disposition of vehement opposition to British colonial rule, to an embrace of
the transitional period of apprenticeship governance under as provisions for independence
were made.
While Nkrumah called for more cooperation with the colonial administration as a
steppingstone to self-government, Tactical Action also maintained the necessity of the
CPP ’s unyielding position that the Coussey constitution of 1951 was “bogus and
fraudulent.”151 Still Nkrumah’s attempt to reassure the radical element of the CPP that
they still had a role to play, the party faced factionalism as the 1952 local elections
approached. The position of cooperation and compromise adopting by Tactical Action,
too many, reflected Nkrumah’s acceptance of the current colonial system. Appearing to
advocate for a softer approach to criticizing the colonial administration, the CPP
appeared to have gone from demanding “Self-Government Now” to merely asking for
“Self-Government in the Shortest Possible Time.” Nkrumah’ attempts to stamp out the
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emergent factionalism within the CPP by emphasizing the party’s commitment to the
Leninist concept of “Democratic Centralism” proved ineffective.152 Moreover, as a small
number of party officers resigned from their positions in late 1951, they cited
undemocratic tendencies within the party, and the slowed pace of the CPP ’s demands for
self-government.
In response to these resignations, Padmore’s focus remained on the necessity of
unity. For Padmore, the maintenance of unity was essential in the transitional period that
the Gold Coast now faced. He maintained that if the CPP were ever destroyed it would be
destroyed only from within its ranks.153 Urging Nkrumah to exercise firmness with those
party members frustrated that things were not moving as rapidly a planned and patience
with those who could not grasp the political maneuvers being implemented with Tactical
Action. Additionally, Padmore stressed that everything must be done to remove any
misunderstanding and factionalism, to facilitate reconciliation and ensure unity within the
party.154 This resulted in the expulsions of a small number of party members that openly
criticized Nkrumah at the CPP conference. These expulsions resulted in the formation of
the Ghana Congress Party, with the political objective of maintaining “an effective
opposition to the CPP government.”155
Aside from the opposition growing from within the CPP , Nkrumah’s introduction
of a controversial piece of legislation caused a bitter discontent to the Gold Coast’s
historical social order. The Local Government Ordinance of 1951 and the Gold Coast
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Marketing Board Ordinance of 1951 called for newly formed democratic local councils to
collect revenue from the cocoa revenue in the stool lands. This legislation forced the CPP
to confront the paradox of popular democracy and the traditional power of the
chieftaincy, which historically considered themselves natural rulers with the only
legitimate claim to controlling the wealth derived from cocoa revenue. During the
reading of the bills in the Legislative Assembly, Dr. J.B. Danquah, Nkrumah’s
ideological and political rival since his days in the UGCC, denounced the bill as
dangerous to the authority of the chiefs in the Asante region and the Akim Abuakwas
state, which produced one-fifth of the Gold Coast’s revenue. This bill was the first step
in curbing the power of the chieftaincy, as control of the stool lands was now derived
from democratically elected local councils that reserved one- third of membership to the
local traditional leadership. Nkrumah maintained the position that the government had the
right to use cocoa revenue as national property to be redistributed fairly across the nation
for economic development.
Conversely, Danquah considered this legislation to be a clear violation of
individual and communal rights to the free enjoyment of the property. He further
characterized this proposal as “naked and unashamed” communism.156 Charges of
communism became a common criticism of Nkrumah from the opposition parties that
emerged during this period. While CPP rhetoric since 1951 had made regular references
to the party’s commitment to socialism and plans to eventually “establish a Socialist
state,” it never expressed how socialism would be realized or implemented in Gold Coast.
By October 1953, the British colonial administration found itself on edge after The
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People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in British Guiana was declared a community party by
the British government for planning general strikes to destabilize the colony’s economy.
This resulted in the suspension of the constitution of British Guiana and the dismissal of
Dr. Cheddi Jagan’s democratically elected government. Shortly after this, an assessment
of the threat of communism in Gold Coast was requested by the British Colonial Office,
as the colonial administration’s acquiescence to constitutional reforms had been based on
the assumption that there was no communist threat in the Gold Coast.
Since his days as a member of WANS in London, Padmore warned Nkrumah to
stay clear of communism, specifically the reach of the influence of the Comintern. With
the communist crisis in British Guiana, Dr. Jagan and the PPP’s flirting with the World
Federation of Trade Unions, what Padmore called a “new Moscow instrument for making
trouble,” proved the legitimacy of his warnings.157 According to Padmore, Dr. Jagan
played right into the hands of the Tories, giving them cause to dismiss all dialogue on
constitutional reforms and independence. Writing to Ivar Holm in November 1953,
Padmore boasted that he warned Nkrumah to stay clear of communism and Russia, and
that “thanks to my advise [Nkrumah] has outmaneuvered them[Britain]” with Fabian
tactics of gradualism in pursuit of constitutional reform for self-government.158
Padmore’s claims were confirmed in Governor Arden-Clarke’s response to the Colonial
Office, maintaining that “Nkrumah and the other Ministers are becoming increasingly, if
gradually, aware of the dangers attendant on communist infiltration and of the importance
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of building up confidence in the Gold Coast in the non-communist world. The lesson of
British Guiana is being learnt.”159
This response reflects the necessity of Nkrumah and Padmore’s strategy of
Tactical Action, that sought to cultivate a pragmatic partnership, which Arden-Clarke
described as “close, friendly,” and “not unfruitful.”160 Furthering their political agenda,
Nkrumah followed up Arden-Clarke’s by not only publicly denouncing communism, but
also expelling two prominent trade unionist from the CPP ’s ranks, and in 1954, Nkrumah
declared that any person found to be an active Communist would be refused employment
within the Gold Coast government including posts in the public service, army, police,
labor, and education.161 These purges and extreme measures, by Nkrumah, were taken
out of necessity to save the ongoing movement for self-government in the Gold Coast.
Padmore congratulated Nkrumah for acting quickly to purge from the party those
“under communist inspiration [who] are out to stir up tribal, religious and labor troubles
on the eve of self-government.”162 Subsequently, while Padmore advised Nkrumah to
vehemently reject and protect himself and the CPP from the multitude of charges of
communist sympathy, he saw the merit in using these rumors as capital to force the hand
of the colonial administration. In his text Pan-Africanism or Communism, a text
denouncing Soviet Communism as opportunists in its support of Black liberation
movements and elevating Pan-Africanism as the most viable political ideology for Black
liberation and decolonization, Padmore warned the imperial powers of Britain, France,
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and the United States that “to cheat the Africans on the threshold of independence would
only prepare the psychological ground for the Russians when they turn their attention to
Africa.”163 As an alternative, Padmore offered the option of acquiescing to the demands
of Pan-Africanism and colonized peoples of the world by granting self-government.

Tribalism, The National Liberation Movement, and Securing Self-Government
By late-1953, for many CPP members, the reality of self-government seemed in
reach, as the CPP controlled parliament voted in a constitutional reform that secured an
entirely elected parliamentary chamber of 104 members.164 This reform presented yet
another source of political tension as the proposal for a second chamber for chiefs was
swiftly rejected, which disturbed the chieftaincy. While Padmore and the CPP celebrated
this as a victory, that the nation was as divided as ever. The approval of 104 members in
parliament, resulted in the re-division of the Gold Coast into 104 electoral districts and 66
new constituencies, which for the first time Nkrumah’s return to the Gold Coast caused
ethnic and regional interests to frame election voting. 1954 saw the emergence of
identity-based political parties like the Muslim Association Party (MAP), The Northern
People’s Party (NPP), and The Togoland Congress. In addition to these new parties,
Nkrumah discovered the new preoccupation with local interests spurred an internal revolt
within the CPP , which manifested in 81 rebel CPP candidates running against official
CPP candidates in the coming election.
Padmore attributed this internal revolt to a lack of party discipline and a growing
spirit of opportunism among CPP members that viewed the party as a vehicle for personal

163
164

Padmore. Pan-Africanism or Communism. (1971), 267.
George Padmore to Ivar Holm, July 7, 1953, Nkrumah Papers, box 154-41, folder 14.

104

ambitions and a means for money-making. To preserve the party’s political standing,
Padmore asserted the necessity of taking drastic steps to suppress revolts “which will
spread like wildfire throughout the party and undermine it.”165 After his appeals to stand
down were rejected by these rebel candidates, Nkrumah, with Padmore’s backing,
expelled all 81 candidates from the party. Ultimately, the general election resulted in the
CPP winning 72 of the 104 seats; however, it was clear that there was a considerable
amount of oppositional voting expressed in the proliferation of parties based on regional,
tribal, and religious identifies. Recognizing that his mass nationalist movement was now
facing similar conditions as those that slow progress in Nigeria, Nkrumah immediately
made it publicly known that he opposed political parties formed on these bases. While the
CPP ’s majority rule in the Legislative Assembly was insured, it was clear that tribalism
had revealed itself in the Gold Coast, and in September 1954 Nkrumah would be forced
to face his most formidable opposition, the National Liberation Movement.
Tribalism and the Opposition:
To Padmore it was tribalism, not communism, that he perceived as the largest
threat to African emancipation and decolonization. Calling it the “present menace,”
Padmore asserted that tribalism is “exploited by unscrupulous politicians to spread
disunity and separatism among the more politically backward sections of people, and
undermine the forces working for national integration.”166 In acknowledging that
colonizing Europeans did not create Tribalism, rather they exploited it and still bear the
responsibility for keeping it alive, Padmore lamented the “tremendous difficulties of
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rapid transition from a tribal and feudal society to modern nationhood based on
parliamentary democracy.”167 Nkrumah later demonstrated Padmore’s influence in his
text, Class Struggle in Africa, in which he distinguishes between “tribe,” which existed
before colonialism and is the extended clan with the same ethnic language within a
territory, and “tribalism” which arose from colonialism and functioned to exploit feudal
and tribal survivals to combat the growth of nationalist movements.
Tribalism, Padmore concluded, came down to a “class conflict” between
traditionalist chieftaincy and the bourgeoisie educated elites, that formed the colonized
autocracy, and the colonial masses of workers and a younger generation of Africans that
are injecting their democratic demands into political discourse through detribalized and
non-regional political organizing. As a result, Padmore posited Pan-Africanism as the
natural ideological alternative and the only force capable of combating the dangers of
tribalism, as it advocates for the “formation of democratically-based nation-wide political
parties on a non-tribal, non-regional membership.”168 Furthermore, by Padmore’s
account and observations, the CPP was the best example of anti-tribalism political
organizing for self-government and independence in Africa, while the clearest display of
tribalism in the Gold Coast manifested in the formation of the National Liberation
Movement.
By the 1950s, the political implications of the CPP nationalist oriented legislation
prompted the National Liberation Movement (NLM) to come into existence in the Asante
region in September of 1954, months after Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP swept the Gold
Coast’s elections. The newly formed opposition, which chose to identify itself as a
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movement rather than a political party, was comprised by many of the young men of
Ashanti, small cocoa farmers numbering in the thousands, wealthy cocoa merchants, and
the Asante Youth Association, which had recently turned against the CPP . The NLM
was created two reasons, the first concerning economics, and the other involving politics.
The economic issue arose as cocoa interests were adversely affected in the Asante region
by the policies of Nkrumah and the CPP government that came to power in 1951. During
the early 1950s, the price of cocoa steadily rose, though farmers never succeeded in
receiving any substantial portion of this as a return. By the 1954 elections, it seemed,
through campaign propaganda, that the government had essentially promised better
treatment for farmers.
Following the election, to prevent wholesale inflation in the economy, Nkrumah
enacted the Cocoa Duty and Development Ordinance, which forced savings and a
development treasury for the state’s use. Thus, export duties on cocoa were raised, while
the price paid to farmers has frozen at 72 shillings a load, even though the world price
was sharply increasing.169 In addition to this, the extra revenue gained was to be applied
to the government for use in the general development of the Gold Coast. In response,
many of the farmers in the Asante region objected, claiming that a larger share of the
added revenue should be returned to them, instead of being applied to general needs.
While the cocoa issue was a catalyst, farmers in the region had long understood that their
financial turn on cocoa was meager; and believed that the large contributions of the
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Asante region to the gross national product of Ghana was being unfairly redistributed to
other areas.170
Reiterating Marx’s arguments about investments, capital, and development,
Padmore believed that the cocoa reserve presented a better option for financing social
development than borrowing from other nations to gain capital.171 For Padmore,
tribalism and nationalism were similar constructs as they were both led by the colonial
bourgeoisie. Ashanti nationalism for Padmore was no more than a ploy for the colonial
African bourgeoisie to position themselves as brokers of power in Ghana. Padmore’s
position was echoed in Nkrumah’s thoughts on Tribalism in his text, Class Struggle in
Africa, in which he follows an assessment of the African bourgeoisie, arguing that
tribalism is exploited by the bourgeois ruling classes as a tool of power politics, and
operated as a useful outlet for the discontent of the masses.172 Despite these social
divisions, Padmore would not be diverted from his purpose and commitment to statedriven socialism, party loyalty, and mass politics guided Nkrumah, the nation’s popular
and charismatic leader.
While the cocoa issue was occurring, the political issue that gave way to the NLM
came as new electoral districts were being structured and the Asante argued that the
region was underrepresented in the new Parliament. By 1954, the Asanteman Council
and the Asante Youth Association, who had been in fierce opposition to each other since
the 1940s, stood as a united front and demanded special treatment for the region. They
argued the Asante region deserved a larger number of seats in parliament, and since the
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overall number of parliamentary seats had increased the Asante members believed the
size of their region warranted a robust increase.173 After their demands were refused, the
NLM was formed with a primary objective of gaining a federalist form of government
that would give financial autonomy to the regions. The opposition also demanded
legislature that gave the chiefs and more Asante members, who warned of “the creeping
dictatorship of the south,” more influence in the national government.174
In addition to this the NLM called a roundtable conference in Kumasi with the
other opposition parties including the Northern People’s Party (NPP), the Ghana
Congress Party (GCP), the Togoland Congress (TC), and the Muslim Association Party
(MAP). At this October 1954 conference, the allied opposition parties called or a federal
framework of government and a constitution that would safeguard their regional and
economic interests against what they perceived as an encroaching authoritarian CPP . In
response to this meeting of the opposition parties, Nkrumah addressed a CPP rally in
Accra, describing as yet “another attempt by imperialists and reactionary agents to bring
together some chiefs and disgruntled opposition politicians to undermine the popular
elected government.”175 According to historian Ama Biney, the formation of the NLM
threw Nkrumah and the CPP government off-balance, just as the Nkrumah led riots of
1948 had thrown the colonial government into a flux. However, what was clear was that
the CPP government would not compromise with the NLM regarding cocoa prices, nor
were regionalist or tribalist constitutional reforms on the table.
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In addition to leading the force of tribalism in the Gold Coast, the NLM’s
formation presented conflict in the personal circles of Padmore and Nkrumah. Joe
Appiah, Padmore’s longtime friend from the Gold Coast, had left London and emerged as
a leader of the NLM. During their time in London Appiah and Padmore had forged a
close friendship, through collaborations in WANS and WASU, and their assistance to
Nkrumah, which culminated in Appiah serving as a witness to Padmore’s will, and
Padmore serving as best man in Appiah’s wedding.176 Coming from the Asante
aristocracy, Appiah inherited a substantial fortune and property upon his return to the
Gold Coast in November 1954. After announcing the formation of the NLM in a letter to
the editor of the Ashanti Pioneer, Appiah resigned from the CPP . While Appiah
maintained that his defection from the CPP was due to Nkrumah’s failure to address
corruption within the party, Padmore interpreted his resignation as a conscious and
deliberate turn to tribalism.
What Padmore viewed as a betrayal by Appiah, did not result in anger or attacks,
but rather an increase in Padmore’s dedication to self-government in the Gold Coast.
Furthermore, Padmore’s commitment to presenting positive representations of Nkrumah
to combat the smears of the NLM resistance made him a target in a number of the Gold
Coast media outlets. Ironically, Padmore devotion to independence in the Gold Coast led
to his “outsider status” being constructed and reinforced by the opposition. Padmore’s
insistence upon unified parties, and a centralized socialist government with Nkrumah as a
strong leader, intensified resentment among opposition parties and led to several attempts
to discredit him. Some of the insults leveled against Padmore in local newspapers
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labeled him an “impecunious and stateless ignoramus’ who escaped from the West Indies
in a tramp ship,” or described him as “completely detribalized and without moral
scruples.”177
A series of editorials even argued that Padmore grandfather must have been a
traitorous slave that lied on other innocent slaves causing them to lose their lives.178
These attacks depict a particular contempt for Padmore as well as descendants of those
that left West Africa to be enslaved in the Americas. The coupling of Padmore’s lack of
tribal identity and an alleged hereditary moral deficiency, suggests a belief that “nonAfricans” like Padmore lacked not only cultural ties but also a value system that formed
the core of a person’s identity in Africa. Padmore matched the opposition’s attacks on
his character with his criticisms of tribalism, which he viewed as a disruptive force, led
by the colonial bourgeoisie, that hindered unity and distracted national attention away
from critical issues of economic and social transformation.
Tribalism and Violence in the Gold Coast:
Such was the case for the NLM, who Padmore referred to as “cocoa politicians”
consisting “of the big chiefs, disgruntled intellectuals like Joe [Appiah] and businessmen”
financed by the trading companies to abolish the government’s trade monopoly.179
Padmore’s position was confirmed in October 1954, the NLM took a more serious
trajectory, as the Asantehene and the fifty paramount and divisional chiefs gave the
movement their approval in a signed petition to the Queen of England. They prayed for a
commission of inquiry into the question of a federal government for the Gold Coast.
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These claims revolved around the notion that the Asante population was sufficient to
warrant additional representation.
Given the democratic nature of Gold Coast politics, it was not unreasonable to
demand that the number of seats in government reflects the population percentages. This
letter to the Queen posed a great concern to Padmore and Nkrumah, as it presented the
image of a Gold Coast that was not unified and therefore not yet fit for independence.
Furthermore, Padmore believed that the British would use the NLM to double-cross
Nkrumah. He derived these suspicions from a document that he received revealing a plot
between the Ashanti opposition and the United Africa Company, in which NLM leaders,
Joe Appiah and Kofi Busia received “a million and a half pounds” to stage a revolution
against the CPP .180 While Padmore had notified Nkrumah of the plot, he swiftly fired
the British agent facilitating the plot, as the NLM opposition, with a new motto of “No
Federation, No Self-Government,” mounted violent resistance to the CPP government in
attempts to undermine Nkrumah’s self-government aspirations.181
Violence erupted in Kumasi, the former capital of the Ashanti Confederation,
between NLM and CPP members, in the form of bombings, assaults, and several political
murders. This violence continued for years as a result of a disagreement. Historian,
Florence Mabel Bourret, notes that the Gold Coast government was extremely slow to
recognize and respond to the situation and suggests that there may have been an initial
unwillingness to consider the NLM’s opposing viewpoints. Nonetheless, by May 1955,
Nkrumah’s several attempts at a roundtable discussion with the NLM were rebuffed, and
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his goodwill gesture of raising the price of cocoa to 80 shillings per load was perceived as
a feeble gesture.182 It clear at this point that the NLM’s position the price of cocoa was
being superseded by the demand for a federal government structure.
The violence that took place in the Ashanti region between September 1954 and
1956 had grown so vicious that it caused many Ashanti CPP supporters to relocate to the
capital city of Accra, were CPP influence was the strongest. By December 1955 the CPP
Information Bureau produced a report on the political tensions in the Ashanti region
reporting that NLM fanatics had been removing CPP flags, intimidating and assaulting
CPP members, and in special cases, CPP leaders in the northern regions were being tied
up and brutally beaten until they resigned from the CPP and joined the NLM. Still,
according to some, Nkrumah and the CPP maintained “majority support” in the Ashanti
Region, as people who were forced to carry NLM membership cards still maintained their
CPP ideas.183 Furthermore, by this time some CPP members were “convinced there is a
likelihood of civil war breaking out in this district if the vandal and atrocious activities of
the NLM remain unchecked immediately.”184
As Padmore looked on the current situation in the Gold Coast, he continued to
work as Nkrumah’s agent in London. As the violence raged on in the Ashanti region,
Padmore felt that the British were trying to use the Ashanti opposition to double-cross
Nkrumah and even refused to leave London at times in order “to keep at hand should any
sudden storm take place.”185 Additionally, Letters between Padmore and Richard Wright
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indicate that he maintained a policy level involvement in Nkrumah’s day to day
endeavors during this time as he complained of being “saddled” for weeks with “four
directors of the Cocoa Marketing Board who have just arrived.”186 Padmore also made
arrangements for Gold Coast VIPs visiting London including the Gold Coast Trade
Union Council led John Tettagah and Nkrumah’s secretary Kofi Baako. In April 1956,
Baako was in London to complete plans for independence and to deliver a letter to the
Colonial Secretary regarding the 1956 election and the constitution. Padmore “doctored”
the letter up before handing it over to the Colonial Secretary and ensure Nkrumah
demonstrated that he knew exactly who was behind all the tribalism confusion facing the
nation.
Securing Independence:
In London, Padmore also witnessed the residual effects of the tribalism in the
Gold Coast as students in London became divided along political lines between the CPP
and the NLM. Padmore believed that it was “a test of Ghana’s maturity to settle their
internal disputes.” Understanding that unity was vital to the British as the prospects for
self-government increased, Padmore sought to quell these growing divisions between
these students by forming the National Association of Socialist Students (NASSO) as a
theoretical discussion group for the Gold Coast students. Under Padmore’s direction,
Nkrumah appointed law student and former Assistant General Secretary of the CPP ,
Tawia Adamafio, to establish the organization to unify the students. Unity was vital to
everything associated with the Gold Coast, as the violence that had erupted and growing
political divisions were perceived to Padmore and the British as a hindrance to
186
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independence. As a result, Padmore explicitly stated that naming the group NASSO
instead of setting up a London CPP branch was paramount, as it would have exasperated
current divisions and prompted the establishment of an NLM branch in London.
The existence of political divisions in the Gold Coast was one thing, however, the
potential of having the CPP and NLM elements in London engaged in public debate and
disagreement posed a large threat to the image of a progressive and unified colony that
was ready for self-government. Back in the Gold Coast, the divisions between the CPP
and the opposition elements remained, as the NLM had achieved at least one of their
goals. In response to the violence and discord throughout the Gold Coast, the British
chose to stall discussions on self-government and independence. Instead the British
imposed another election in 1956 for the CPP to demonstrate enough national support to
justify the transfer of power.
Nkrumah protested the holding of another election believing that it would only
lead to confusion and the essential issue of concern should be in establishing a firm date
for independence. He maintained that the will of the people had already been made clear
and the constitutionally he could not “another election as a prerequisite to independence,”
and that “By forcing it upon us the British government will give the impression that they
are condoning the anti-constitutional attitude of the NLM and will thereby undermine the
fundamental principles of the British parliamentary system.” This was the obstacle that
Padmore was attempting to avoid in his calls for political unity in the Gold Coast. In
response Secretary of State, Lennox-Boyd maintained that a general election was the only
answer, for as long as Nkrumah and his “Ministers seem[ed] unable to visit Ashanti I am
bound to take notice of this and of its implication that there exists a determined
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opposition in at least one part of the Gold Coast which is not prepared to accept Gold
Coast independence under your leadership.”187 As such, Lennox-Boyd believed it
necessary to test the public opinion and for a “reasonable majority” to manifest as a
prerequisite to independence.
Despite the violence and apparent discord throughout the nation, letters of support
poured into the CPP ’s Accra offices with members pledging themselves to remain
“always at the back of [the] CPP .”188 A former CPP wrote to Nkrumah that “I have
never been happy since I obtained the NLM card through fear and intimidation as this
NLM party has brought gangsterism which hitherto was unknown to this country.”189
Furthermore, while CPP leaders painted the NLM as feudalists, tribalists, and
subversives, their economic policies were only slightly to the right of the CPP , as many
of the NLM’s national executive committee were former CPP members and trade
unionists.190 Ironically, the CPP had trained, developed and expelled the electoral
opposition in its most important election to date. Still, as the 1956 elections approached,
Padmore maintained that “To win a voluntary mass basis, the NLM has to produce a
more leftist program than the CPP , which like their leadership they cannot do.”191
Ultimately, the people proved Padmore right by delivering a victory in the 1956 general
election for the CPP winning 71 of 104 seats in the Legislative Assembly, which
translated to 398,141 in support of the CPP and 299,116 in support of non-CPP entities.
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In response to the results, the NLM and the Asante region was left with no other choice
than to threaten succession, which threatened the Gold Coast losing its most wealthy
region.
The summer of 1956 was a pivotal period in the history of Ghana’s independence.
The United Nations held a plebiscite in the British controlled Togoland, in which the
voters chose to be integrated into the Gold Coast where independence was clearly on the
horizon. In the same month, Nkrumah's government issued a white paper with a formal
proposal for the Gold Coast's independence. Despite the political tensions continued in
the Ashanti Region, the July 1956 general election solidified the CPP as the ruling
political party in the nation and the governing body that would lead the nation to
independence. As the NLM made its claim as the major opposition to the CPP through its
threats of succession and multiple attempts to stall independence, Padmore advised
Nkrumah on how to approach the opposition to his party. While Padmore stressed that
unity was imperative for the nation to secure self-government, in a rare instance he
recommended that Nkrumah seek to cultivate division in the legislative assembly.
Writing to Nkrumah in July 1956, Padmore advised Nkrumah to immediately
divide the opposition by recognizing the NPP as the official opposition party in the
parliament.192 Padmore believed it necessary that Nkrumah’s immediate strategy must
aim at widening the gaps between the main opposition groups, the NPP and the NLM.
Ever the political strategists, Padmore recommended Nkrumah cite a 1954 precedent in
which the Speaker, despite Nkrumah’s protest and warning, recognized the NPP as the
official opposition based on them being the party with the largest number of seats
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following the CPP ’s position as the majority party. Since the NPP had gained 15
Legislative Assembly seats, to the NLM’s 12, Padmore suggested they must be
recognized as Nkrumah’s official opposition. He believed such a ruling would stir the
NLM as the party produced more votes in the election but were granted fewer seats in the
Legislative Assembly.
Drawing on the example of the British House of Commons, in which the Labour
Party is recognized as the official opposition, along with the Liberals being recognized as
a distinct opposition, Padmore noted that only the official opposition leader enjoyed the
rights, privileges, and salary of the position. He believed that S. D. Dombo, leader of the
NPP, regardless of any agreement he may have had with Kofi Busia, leader of the NLM,
would never sacrifice the official salary of the position. As a result, Padmore, in a rare
instance, instructed Nkrumah to “Arouse their tribal jealousies,” stating that “This is one
occasion when you can exploit tribalism to your advantage.”193 In particular, he advised
Nkrumah to cultivate a situation in which the NPP having ran fewer candidates and won
more seats than the NLM, were perceived to be trying to gain what they could not at the
polls through the back door of the Parliamentary apparatus. Furthermore, causing discord
and division amongst the opposition parties, for Padmore, would prevent them from
uniting against Nkrumah and the CPP and potential attempts to halt discussion on selfgovernment once again.
Nkrumah capitalized on the moment by introducing a motion calling for
independence to the Legislative Assembly, which was swiftly passed, despite the NLM
opposition walking out of the session. Having won 12 of the 21 seats of the legislative
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assembly for the Ashanti region, along with the NPP winning 15 of the 26 seats in the
Northern region, the NLM attempted to argue the legitimacy of a federation system. The
opposition party even sent a delegation to London to meet with Secretary of State Alan
Lennox-Boyd to argue for constitutional safeguards with succession as the alternative;
however, Lennox-Boyd instructed the NLM to operate within the democratic boundaries
of the Legislative Assembly. To gain the upper hand on the opposition, Nkrumah invited
Secretary Lennox-Boyd, to the Gold Coast to hear the NLM constitutional proposals.
The January 1957 discussions between Lennox-Boyd, the NLM, and the CPP resulted in
an amended constitution that maintained the four regions, created a Regional Assembly,
and established a House of Chiefs. Additionally, the Asantehene was recognized as the
head of the Asante region; and safeguards were imposed to prevent threats of carving up
the Asante region by the central government.194 While the CPP stood firm on most of its
positions, mainly the issue of cocoa, the NLM saw victory in compromise and were ready
to approach independence as a unified Gold Coast. Now with a constitutional agreement
that seemed to satisfy all parties involved, it was apparent that Nkrumah had secured the
declaration of independence from the British and preparations for independence on
March 6, 1957, were scheduled.
Independence and Beyond
The celebrations for the official end of British colonial rule in the Gold Coast
commenced at midnight on March 6, 1957, the symbolic date of African independence.195
As a crowd of a hundred thousand Ghanaians assembled in the capital, Nkrumah
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declared: “At long last, the battle has ended! And thus, Ghana, your beloved country is
free forever!” Fully aware of Ghana’s significance to the rest of the modern world, the
Ghanaian Prime Minister asserted that Africa was ready to demonstrate that “the Black
man is capable of managing his affairs.” Delivering his speech wearing a traditional
Northern Ghanaian batakari, Nkrumah declared “We are going to demonstrate to the
world, to the other nations, that we are prepared to lay our foundation – our African
personality.” This term “African Personality” had been coined nearly a century earlier by
West Indian Pan-Africanist, Edward Wilmot Blyden, who was a pioneer in promoting
repatriation to the African continent and a large proponent of Blacks in the African
diaspora identifying with Africa in their thinking.196 Additionally, after touring West
Africa in the nineteenth century, Blyden acknowledged the sophistication of African
civilizations and culture and advocated for its necessity and applicability in Black
liberation movements.
Along these same lines, Nkrumah emphasized the Pan-African significance of
Ghana’s independence as he famously emphasized to thousands of Ghanaians that: “OUR
INDEPENDENCE IS MEANINGLESS UNLESS IT IS LINKED UP WITH THE
TOTAL LIBERATION OF AFRICA.” The independence celebrations were truly a PanAfrican affair as dignitaries and officials of African descent from across the globe were in
attendance to witness the birth of Africa’s first independent nation. Ensuring the
significance of making the independence celebrations a Pan-African and international
affair, Padmore advised Nkrumah in the months before inviting Eric Williams and all of
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the “big shot” African Americans and West Indians.197 Among the African Americans in
attendance were civil rights leaders Ralph Bunche, Martin Luther King Jr., and Adam
Clayton Powell Jr. Writing in January 1957, Padmore implored Nkrumah to send
Independence celebration invitations especially to the West Indian politicians who were
meeting in Jamaica to discuss prospects for a federation to distract them from their
tribalist tendencies and to inspire unity.198 Several prominent leaders from the West
Indies such as future Prime Ministers of Guyana, Cheddi Jagan, and Forbes Burnham,
from Jamaica Andrew Salkey and the nation’s future Prime Minister Norman Manley,
and Nkrumah’s close friends C.L.R. James, T. Ras Makonnen, and Padmore.199
Further reflecting the Pan-African context in which Ghana’s independence took
place, Nkrumah paused in his speech stating: “Here I wish I could quote Marcus
Garvey. Once upon a time, he said, that he looked through the whole world to see if he
could find a government of Black people. He looked around, he did not find one, and he
said he was going to create one. Marcus Garvey did not succeed. But here today the
work of Rosseau, the work of Marcus Garvey, the work of Aggrey, the work of CaselyHayford, the work of our illustrious men who have gone before us had come to reality
at the present moment.”200 This moment was truly the crystallization of dream come
true, as freedom from nearly a century of colonialism domination had been gained, and
Nkrumah placed Ghana, a small nation of six million people at the center stage of a
new era of African history and that of the African Diaspora. Subsequently, while CLR
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James would christen Nkrumah, the “Father of African Emancipation,” in Ghana the
name “Osagyefo,” meaning “Redeemer” in Akan, had been bestowed upon him
following this ceremony.
Even the Queen of England recognized the gravity of Ghana’s independence,
noting in here official address that “the hopes of many, especially in Africa, hang on your
endeavors. It is my earnest and confident belief that my people in Ghana will go forward
in freedom and justice.”201 After independence, Ghana remained a member of the British
Commonwealth and engaged Westminster procedure in its ceremonies. Following the
reading of the Queen’s message, he sent a humble address of thanks to the former
Imperial power. Extending a hand of goodwill and friendship, as opposed to adopting a
disposition of bitterness and resentment, Padmore’s pragmatism again influenced
Nkrumah’s approach to British politics. Maintaining the Westminster Parliamentary
system, Nkrumah opened Ghana’s first Parliamentary session stating: “If, on the other
hand, we fail, if we show ourselves disunited, inefficient or corrupt, we shall have
gravely harmed all those millions in Africa who put their trust in us.”202 Upon hearing
Nkrumah’s mention of corruption the opposition gave an outburst of “Hear, hears.” The
irony in this instance is found in the fact that it was the opposition that did everything in
their power to halt and delay independence and as recent as two weeks before the
independence celebrations, Baffour Akoto, a founder of the NLM informed the chief
regional officer, A.C. Russell, that there would be no independence celebrations in the
Ashanti region.203 Still, in Parliament, there was genuine applause from both the CPP
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government and the opposition, who compromise on the Constitution after the 1956
elections demonstrated the political maturity of the newly formed nation.
In his Independence celebration speech Nkrumah reiterated that while the nation
had won the battle against colonialism, their success rested on them rededicating
themselves to building the nation and aiding in the liberation of the rest of the African
continent. Padmore too understood that there was much work to be done and that time
could not be wasted on celebrating. Writing to Richard Wright in January 1957, Padmore
debated whether or not he would attend the independence celebrations stating: “I really
cannot afford the money just to see spades dance.”204 He was eventually convinced by
Nkrumah to attend, who refused to accept any excuse whatsoever. Although Padmore
agreed to attend, the purpose of his two-month trip to Ghana was not to celebrate but
rather to reaffirm the role of each citizen, in taking ownership and personal investment, in
the next phase of Ghana’s revolution. Rather than dancing in the streets, Padmore was
primarily concerned with praising the Ghanaian masses, whose devotion and selfsacrifice had made the birth of Ghana possible. In doing so, Padmore emphasized that
hard work and self-discipline would be vital to the building of the nation.
Observing Padmore’s disposition, Ralph Bunche noted that at the independence
celebration he “was not looking very convincing in the Kente cloth role he was
affecting.”205 Remembering the state ball, CLR James recalled that while Padmore loved
to wear African clothes, his mood was somber, and he was very quiet. As dignitaries,
government officials, and the Ghanaian elites danced into the night, James noticed tears
in Padmore’s eyes. Padmore then lamented that “the people who are dancing in here, are
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the ones who opposed independence. Outside are all the market women, and others, who
funded the movement, who fought for the movement, who did all the work of the
movement, but they are not in here dancing.” This Padmore exclaimed was “no good at
all.”206
Always in Padmore’s immediate concerns were the interests the Ghanaian
working masses, and according to James, this was not lost on them as he recalls riding
with Nkrumah, during the celebrations, through crowds of people shouting “Hello,
Padmore!” “How are you, Mr. Padmore,” “Good Evening, Mr. Padmore.” According to
James, Padmore was not riding with them but “If a black stranger was in the Prime
Minister’s car on a night like this then it was, of course, Mr. Padmore. I had the heart nor
the courage to disappoint them. So, I accepted the greetings and smiled and shook hands
on behalf of George.”207 Padmore understood that independence was merely the first step
and that while the struggle for self-government was important, the present struggle would
now be waged between the barefoot masses and the Ghanaian aristocracy and middle
class.
It was not lost on Padmore that one of the reasons he chose to work with
Nkrumah in Ghana was because it posed the best chance for staging a Pan-African
Socialist revolution in Africa. In the weeks following independence Padmore stayed in
Ghana attending meetings of the Central Committee where he examined the economic
and political situation facing the new nation. Despite having no official position in the
government, Padmore spent a good amount of time meeting with and teaching the
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principles of socialism to the CPP youth. Beyond his recent idea to establish NASSO,
Padmore’s particular interest in the youth dated back to 1955 when he wrote to Nkrumah
on the necessity of inspiring the youth stating that “We need to give them the tools to
carry on the struggle after we have gone. Marx was right. Ideas are more dangerous than
H-bombs which they can’t use after all.”208 In a message to the CPP Padmore declared
that establishing socialism in Ghana would “create a new type of human society on the
African Continent which will be an object lesson to the work and an inspiration to our
brothers who are still struggling to free themselves from foreign rule and alien
domination.”209
During this time, Padmore also traveled to Sierra Leone to support a youth
movement that hoped to influence the nation's upcoming elections. Subsequently, Sierra
Leonean politician, Hugh Smythe, who was in Ghana the independence celebrations,
informed a reporter for the NAACP’s Crisis magazine, that Padmore was “the silent hero
of Ghana and a figure venerated and respected throughout black Africa.”210 For Padmore,
Ghana’s independence, while important, was a prelude to African socialism, and his
dealings in Ghana in the weeks following independence were a testament to this.
Historian, Leslie James, notes that at the foundation of the Pan-African Socialist
revolution Padmore envisioned taking place in Ghana, was a dual progression of both
national and international interests. For Padmore, real socialism was essential “a
philosophy of internationalism” and one could not “be truly socialist at home and at the
same time adopt an attitude of racial chauvinism and contempt towards other peoples or
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act as an imperialist aboard.”211 As such, the application of socialism to the Black
nationalism of Pan-Africanism was a natural progression for Padmore and remained at
the underpinnings of his dealings with Nkrumah and Ghana.
Planning to leave Ghana in mid-May, Padmore advised Nkrumah that it was
necessary to impose a temporary transition period of “benevolent dictatorship” if Ghana
were to get started on the road to civilization. Padmore believed that there was “so much
to do at all levels, and so much mess to be cleaned up that no other way but the strong
government can even essay the task.”212 Leslie James attributes this advice to Padmore’s
early political training in the Soviet Union and the model of the Bolshevik Revolution,
which emphasized the role of the state in efficiently developing socialism. This was not
lost on Nkrumah, who understood as well as Padmore that the British had left the nation
in a mess and there was much that still needed to be overcome.
According to Padmore, in April 1957 Nkrumah begged him to stay and help him
implement his plans for the nation. Padmore recalled Nkrumah stating “George if you
leave us now all that you & I have worked for will fail after having kicked these British
bastards out.”213 He could not decline such an appeal and immediately set about
developing plans with Nkrumah for rural electronification, setting up rural water
deposits, and road building to connect the farms to major motor roads. On the
international front, Padmore and Nkrumah hosted a delegation of “Young Turks” from
Félix Houphouet-Boigny’s Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) who traveled
to Accra and expressed that Ghana’s independence had set the surrounding territories
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aflame and had the French worried stiff. In these initial moments, Nkrumah, with “his
hands [now] free, set out systematically to initiate and carry through the policies of the
Manchester Conference on the most expansive scale.”214 To do so, Padmore, the
architect of the modern Pan-African movement, was needed not as an intermediary in
London but in a permanent capacity as a government official in Ghana.
Padmore the Advisor on African Affairs
With self-government secured, Nkrumah was primed to place his Pan-Africanism
into practice through the Ghanaian government. As a result, on November 12, 1956,
Nkrumah announce Padmore as the Prime Minister’s Advisor on African Affairs.
Padmore did have his reservations about moving to Ghana and becoming an expatriate
advisor to Nkrumah.215 He understood all too well that the persisting menace in
Ghanaian politics was that of tribalism, which he had become all too familiar with in
recent years. For Padmore tribalism held back the industrialization of the nation and
presented a tremendous difficulty for the rapid transition from a tribal and feudal society
to modern nationhood based on parliamentary democracy. As a result, Padmore placed
his hope in the newly emancipated younger generation of Africans, most of whom,
according to him possessed a detribalized outlook, in comparison to the Tory-mined
expatriates and the autocratic chiefs, resented the passing of power to the common people
officials.216
Furthermore, Padmore entered Ghana conceiving of Tribalism as integral to a
“class conflict” that only sought to deter his and Nkrumah’s plans to liberate the African
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continent. In a calculated move against tribalism, Nkrumah’s government passed the
Avoidance of Discrimination Act (ADA) in December 1957, which banned the formation
of political parties based on tribal or religious allegiances. While the ADA was meant to
neutralize the opposition, it catalyzed unifying the opposition parties of the Ewe, Ashanti,
and Ga ethnic groups in the formation of the United Party, as the primary opposition to
the Convention People’s Party.
Returning to London to gather his belongings for this three-year contract position
with the Ghanaian government, Padmore presented his plans to his Barbados born
physician, Dr. Cecil Belfield Clarke, who encouraged him to take up the post in Ghana,
believing the warm climate might alleviate his constant, if intermediate ill health, which
he would struggle with for the entirety of his time in Ghana. He was also met with a
farewell gathering of Africans and West Indians. The group of comrades and allies
presented with a leather briefcase engraved with a map of the Black Atlantic, and Dr.
Kwame Sanaa-Poku Jantuah, the High Commissioner for Ghana in London, said:
“George has been given that post, not as a reward for past services but because he was the
best man for the job.”217 Addressing those in attendance, Padmore stated that he was
merely “going to Ghana to give my advice when it is asked for.”218 Padmore’s mission
was to transform Ghana into a Mecca of Pan-African for African freedom fighters, with
the eventual goal of establishing the United States of Africa. There was truly no one
more qualified for the work Padmore was poised to undertake in Ghana.
While Padmore’s qualifications were apparent to the Pan-African community and
Nkrumah, these sentiments were not shared by everyone in Ghana and would elevate the
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concern over Africanization of the civil service to a major concern in Parliament. Several
of the Ghanaians serving in Parliament came from prominent families, were educated in
London, and saw themselves as distinguished men of British tradition, with the only
legitimate claim to administering government in Ghana. Furthermore, when Padmore
entered the nation in the same month as the introduction of the ADA, it only exacerbated
those factions of the Ghanaian government that were already in a scramble for power in
the newly independent nation. Ultimately, while Padmore’s work in Nkrumah’s
administration would prove to be stimulating and productive, he was still treated as an
outsider in Ghana. The fact that Padmore was not a Ghanaian and the charges that he
was still a communist, caused elements in the Ghanaian government to disapprove of his
newly created position, especially since he operated separate from the civil service, was
unelected and shared a close friendship with Nkrumah.
As a result, Padmore’s actions in this new position placed under him a microscope
of public critique for the entirety of his tenure in Ghana and, from day one his
appointment was protested by the opposition in Parliament for a number as reasons. The
first concerned the necessity of the position all together as United Party representative,
Mumuni Bawumia, questioned “whether the prime Minister is not himself an African
acquainted with the nature and problems of Africans. He ought to know the African and
his problem and he does not therefore need the advice of another on African affairs.”219
Another argument against Padmore’s appointment came from A.L. Adu, the Britishtrained permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who claimed: “Padmore was not
competent to advise Nkrumah on African affairs because he had not lived in Africa.”220
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Adu’s argument disregarded the nature of Padmore’s previous work and well-established
position as arguably the most famous Pan-African organizer and black Marxist on the
planet. If anyone was qualified to oversee Ghana’s Pan-African foreign policy, it was
undoubtedly the man with nearly four decades of experience working in anti-colonial
activist circles, with a network spanning multiple continents and transcending multiple
language barriers.
Interpretations of Africanization:
The third objection to Padmore’s appointment engaged the issue of
“Africanization of the Civil Service,” which had been a recurrent topic of discussion in
the Legislative Assembly and Parliamentary Debates of the 1950s and 60s. The issue of
African representation in civil service positions persisted throughout the early twentieth
century. Africanization of the civil service called for top posts in the government, many
of which were being filled with white expatriates, to be replaced with qualified
Africans.221 In 1947, 19 of 92 senior posts in the civil service were held by Africans, and
as decolonization took place the British established a Select committee on Africanization
to make recommendations for facilitating Africanization.222 In 1951, A.L. Adu was
appointed Commissioner for Africanization. Although Adu and Nkrumah disagreed on
the necessity of Padmore’s role in Ghana, he and Padmore agreed on the issue of
Africanization. Padmore was a proponent of Africanization since 1951 when Nkrumah
became Leader of Government Business; however, his concern was not merely with
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representation but rather with the “trojan horse advisors” that served the interests of the
British Empire instead of the people of the Gold Coast.223
Writing the Nkrumah in January 1952, Padmore foresaw the issue of importing
repatriates becoming “a popular issue to mobilise opposition around, especially among
African civil servants who naturally feel that they are being cheated.”224 As such he
advised that under no condition should Nkrumah “accept the new salary scales and
allowances for repatriates,” as the Gold Coast was already paying the highest salaries and
increases would end in Bankruptcy for the country. In favor of removing British officials
from the government, Padmore maintained that: “If the whites don’t want to be satisfied
with equal pay for equal work then give their jobs to blacks. They will soon learn.
Nothing educates like RESPONSIBILITY; so stand firm.” Despite this, Nkrumah chose
to trust Governor Arden-Clarke’s plan for Africanization, which by independence in 1957
had yet to produce a comprehensive African civil service.
While the expatriates serving in the government included individuals of both
African and European descent, the comments made about West Indians government
officials, like Padmore, displayed a particular resentment and fundamental opposition to
Nkrumah’s Pan-African vision for the nation. According to historian Kwadwo AfariGyan: “Some people objected on the ground that there were already several West Indians
in senior positions in the administration and the judiciary.”225 Furthermore, the power
and influence that Padmore wielded caused resentment, particularly because of his title,
the Advisor on African Affairs, on the grounds that “a West Indian could hardly have

223

George Padmore to Kwame Nkrumah, November 15, 1950, Nkrumah Papers, box 154-41, folder 13.
George Padmore to Kwame Nkrumah, January 25, 1951, Nkrumah Papers, box 154-41, folder 13.
225
Sherwood. “George Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah,” (2009), 173.
224

131

anything to teach them about Africa.”226 Mr. Bawumia of the United Party went as far as
to declare to Parliament that “It is very disgraceful for an all-African government to
employ the services of a foreigner to come and advise them on African affairs. At least if
there was the need for an advisor, they should have appointed an African.”227 W.A.
Wiafe of the CPP countered Bawumia’s argument stating that “When we talk of Africans,
some people here say that West Indians are not Africans. I do not want to dilate much on
this point, but I only want to point out that the person appointed as Adviser on African
Affairs is an African. There is no doubt about that.”228
These debates in Parliament regarding Padmore’s Africanness as a qualification
for serving as Nkrumah’s Advisor on African Affairs, reveal more than a mere prejudice
to outsiders working in the Ghanaian government. They problematize commonly
accepted notions of racial essentialism that rest at the very foundations of conceptions of
not only diaspora but Pan-Africanism as well. The very idea of Pan-Africanism relies on
the assumption of racial essentialism that is predicated on the shared histories, ancestry,
oppression, and social conditions of people of African descent. The notion of the shared
conditions associated with Blackness is integral to Pan-Africanism, as it is the only
definitely attribute that binds people of African descent to each other. Regardless of how
they identify themselves, the racial identity and social standing conferred upon Blacks
will always transcend national borders, class, language, and political ideology. However,
the situation in Ghana, regarding Padmore’s Africanness, presents a unique opportunity
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for exploring the limitations of Pan-Africanism, as it confronts the concept of racial
identity in the context of the post-war age of decolonization itself.
In the context of African nationalism and the rise of national consciousness in
Africa, the transnational and migratory nature of West Indian culture comes into direct
conflict with the fundamental elements that inform African identities such as ethnicity,
kinship, or language. In Ghana as Padmore sought to place his Pan-Africanism into
practice through the Office of the Advisor on African Affairs, Ghanaians in the
Parliament found it difficult to identify the “tribeless” Padmore with their own African
identity. To many of them, regardless of the work he had done for Africa and Ghana in
particular, Padmore would always remain an outsider. Such a position invokes Brent
Hayes Edward’s assertion of the necessity of décalage in analyses of diaspora.229 While
notions of diaspora tend to focus primarily on racial essentialism and stress the
similarities of the Black experience that transcend national borders, it must be understood
that as these Black transoceanic interactions take place, décalage or notions of “gaps”
and “differences” in not only language but in culture and identity that must be translated
in both articulations and disarticulations of the diaspora are just as significant. Thus, for
several Ghanaians, Padmore’s outsider status in addition to the privileged and insulated
position Nkrumah created for him within the government would remain an issue of
contention throughout his tenure in Ghana.
Although Padmore had always intended to respectfully offer his advice to
Nkrumah and Ghanaian government when he was asked for, he later admitted that he “we
had a hard struggle, meeting with hostility from some of the very people we were trying
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to serve.”230 While Padmore’s disputes from the opposition are understandable, the
resentment that he received from some CPP members is unexpected. According to
historian, Kofi Buenor Hadjor, there was “considerable opposition even within the CPP ”
to Padmore’s appointment.231 He was continually criticized and resented by some CPP
leaders for his role in NASSO, in which he served as a mentor and advisor to the group
holding weekly study sessions, sometimes attended by Nkrumah. In these sessions,
Padmore tried to instill in the youth proper socialist ideals and attitudes to counter the
“phoney socialism” that he observed in some of the CPP members.232
This was Padmore’s way of providing a political education to the future of their
movement and militarizing the youth against “ignorance,” in order to keep them engaged
in issues of national importance. As early as January 1952, Padmore impressed upon
Nkrumah the significance of the youth, suggesting that everything must be done to
remove misunderstandings within the party, especially when it concerned relationships
between the old guard and the youth. Padmore implored Nkrumah to avoid the mistake
of past revolutions in their tendencies to “devour [their] children.”233 Writing to Nkrumah
in 1955, Padmore admitted that his seminal text, Pan-Africanism or Communism, was
written for the youth in order “to give them the tools to carry on the struggle after we
have gone.” 234 Regardless of his good intentions and the extensive work done behind the
scenes, Nkrumah eventually abandoned his initial plans of appointing Padmore to a
cabinet post, seeking to minimize dissent from within and outside of the CPP by making
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Padmore his personal advisor. Historian Marika Sherwood suggests that these
observations of CPP resentment may call into question the accuracy of James’
recollection events at the Independence celebrations. More importantly it is curious as to
whether CPP members were opposed to Padmore the individual, or that they simply
wanted Ghanaians directing the government instead of foreigner, regardless of the fact
that arguably no foreigner wholeheartedly supported the CPP more than Padmore.
Initially Nkrumah intended for Padmore to serve as Advisor on African Affairs
working out of the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs (MDEA); however, both
men realized the foreign service, many of whom were British expatriates leftover from
the Colonial administration or British trained Africans, could not be trusted to carry out
their Pan-African program. For some time, Nkrumah had been aware of an “attitude of
dual allegiance – one loyalty to our government and the other to the Colonial Office.” In
executing this plan, Nkrumah first took control of the MDEA, which in line with
Padmore’s previous advice on the necessity of Nkrumah taking external affairs into his
own hands and “guiding the country in its orientation as it moves into the sphere of
international relations.”235 Since it was clear that the MDEA the civil servants in the
external service and foreign affairs “would hardly enable us to project the African
personality” in their relations with other nations, Nkrumah decided to create an
institution, separate from the MDEA, in order to do so.
As a result, Nkrumah directed Padmore to build his own office modeled on the
anti-colonial organizations he had spearheaded throughout his entire career from his days
in Russia as Secretary of the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers
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(ITUCNW), and London as a founder of the Pan-African Federation (PAF). This new
office was appropriately named: The Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on
African Affairs. Drawing on his work with the Chairman of the International African
Service Bureau (IASB), this new office would also operate as an investigative body for
recovering information and contacts, a propaganda forum for spreading Nkrumah’s PanAfrican ideology, and a medium for exchanging news on anti-colonial movements
throughout Africa and highlighting the views of African leaders. This office was the
culmination of decades of Padmore’s activist organizing, providing him the resources and
free-range to apply his expertise to cultivating African unity by providing political and
financial support to African liberation movements in furtherance of Pan-Africanism and
African emancipation. Furthermore, since “officially” the office would supplement
rather duplicate the work of the Ministry of External Affairs, Padmore was positioned to
operate as “a de facto Ghanaian ‘shadow’ Minister of External Affairs” as he traveled the
African continent to export, what Matteo Grilli calls, “Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy.”236
Still, several foreign services and government officials opposed Padmore’s
independent office, citing discomfort over a non-Ghanaian representing the independent
nation in negotiations with foreign states. Also, the role of Nkrumah’s distrust of his
civil servicemen cannot be ignored in our understandings of their opposition to
Padmore’s appointment; nonetheless, the unorthodox system of governing the Nkrumah
was implementing set the stage for confrontations within the CPP government that would
last for several years. In what Nkrumah viewed as an attempt to avoid potential conflict
with other civil servants, Padmore was also given the freedom and authority to select his
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staff, which forced the issue into a debate among government officials. In parliament,
Nkrumah was criticized for the “Trojan Horse” tactics being used in the employment of
the Special Adviser on African Affairs. United Party representative M.K. Apaloo was
outspoken on the subject stating:
I know that the holder of the present position is an old friend of the Prime Minister
and he belongs to the Pan Africa Group. But what I want to say here is that when
the original amount for engaging this man was asked for, the government did not
come forward with an estimate… Now, after this gentleman has arrived and
assumed duty, he is putting forward proposals for the engagement of staff, and
believe me, Sir, if the qualifications he wants for his immediate subordinate are to
be the ones they would insist on, then no single African in this country, except
perhaps the Minister of Finance or the Leader of the Opposition, would become his
assistants. In other words, if he insists upon having people who have traveled
widely across Africa as his subordinates – well, you see, nobody would in fact have
that qualification, and therefore we shall have to go back the West Indies perhaps,
to get his immediate juniors to come and advise us on African affairs.237
Mr. Apaloo’s concerns were shared by several government officials who also believed
the West Indian ex-Comintern official, Padmore, exercised too much power because of
his direct line to Nkrumah and his requirement that his office’s staff meet his
qualifications. It also did not help that Nkrumah was slow to explicitly state the role that
the new office would play, and exactly why the MDEA had been cut off from interacting
with African liberation movements. However, while the unease pertaining to the lack of
transparency in the estimated costs of Padmore’s office were warranted, the concern
regarding his hiring practices and standards were unfounded. Padmore was primarily
concerned with recruiting reliable men that shared his ideologies and possessed extensive
experience working in anti-colonial struggles. The fears of an entirely West Indian
staffed office were put to rest when Padmore chose a Ghanaian, James Markham, and T.
Ras Makonnen from Guyana as his top assistants in his office.
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Both men easily met Padmore’s qualifications. Markham, a man of Ewe descent,
had strong ties to the anti-colonial struggle in Ghana and had proven himself a
trustworthy supporter of Nkrumah dating back to his time as editor of the Accra Evening
News, being imprison with Nkrumah in 1949, and helping to organize Nkrumah’s
election campaign in 1951.238 Also, Markham maintained correspondence with Padmore
during his time working for the Anti-Colonial Bureau of the Asian Socialist Conference
in Rangoon and attending the Bandung Conference in 1955.239 Like Padmore, Markham
was a seasoned journalist and a leading figure in NASSO, which made him useful in
carrying out the Office’s propaganda campaigns.

Additionally, Makonnen was an old

friend of Padmore and Nkrumah’s from their days in the Pan-African movement in
London. Along with being more closely aligned with Padmore than anyone in the nation
from an ideological standpoint, Makonnen’s extensive experience in newspaper editing
and his proficiency in dealing with managing finances made him a perfect candidate for
Padmore’s Office. As, a result the trio of Padmore, Markham, and Makonnen ran the
Office, with a staff comprised entirely of Ghanaians.240
In spite of the protest and cool attitude of the foreign service, Padmore was once
again in his element, this time with “more money, more power, and more freedom of
action to put his ideas into practice.”241 For the last three decades, Padmore had grown
accustomed to either working on his own or with a skeleton crew of trusted individuals
within executive committees of the activist organizations. According to CLR James,
Padmore admitted that there were two things in the world that he could not take, the first
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being race prejudice and the other bureaucracy.242 The frustrations of bureaucracy were
also shared by Nkrumah, who was known to cut through normal procedure to accomplish
his objectives in Ghana.243 This was reflected in the structuring of Padmore’s Office.
Free of intricate infrastructure and meant to be flexible and act swiftly when political
action was needed, the size of Padmore’s office, seven staff members in a “fair-sized
single-story bungalow,” embodied how Ghana’s first Pan-African institution was
intended to operate. Padmore expressed his expectations in a letter to his staff stating:
I feel that we are devoting too much attention to what I consider petty routine
matters which can be dealt with more efficiently… all directives, observations and
recommendations addressed to me must be stated as laconically as the English
language permits… I frankly have no time for “essay reading.”244
The humor in Padmore’s message is apparent; however, it merely shielded his frustration
with the formal bureaucratic structures of the Ghanaian government. In the same note, he
lamented that Ghana’s traditional bureaucracy weighed upon his office like the Alps and
called for his office to streamline “the work of this office as much as possible without
unduly offending the “the sacred cow”, bureaucracy.”245
While his Office operated independent of the MAEA, there was constant overlap,
as his office was focused on practicing Pan-Africanism through transnational relations on
the continent and the MDEA was concerned with international relations. The result was
a constant state of poor communication between the two offices. For instance, in
February 1959 when the US Embassy called upon Padmore to discuss Ghana’s position
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on the Cameroons, the memorandum on the issue had been sent to the MDEA.246 The
foreign service “refused to let Padmore use their cable service and denied him access to
their file. ”247 Recalling that the MDEA “tended to keep things very in their own hands,”
Padmore constantly insisted upon the being afforded the proper respect but also found it
necessary to project authority in order to ensure that information was received in time for
his office to act efficiently. Although Padmore struggled to adapt to the day to day
politics of Ghanaian bureaucracy, he would now turn his eyes away from the local
tribalized politics of Ghana. With independence secured and Nkrumah’s resources at his
disposal, Padmore switched his focus to the rest of the continent and in turning Ghana
into a model nation that exuded the principles of Pan-Africanism not only in rhetoric but
in action.
The Office of the Advisor on African Affairs and Exporting Nkrumaism
With his office established, Padmore, The Advisor to the Prime Minister on
African Affairs got to work immediately on using Ghana and Nkrumah’s fame and
political standing to spurring independence throughout the rest of the continent. In
January 1958 Padmore was tasked with establishing a United Nations Regional
Economic Commission for Africa, as well as overseeing Ghana’s bid to have the
commission based in Accra. Joining the small number of independent nations in Africa,
Ghana was now in competition not only for the commission but also for political
influence on the continent with Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Working with Mordechai
Kidron, the Deputy Head of Israel’s permanent delegation to the UN, Padmore contended
that Ghana would be the best choice for the location of the commission since: Ghana was
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the latest African independent state to be admitted as a member of the United Nations; it
was more advantageously located than the other three countries, and the Ghana
government was ready to provide all necessary facilities for the accommodation of the
office.248
While Ghana sought to establish its position of influence on the African continent
to the UN, Padmore and Nkrumah sought the do the same throughout African by
planning the Conference of Independent African States. They discussed calling a PanAfrican Conference back in 1954, but Padmore suggested postponing such a meeting
until independence was secured. Plans for the conference subsequently began in early
1958 and Padmore led a delegation mission to the seven independent African nations at
the time – Egypt (UAR), Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia, and Liberia. On
these missions, Padmore along with the Minister of External Affairs met with
ambassadors and nation heads to discuss the conference’s agenda, procedure, and
administrative arrangements.
The arrangements were largely in Padmore’s hands as he was now entrusted by
Nkrumah to “work out a program of non-violent “Positive Action” and a “Tactical
Action” [program] on a continental scale.”249 With Padmore authoring Nkrumah’s
Inaugural Address, the themes of African unity, cooperation, and the African Personality
were centralized. Coordinating their foreign policy, the nations agreed on the
significance of the “sovereignty of the state,” and pledged their support of African
independence and self-determination. While no monumental decisions were made at the
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April 1958 conference, the nations’ voiced their commitment to educational and cultural
exchanges, coordinated economic planning, agreement to reconvene every two years, and
the repeated use of the term “African Personality” demonstrated the success of the
meeting.
In the summer of 1958, Padmore was constantly on the move. He and Nkrumah
embarked on a “goodwill mission” to the seven participating nations, to further
strengthen ties and discuss the plans for a United Nations African Group. On this trip
Nkrumah publicly expressed his gratitude to Padmore for his “loyal support, devotion to
duty and pleasant companionship” calling him “the life of our party.”250 In July of that
year, Padmore represented Ghana as an unofficial observer at the congress of the African
Regroupment Party (PRA) in Dahomey, where the demands of the French-speaking states
were voiced. He noted that the “the women delegated were the most important factor in
stimulating the drive for full independence… I was actually frightened by those
women.”251 With the Algerians in open war with the French, and Ghana energizing
independence movements in Ivory Coast, the drive for independence in the French
colonies came to center stage in September 1958 with the French Constitutional
Referendum and the “Guinea Question.”
In October 1958, Sekou Toure led Guinea to independence, voting to no in the
Constitutional Referendum and the French leaving the nation in economic ruin. Padmore
saw this as an opportunity to launching a project of political unity and suggested to
Nkrumah that he offer a loan of £10 million to save the Guinea economy. As a result of
this offer, Toure could not avoid Nkrumah’s proposal of unification, and after accepting,
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the Ghana-Guinea Union was announced in November 1958. The Governor of Sierra
Leone summed the moment up perfectly stating that “Guinea’s need had been Nkrumah’s
opportunity of advancing Pan African ideas.”252 The Union was intended to demonstrate
to budding independence movements the path towards a united Africa. For both Padmore
and Nkrumah, the unity of Africa always rested on Pan-Africanism manifesting in the
formation of a United States of Africa, but the two diverged on the idea of regionalism
maintained opposing views on what that unity should look like.
United States of Africa or Pan-Africa:
The establishing of a United States of Africa and the idea of uniting the continent
under a single flag was always at the foundations of both Padmore and Nkrumah’s
political agendas. However, by 1958 Nkrumah was in favor of immediately pursuing a
United States of Africa, while Padmore embraced the pragmatism of establishing selfgoverning regional federations to be later united with the entire continent.253 In a way,
Padmore foresaw the conditions that would create the Casablanca and Monrovia Blocs in
the 1960s, as African nations became divided on what African unity would look like in a
liberated Africa. Furthermore, while Nkrumah’s Padmore authored opening speech at the
All African People’s Conference stated that the Ghana-Guinea Union constituted the
nucleus of a United West Africa to later become a United States of Africa, Nkrumah’s
vision began to prevail as, by May 1959 the official declaration of the union referred to a
“Union of Independent African States” that were opened to all independent African
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States or Federations adhering to the principles on which the Union is based.254 In July
1959, Padmore was in Liberia with Nkrumah to discuss a unification between Ghana,
Guinea, and Liberia to be called “The Community of Independent African States.”
Unfortunately, the three heads of state agreed to leave in place the colonial boundaries
stemming from the Berlin Conference of 1884, which left in place many of the invented
traditions and national identities bred by the colonial system. While the union never
materialized and appeared to be shortsighted, having no agenda for implementing many
of its resolutions, Padmore and Nkrumah appeared to be diverging in their political
outlooks.
Still, the two agreed on the primary goal of Padmore’s office, which was to
support anti-colonial movements in Africa to create a united front of African nationalist
parties and eventually a continental government. In order to achieve this Padmore
endeavored to turn Accra into a haven for African Nationalists and chief meeting site for
anti-colonial politics. Making use of Padmore’s extensive political contacts from his
days in Moscow and London, Padmore organized the All African People’s Conference,
which was held in December of 1958. What set this conference apart from the CIAS was
that it was a gathering of over two hundred delegates from thirty-six nongovernmental
political parties, movements, trade unions, cooperative associations, and youth and
women’s organizations.255 As the most significant Pan-African gathering since the
Manchester 1945 Congress, Nkrumah believed this conference marked a beginning of a
new course and chose to use the term “All-African” in the name of the conference as
opposed to “Pan-African,” as Padmore had suggested. While the two disagreed over the
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name, Padmore’s influence on the AAPC was also demonstrated in the use of the symbol
of a “Black man rising out of the map of Africa, rending as under his chains,” on the
publicity for the conference, which was lifted directly from the Padmore edited Negro
Worker newspaper from his days running International Trade Union Committee of Negro
Workers (ITUCNW).256
The conference organizers invited members from 62 nationalist parties, delegates
from fraternal countries or organizations, and observers from across the globe. Among
the attendees were future Prime Minister of Congo, Patrice Lumumba, Alfred Hutchison,
and Franz Fanon as a delegate for Algeria.257 In addition to the official list of invitees,
the conference attracted several uninvited freedom fighters who flocked to Ghana after
hearing about the conference. Many of them arriving in Ghana without documents and
requesting Padmore’s Office to vouch for them.258 At the conference, Nkrumah
capitalized on the opportunity to promote his ideas on African liberation, and Ghana’s
recent achievements since gaining independence to entice African revolutionaries and
anti-colonial movements to align themselves with Ghana.
Presenting the CPP as a model nationalist party, Nkrumah promoted his Padmore
inspired methods for attaining independence, particularly the non-violent strategy of
Positive Action. The conference’s resolutions reiterated the commitment to the highest
standards of life through freedom and independence; the creation of unity and community
between independent African states; and the economic and social reconstruction of
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Africa.259 While Fanon was an avid supporter of armed struggle based on the conditions
in Algeria, a compromise was reached in the AAPC’s resolutions which endorsed nonviolence and civil disobedience as well as the right to retaliate against violence where
such retaliation becomes necessary. Ultimately, the AAPC established Ghana as the
nation willing to take the lead in the for African liberation and the base of Pan-African
activity on the continent.
By 1959 Padmore was second only to Nkrumah when it came to Ghana’s foreign
relations and it was in these 9 months that his large influence in Ghana Pan-African
policies was placed on display. Padmore traveled throughout several nations in 1959 and
according to a British Foreign Office report, the Ministers of External Affair “played
second fiddle to George Padmore when it came to talking business.”260 Padmore and
Nkrumah also decided to form the African Affairs Committee, which was a council of
high ranking CPP members, advisors, and non-Ghanaian African nationalists to assist
Padmore in carrying out his duties efficiently and catering to the needs of freedom
fighters and political refugees that flocked to Ghana.261 Central to this was the
propaganda being produced by Padmore’s Office, which used print media and
international radio broadcasts to spread Pan-Africanism in Ghana and the continent.
Padmore’s expertise from his decades of international journalism was put to use
as his office was tasked with producing publications of the AAPC and IAS conferences,
and providing Ghanaian newspapers and booklets to political parties that closely aligned
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with Ghana and the CPP . Furthermore, Radio Ghana was established to spread
Nkrumah’s messages throughout the continent. Also, as Africa revolutionaries flocked to
Ghana, they made use of Radio Ghana to broadcast their programs, concerns, and
messages internationally. Padmore also made it a point to broadcast Nkrumah’s
messages in French and Portuguese to for francophone and lusophone nationalists in
neighboring nations to be reached.
Padmore’s Office also supported the African liberation movement beyond
providing radical literature and radio broadcasts from Ghana. Through his office,
Padmore was able to finance political parties and movements in other nations. The
Office also provided funding for travel to international gatherings, propaganda, and even
in some cases arms when violence was deemed necessary. While the partnerships with
Liberia and Guinea were fruitful, Padmore’s Office ensured Ghana’s influence on the rest
of the continent through his political contacts. His Office established early collaborations
with Hastings Banda’s Nyasaland African Congress, Kenneth Kaunda’s United National
Independence Party, both of whom developed their parties based on the model of the CPP
. Following the AAPC, Patrice Lumumba returned to Congo more radicalized having
abandoned his pro-Belgian politics and conveying “rhetoric [that] echoed that of his
Ghanaian mentor,” which signified the close relationship Nkrumah would develop as
Congo gained independence in the coming years.262
Padmore’s Office’s propaganda drove Ghana’s influence to East Africa, as Julius
Nyerere’s Tanganyika Action National Union adopted the CPP slogan of “Forward Ever,
Backward Never” and appropriated propaganda from the Accra Evening News for his
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speeches.263 Padmore’s influence on the CPP from the early 1950s also manifested in
Uganda, the Uganda National Congress adopted the CPP ’s slogan of “Self-Government
Now!” and patterned their constitution on the CPP ’s aims of eradicating tribal barriers
and unity under a central African government. Also, because of his long-time friendship
with Jomo Kenyatta from their London days, Padmore’s Office established close ties
with Kenya’s Tom Mboya and his People’s Convention Party.
In addition to providing a model for independence movements across the
continent, Padmore’s Office also provided political support by infusing new radicalized
CPP members into the Foreign Service and directing them to raise questions concerning
colonialism and African independence at international gathers, especially at the United
Nations.264 Thus when an African political party or movement was unable to represent
itself in an international conference or the UN, its political statements and requests were
conveyed by Ghanaians supplied with directives and messages from Padmore’s Office.
The success and far-reaching influence of Ghana’s Pan-African Policy as administered by
Padmore’s Office were clear as Ghana became the leading force for African liberation
and unity.
The Personality Cult of Nkrumahism:
Part of this success was due to the emergence of the personality cult known as
Nkrumahism. Merging the notions of Pan-Africanism and Socialism, Nkrumaism was
set forth as by the Accra Evening News as Ghana’s national ideology. Nkrumaism
essentially became the Ghanaian brand of Socialism, meaning it did not represent the
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special interest of individual groups, but rather the interests of people and the
reconstruction of society. It was promoted “as a social idea that maintains the belief that
politically the salvation of Africa was in the effective political union with a continental
federal government” (i.e. a United States of Africa).265 Nkrumaism was heralded as a
“symbol of hope for oppressed Africans,” and promoted the rediscovery of “‘the
African-psyche’ and the attainment of effective African political unity to prevent the
Balkanization of Africa.”266 Since his London days, Padmore knew that Nkrumah’s
vanity was something that required his constant attention; however, he believed in the
necessity of Nkrumahism as a way of operationalizing Nkrumah’s fame as a tool for
advancing Pan-African Socialism. As a result, Padmore maintained that “Destiny has
placed an unshrinkable duty on Kwame Nkrumah, not only to inspire the redemption of
Africa but most importantly, to provide a distinct African state pattern for the emerging
nations of our peoples.”267
This idea of the necessity of a charismatic strong leader that exuded intelligence,
wisdom, and populism, according to Leslie James can be traced back to Padmore’s
political training and upbringing in the West Indies where men like H. Sylvester
Williams, Hubert Harrison, and Marcus Garvey were venerated for expressing some of
the earliest iterations of Pan-Africanism and socialism. Furthermore, Nkrumahism
served as an ideology for gaining national support and inspiring loyalist to leader and
party, which Padmore believed were fundamental to the success of Ghana. It was also
fundamental to propaganda campaigns aimed at presenting Nkrumah to the rest of the
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continent as a champion of African liberation and unity that was primed to lead Africa
into the modern age.
Padmore’s Death and Legacy
By August 1959, Padmore’s Office reached its apex and Ghana’s Pan-African
policy was spreading across the African continent; however, due to cirrhosis of the liver,
Padmore’s health had deteriorated so much that he could no longer hide his condition,
and Nkrumah granted him leave to undergo a medical examination. Arriving in London
in September to consult his physician, Padmore took some days for himself and drafted
letters reiterating his commitment to African unity in a letter to Sekou Toure assuring him
that he would see through the Ghana-Guinea Union. Later in that month, Padmore was
admitted to University College Hospital with fluid in his abdomen and a hemorrhage that
place him in a coma from which he never awoke.268 While many believed Padmore had
been assassinated by imperialist agents, there was never any evidence to support the
claim. While Padmore stated that he wished to be cremated and his ashes buried in
Trinidad in his mother’s grave, the final burial ground is in Ghana. Leslie James notes
the significance of this as there is no monument of Padmore in Trinidad, no institutions
bearing his name, and no evidence of his existence.
In Ghana, Padmore was celebrated as a national hero and son of Ghana. Despite
their disagreements, upon hearing the news of his death Nkrumah stated that Padmore
“was one of the greatest fights against colonialism of our modern times…One day, the
whole of Africa will surely be free and united and when the final tale is told the
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significance of George Padmore’s work will be revealed.”269 Speaking at Padmore’s
burial, Nkrumah remembered that from the time they met fifteen years prior they
“thought along the same lines and talked the same language. There existed between us
that rare affinity for which one searches for so long but seldom finds in another human
being… that indescribable relationship that exists between two brothers.”270
Shortly thereafter, Nkrumah declared September 23 George Padmore Memorial
Day, and on this day each year until his removal from power flooded the Ghanaian press
with special issues dedicated to his friend and mentor’s memory and contributions to the
nation’s independence and that of several other African nations. According to John
Phillips, “it has been said that the late George Padmore had been the moving spirit in
suggesting and organizing the meetings and in stimulating his friend to speak so clearly,
so often and so passionately about Pan-Africanism. Further, it is thought by these and
other circles that much of the Prime Minister’s interest and emphasis upon the African
Personality and the African Community owe their origin to Padmore’s influence.”271
Others maintained that Padmore’s influence on Nkrumah led him down a
misguided path believing that Padmore was “out of touch with the new generation of
African nationalists…[and] that if Nkrumah himself had taken the trouble to ascertain the
thinking of the other African leaders on the subject of Pan-Africanism, rather than relying
on Padmore’s interpretation of what the shape of Pan-Africanism should be, Nkrumah
might have more stature that he has today.”272 Critics would agree with this assessment
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citing Padmore misguiding Nkrumah by supporting his implausible plans for a single
continental state. What became clear following Padmore’s death was that Nkrumah
appeared to be free of the checks and restraints that Padmore brought along with his
counsel. Nkrumah had parted with Padmore in the end, particularly on the issue of
Padmore’s views of communism. Whereas Padmore eschewed collaboration with
communists, Nkrumah desired to forge stronger ties with the east. With Padmore’s
death, the direction and emphasis of Nkrumah’s approach to governance shifted as his
non-aligned position faded as his relationships with Russia and China became more
apparent, and the shrew democratic Padmorean politics of the 1950s became increasingly
authoritarian.
In the end, Padmore’s three years working in Ghana was the period when the
ideas, planning, networking, and political strategy of the three decades converged. He
left Ghana and Nkrumah with qualified and well-trained staff to continue the work of
carrying out Nkrumah’s Pan-African Policy; Ghana had become the center of PanAfrican activity on the African continent and the rest of the world; Nkrumah was primed
to sever its ties to the British commonwealth, and Ghana was poised to implement a
socialist economic development program. Ultimately, Padmore’s death was timely as his
life’s work had culminated in Ghana and his influence set the stage for 1960, the “year of
Africa,” in which seventeen African nations gained independence thus ushering in a new
phase of African history.
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W. ARTHUR LEWIS, PAN-AFRICAN ECONOMICS,
AND DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA
During his 1979 Nobel Prize speech, W. Arthur Lewis recalled: “I had no idea in
1933 what economics was, I did well in the subject from the start.”273 Enrolling at
London School of Economics in 1935, Lewis quickly found himself intent on answering
questions as to why some countries were rich and others poor. Lewis was a success upon
arrival in London, winning the admiration of his professors, one of whom described him
as “My best student, serious and hardworking and remarkably intelligent.”274 In his first
year, Lewis won the Director’s Prize for the best undergraduate essay, showcasing a
maturity quite unusual in a first-year student. After graduating in 1937 with a B.A. in
commerce and first-class honors, Lewis intended to return to work in the West Indies;
however, the Colonial Office denied his application to work as a civil servant in Trinidad
because he was not of European parentage. In spite of multiple rejections because of his
race, one of Lewis’ mentor’s at LSE recognized his gifts for economic analysis and
recommended that he be admitted to the Ph.D. program, noting that he was “the most
brilliant of all graduates whose work I have seen.”275
Lewis’ brilliance and expertise in development economics were not lost to the
Pan-African movement, as he went on to serve as Kwame Nkrumah’s chief economic
advisor as he secured self-governance in the Gold Coast and in the immediate years
following independence. This chapter provides an examination of the contributions of St.

273

Sir Arthur Lewis, “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
1979,” NobelPrize.org, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economicsciences/1979/lewis/biographical/.
274
Robert L. Tignor. W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Development Economics. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006), 17.
275
Ibid., 17.

153

Lucian economist Sir W. Arthur Lewis to nation-building process in Ghana. While
nation-building in Ghana during this time was primarily concerned with creating a base
for Pan-African liberation for the African continent and raising the standards of living for
the nation’s citizens, economics was vital to both of these objectives. Through an
assessment of Lewis’ Pan-African activism and pioneering scholarship in Development
Economics in Britain, his contributions to stimulating economic development and
industrialization in Ghana, as well as the causes of his deteriorating relationship with
Nkrumah, this chapter argues that Lewis was fundamental to Nkrumah’s nation-building
process in the realm of economics.
An Imperial Education for Decolonization
The generation of African nationalists that ushered in independence in the 1950s
and 1960s, had known each other as students in European universities in the 1930s and
1940s. Those African colonial subjects that attended university in London quickly came
into contact with a new Black intelligentsia from the West Indies that prioritized taking
advantage of rigid and “murderously competitive” education system of the British
Empire. In the West Indies, education and the embrace of bourgeois Victorian cultural
notions of refinement were linked to social mobility. As a result, the minds of young
aspiring scholars like William Arthur Lewis, from St. Lucia, were intensely cultivated in
English history, European history, Greek history, Latin, French, and English literature.
The son of two school teachers and the fourth of five sons, Lewis was raised in a
disciplined and hardworking household that produced a psychiatrist, a civil servant, and a
lawyer. His parents passed on their beliefs in the virtues of western culture and English
liberalism, which for them fostered humanism and nonracialism. Equipped with this
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belief in rationality, democracy, a deep faith in human beings to rise above racial and
religious division, Lewis won a scholarship to study at the London School of Economics
(LSE).
Shortly after enrolling in the Ph.D. program at LSE, Lewis’ professors made a
historic decision by inviting Lewis to join the faculty as a temporary one-year assistant in
the economics department. Such an appointment had never been offered before, and his
appointment was approved on the condition that he would lecture and takes classes, but
he would “not see students individually but only in groups.”276 While the appointment
committee was unanimous, it recognized that the appointment of a colored man may be
open to some criticism. Ultimately, the committee’s fears were unfounded, as Lewis was
a success as a lecturer, and after his first year, advanced to the rank of assistant lecturer
along with his contract being extended an additional four years.
While Lewis initially lectured in the field of transportation, he soon began to
teach the principles of economics, economic history, industrial economics (the subject of
his dissertation), and lecture on the interwar economy in Europe and North America.
Recognized as one of the school’s best teachers, Lewis’ courses on issues of development
attracted students of color from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which prompted him to
offer the department’s first course on colonial economics. Setting Lewis’ courses apart
from others offered in the economic department was that instead of focusing exclusively
on British and European economics, Lewis’ new courses dealt with the economic
particularities of colonial territories. As a result, in these lectures lay the seeds for the
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field of Development Economics, which Lewis would pioneer and direct the discourse on
in the late 1940s.
Pragmatism and Pan-Africanism
Although Lewis established a reputation as a dynamic lecturer at the London
School of Economics, his entrance into the Economics Department’s faculty coincided
with an influx of West Indians and Africans into London that reignited the Pan-African
movement. While Lewis’ longtime friend and future president of Trinidad, Eric
Williams, charted a similar path as an academic at Oxford University, his other West
Indian contemporaries, George Padmore, CLR James, and Ras Makonnen became
outspoken figures on the significance of Pan-Africanism to anti-colonialism, African
Emancipation, and Black political organizing in London. Although he was a selfproclaimed socialist, Lewis did not share the reverence of Marx, the Soviet Union, and
trade unionism that many in the Pan-African movement possessed. Still, Lewis shared the
same Pan-African sentiments as Padmore, James, and Makonnen, and eagerly joined the
International Friends of Ethiopia following Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.
Lewis continued to lend his own advice on economic issues in the colonies when the
organization renamed itself the International African Service Bureau; however, he never
shared the strident radicalism of Padmore and Makonnen.277 Instead, Lewis opted for a
partisan approach to politics that placed gradual and immediate political gains over the
passionate populism that drove the activism of the age.
At the time there was no shortage of Black political organizations in London, and
Lewis found companionship in the predominantly West Indian led League of Coloured
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Peoples (LCP). In addition to the sociability provided by the League sponsored dinners
and dances, Lewis found the organization’s moderate approach to its calls for an end to
racial discrimination and colonial reform appealing. In the mid-1930s Lewis became a
leading figure in the LCP when he became the Publicity Secretary and Editor of the
organization’s journal, entitled The Keys.278 While the LCP membership catered to the
West Indian community in London, Lewis used his position as editor of The Keys, to
advocate for colonial reforms and strengthen Pan-African alliances amongst people of
African descent in Britain. Lewis understood the significance of people of African
descent participating in the academic and public discourse surrounding colonialism and
sought to highlight Black voices with The Keys.279
Under Lewis, The Keys was also deployed to attack the foundations of anti-black
racism and European imperialism, which he believed were derived from an unrestrained
and fundamentally immoral pursuit of economic gain. In an early issue of The Keys,
Lewis argued that racial prejudice was “the result of a deliberate policy, executed for
sound economic reasons. Colour prejudice is the active expression of the theory of racial
superiority and the foundation and modern excuse for imperialism.”280 For Lewis,
Europe imperialism existed solely to acquire the cheap raw goods and labor to ensure the
high living standards of modern Europe; however, he maintained that the barbarous
means through which this was achieved (i.e. forced labor, taxed labor, and alienation of
native land) were predicated on the embrace by both the colonized and the colonizers of
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the baseless idea that the backward peoples of the world must be civilized. Lewis
understood that the British empire and racial discrimination went hand in hand and were
both maintained and justified by ideas and assumptions proliferated by knowledge
production institutions in Europe.
Thus, as scholarship of the time continued to promote the false myth of “The
White Man’s Burden,” which predicated the colonial system on sympathy and
humanitarianism, in The Keys, Lewis took aim at the scholarship emanating from British
Universities, which were “amazingly apologetic” towards the British colonial system.
Lewis also understood the bitter hostility of British academics to this new generation of
Black intellectuals who, as LSE anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski stated: “turns our
own weapons against us. He is studying European aims, pretenses, and all the real and
imaginary acts of injustice.”281 Demonstrating the validity of Malinowski’s claim,
Lewis’s 1936 article entitled “ Europe’s Impact on Africa,” Lewis reviewed Lucy Philip
Mair’s Native Policies in Africa, in which he took aim at Mair’s support of the British
policy of Indirect Rule. Lewis argued that “like all good Lugardites,… [Mair] is
suspicious of the educated African, who dares to have his own views as to how Africa
should evolve.”282 With great foresight of the emerging anti-colonial movement, Lewis
warned that: “Those who expect Africans to tolerate for generations a system in which
every European, however ignorant or uncouth, is an aristocrat, and every African,
however cultured, a subordinate, are dreaming a dangerous fantasy.” Lewis would
substantiate this warning with his own work with the LCP and the Pan-African
movement in London.
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In 1938, the Colonial Office’s West Indies Royal Commission (Moyne
Commission) was created to investigate the recent outbreak of labor agitation, strikes,
and violence throughout the West Indies. Collaborating with Padmore, Makonnen, and
other members of the Pan-African movement, Lewis co-authored a memorandum
attributing the labor discontent in the West Indies to the extreme poverty in the region,
which he regarded as a legacy of West Indian Slavery. This poverty, according to Lewis,
was due in large part to the low prices on West Indian exports of sugar and bananas,
which the British government refused to pay a premium for. However, to remedy this
issue, Lewis did not suggest raising prices, rather he concluded that the sole long-term
solution was industrialization and a radical program for redistributing income from the
rich to the impoverished population.
When the Moyne Commission submitted its report in 1939, it recommended the
British Government establish a West Indian Welfare Fund to improve education, public
health, housing, intensify the agricultural sector. In addition to this, the commission
spoke against the “extreme proposals” for immediate and complete self-government.283
Lewis and the LCP would publish a critique of the commission’s report, in which Lewis
objected to the report’s weakness on economics. While the report suggested the
prospects for industrialization were low in the West Indies, Lewis maintained that the
region has vital raw materials and easy access to markets in North and South America,
and more importantly what the region lacked was skilled manpower and capital to
facilitate industrialization and development. Lewis also chided the commission’s report
for its failure to discuss the implications of West Indian slavery that created the social
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conditions and concentration of wealth that were the root causes of the violence sweeping
the region. The Colonial Office was shocked by Lewis’ critiques, and while the Office’s
top economic expert agreed with many of Lewis' suggestions, they resented the fact that
he made his objections public instead of privately sharing them with the Office. This
would not be the last time the Colonial Office would here from Lewis.
Racial Discrimination and The Colonial Office:
In the same year, the League of Coloured Peoples protested the British
government’s discrimination against people of color in the hiring practices of the
Colonial Office. Having been denied employment by the Colonial Office based on his
race, Lewis jumped at the opportunity to serve on an LCP delegation to press the case
against the government’s hiring restrictions against Asians and people of African descent.
Whereas citing, among several other instances, a May 28, 1938, Colonial Office
advertisement for a Jamaican medical officer of European parentage, the League
demanded an unequivocal statement against discrimination in hiring and promotions for
people of color in the colonial services. However, the Colonial Office maintained that
while local colonial peoples could indeed adequately serve in their own native colonies, it
was their belief that they would be unwanted in other colonial areas, which was why
white Britons were preferred. Furthering the Colonial Office’s deflections from the issue
of race, Lord Lugard issued a statement claiming that opening the colonial services to
every British subject would violate the principle of Africa for the Africans.
In response, the League commissioned Lewis to publish the lengthy
correspondence in which the Colonial Office defended its racist hiring practices for
public consumption. The correspondence was accompanied by scathing commentary by
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Lewis in which he argued that “Ever since its inception it [colonial employment] has to
all practical purposes been reserved to white men to the exclusion of those born within
the colonial empire itself.”284 Lewis shot down the Colonial Office’s denial of the
existence of racial barriers, citing job listings that required job candidates to be of
European parentage, quoting a long list of statements from qualified candidates whose
applications had been rejected because of their race. The Colonial Service Recruitment
Manual was also cited by Lewis because of its specific reference to the need for
candidates to be European parentage. Concluding the publication, Lewis stated that:
“Until that determination [race-based hiring] is done away with and people are chosen on
merit alone and posted on merit alone in a colony… the basic problem persists.”285
The public response was overwhelming as the League’s correspondence and
Lewis’s commentary were covered in the Manchester Guardian, the Yorkshire Post, the
Liverpool Daily Mail, the Western Mail, the Bulletin and Scots Pictorial, West Africa, the
New Statesman and Nation, and several others. The Colonial Office was stung by Lewis’
hand in publicizing both the protests of racial discrimination, and his public criticisms of
the West Indies Royal Commission’s (Moyne Commission) report on labor agitation,
strikes, and violence throughout the West Indies. Not only had he exposed their overt
racial discrimination, but at a time when Britain was standing alone against the rise of
fascism, Lewis likened the British government’s bigotry to that one would expect to find
in Nazi Germany. Seeking to address the problems of colonial economies in the midst of
the second world war, government officials turned to LSE for help and it was swiftly
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recommended that the seek the services of the twenty-six-year-old Lewis, whom they
regarded as a rising star in economics.
Based on the recommendations of his LSE mentors, Lewis was offered a
consultant position with the Colonial Office, with the task of preparing a statement on the
subject of mining and industrial undertakings in the colonies for post-war reconstruction
of the colonies. As such, he had no interest in day to day busy work but was rather
interested in taking up policy issues that would promote the economic development of the
colonies. Through his work with the Colonial Office Lewis consulted on several issues of
colonial economics, industrialization, development, and economic planning. Following
Lewis’ first report, which demonstrated the how different parts of the British empire were
attracted to different capital flows, showcased his capacity for critical analysis and
articulation of a high “intellectual standard,” the Colonial Office would bring Lewis on to
serve on it Colonial Economic Advisory Committee, the Colonial Economic
Development Council, and the board of the Colonial Development Corporation
throughout the 1940s. Furthermore, while Lewis’ opinion was highly valued by
government officials, his decision to consult the Colonial Office, in spite of its past racial
discrimination, was predicated on his intention and belief that the British system could be
rehabilitated from within.
The Fabians and Africa’s Man of Destiny
Joining the reemergent Fabian Society shortly after his arrival in London, Lewis’
approach was well within the bounds of their philosophy, which amalgamated the
English Liberal tradition, French Positivist doctrine, and mainstream Socialism with the
goal of establishing “a society in which equality of opportunity will be assured and the
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economic power and privileges of individuals and classes abolished through the
collective ownership and democratic control of the economic resources of the
community."286 The Fabians functioned as an independent research body, with the major
purpose contributing new ideas for British Labour Party policy; subsequently, Lewis’ role
in consulting the Colonial Office on colonial policy to alleviate poverty and promote
development in the colonies contributed not only to the Fabian mission but also to the
Pan-African and African Nationalist ideals of colonial reform as decolonization
approached.
When Lewis arrived in London in the early 1930s, the West Indies was engulfed
in political turmoil, brought on by sluggish export, stinginess in the transfer of public
funds from London, and declining living conditions, which culminated in strikes and
violent confrontations in Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, British Guyana, and several other
islands.287 One of Lewis’ initial responses to this was to write a letter in 1935 to John
Parker, General Secretary of the New Fabian Research Bureau, in which he stated: “if
you do need assistance on the West Indies, I beg to offer my services. I am myself a West
Indian student, and have recently been doing a not-inconsiderable amount of research
into the history, government, and prospects of the West Indies . . . I might add that I am
well known to the leaders of the Socialist Party in this school.” With the backing of
Leonard Woolf who thought that a pamphlet with detailed accounts of history, welfare
conditions, politics, and economics in the West Indies from Lewis was “just what is
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wanted in the Party.”288 This pamphlet, Labour in the West Indies, was eventually
published by the Fabian Society in 1939 and became one of Lewis’ famous monographs.
From this moment forth, Lewis was regarded in political circles as “a close student of
Imperial, social, and economic problems who has spoken and written much on these
matters”289
Labour in the West Indies laid the foundations of Lewis’ future work on policy
proposals for economic development colonial and postcolonial nations. This is
manifested in three particular ways. First, Lewis’ policy ideas for the Caribbean were
emboldened by the strong will for an economic development in which local economic
structures should be diversified, and a federalist framework would be established in order
to economize the cost of infrastructure.290 Second, from a moral and political standpoint,
Lewis denounced the monopolistic nature of white planter aristocracy. Instead, he argued
for a radical land redistribution policy, which would be accompanied by a large scale
educational, financial, processing, and marketing institutions to make peasant production
more efficient and competitive.291 Thirdly, Lewis entered the political sphere, advocating
for popular participation in political life West Indian colonials. For Lewis, land
redistribution needed to be accompanied by improved industrial relations and
constitutional reform.
In 1940 the Fabian Colonial Bureau(FCB) was created to serve as an
independence section of the Fabian Society that was specifically devoted to colonial
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issues. Loosely affiliated to the British Labour Party, which took control of the British
Parliament following World War Two, the FCB maintained close ties to the party and its
politicians and in most cases defended the government’s policies. Black critics of the
British government after 1945 came to view the FCB as the “unofficial mouthpiece” of
the Labour Party government.292 Among the prominent socialist critics of colonial policy
within the society, Lewis was selected to serve on the Bureau’s executive board, which
by the mid-1940s was interested in increasing partnerships between the progressive
forces of Britain and those in the colonies.
As a result, when the FCB held a conference in April 1946 on the colonial’s
criticisms of the Bureau and to exchange views, Lewis was charged with compiling an
invitation list of politically active West Indians and Africans in London.293 Lewis
recommended that the FCB should not seek out solely “bureau buddies and Labour
propagandists” to address the conference attendees, rather “it is your enemies you must
invite, rather than your friends” that must be engaged in dialogue.294 His initial list
included H. O. Davis of West African Student Union, and George Padmore of the PanAfrican Federation, who Lewis described as “the centre of opposition among the West
Indians.”295 It is likely that through Lewis’ initial inquires for Padmore’s participation
that Kwame Nkrumah, now the PAF’s Secretary-General, was recommended to address
the conference. Since Lewis was now a Professor of Political Economy at the University
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of Manchester, there would have been no overlap between his and Nkrumah’s time at
LSE and this FCB conference is likely the first meeting of the two men.
As Africans, West Indians, and British Fabians and Labour Party officials
gathered for the conference, the now-famous Pan-African leader Nkrumah, was the first
speaker in a session entitled: “The Problem of Confidence: Reasons for Distrust on the
Part of the Colonial Peoples.” In addition to the restating the resolutions adopted at the
1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress, Nkrumah delivered a stiff, militant address
condemning colonialism, castigating the Labour Government, and condemning Europe
for its role in drawing artificial political boundaries, alienating land and mineral rights
and crushing the traditional political and cultural systems that led to “retrogression” in
Africa.296 He concluded his speech by stating that:
more gratitude will be shown to the Fabians when they do more when they put into
practice their high sounding principles. You can shackle the bodies and feet of men,
but not their minds. There is justice behind every historical necessity. The
institutions of the colonial world may retreat, but the masses of the colonial peoples
have nowhere to retreat. They have only one cry: ‘Destroy Imperialism.’297
Reflecting on the presence of Pan-African anti-colonialists in attendance, Nkrumah’s
remarks were met with “cries of hear hear and stamping.”298 The response from the
crowd of London’s radicalized African and West Indian activist community reflected the
culmination of Nkrumah’s emergence as a prominent figure in the Pan-African
movement, which was now demanding an immediate end to the colonial system instead
of the prayers of colonial reform from Black activists of the past.
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When Lewis ascended the platform to address the conference participants, he
delivered a dual criticism of the colonial situation. Lewis’ first criticism was directed
towards racism as he stated: “The only people who can transform the colonies into
anything worthwhile are the educated Natives, intelligentsia…[But] as soon as a Native
can read and write, he automatically becomes an opponent of the British Government…
Every educated African and colonial knows that he can get the highest qualifications and
competence, but he cannot get the highest jobs. He is bound to have to work under a
white man who may be even of inferior inability.” For Lewis, these comments reflected
his own experience with racial discrimination in the hiring practices of the Colonial
Office. Lewis leveled his second criticism against the frustrations among his fellow
colonial elite, who were “principally interested in acquiring power—few make a serious
study of colonial problems and would know what to do if they acquired power. Their
frustration distorts their perspectives, makes them ill-informed, strident.” Reaffirming his
Fabian approach to colonialism and development, Lewis suggested: “The art of
democratic government is acquired painfully and gradually, and this is precisely the
opportunity which is denied to them.”
Addressing his fellow Black intellectual activists, Lewis asserted that “Fabians
are never interested in general principles, but in specific problems. A Fabian who gets an
itch to do something goes down to Islington looks at the local laundries, and comes back
with a red pamphlet report on what is wrong with the laundry system and how municipal
ownership would improve it. Then along comes a colonial politician with an eloquent
discourse on the general principles of the rights and wrongs of mankind, which the
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Fabian interrupts impatiently with ‘Yes, yes . . . but what are your laundries like?’”299
Thus, the Fabian approach was concerned with addressing the specific issues of society
through gradualist democratic means, and this would be their approach to the issue of
colonial policy. Unfortunately, this did not bode well with the radicalized nature of the
Pan-African movement, which was now demanding independence and placing violence
on the table as a last resort means for ending the colonial apparatus.
In this appeal to the radical Pan-African movement, Lewis was suggesting a waitand-see approach to the FCB and the new Labour government. Since the Labour Party,
whom the Fabians regularly advised on colonial policymaking, had seized control of the
British government following World War Two, its colonial policy was that of benign
trusteeship, meaning that Britain’s now flailing post-war economy was now dependent on
exports from Africa and the West Indian colonies to replenish foreign exchange reserves
within the Empire.300 Understanding the principles of Fabian gradualism, as well as the
rage derived from the colonial experience, Lewis found himself in a trying position.
Concluding his speech, Lewis maintained that “We must give the new Government time,
and see what it does . . . If it does change we must co-operate. If not, then I agree with the
previous speaker: we must push the British out and do the best we can for ourselves.”
In spite of these remarks, Lewis, in a letter from later in 1946, appeared to have
been skeptical of the Labour Party’s command of colonial policymaking and urged the
FCB to keep its distance from the Labour government. In a letter to Rita Hinden, Lewis
stated that FCB’s past activities appeared to render “the bureau to a sort of reformist
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‘leftwing of the colonial office’ line, which it may have adopted in practice, but which it
has never adopted or intended to adopt in principle.”301 Thus, with the era of
decolonization approaching, Lewis’ involvement with the FCB and the colonial
policymaking, pushed his focus to the issue of development planning in the colonies.
The Lewis Model for Developing Colonial Economies
Following the second world war, Lewis's area of specialty had been industrial
economics, and the history of the world economy, which he began to study while he was
still at the London School of Economics. As Lewis recalled in his Nobel Prize speech in
1979, Frederick Hayek, LSE’s chairman of the Economics Department, suggested that
Lewis teach a course on the economics of the period between World War I and World
War II. Admitting that he very little knowledge of what had happened between the wars,
Lewis was told that the best way of learning a subject was to teach it. This ultimately
culminated in the first of a dozen influential texts by Lewis entitled, Economic Survey,
1919–38, which was published in London in 1949. This also prompted Lewis to develop
special expertise in the economics of the developing world, a topic for which there were
no formal curricula at LSE. Motivated by the special interests that students of African
and Asian descent had taken in his classes and the ongoing struggle for independence,
Lewis undertook the task of investigating and solving the problem of economic
development in the tropical colonies.
Although he was from the West Indies and was outspoken on economic
development in the West Indian colonies, Lewis maintained a particular interest in

301

Lewis’s comment on the draft of Hinden (1946) can be found in: FCB 31/3, ff. 1– 4. In Mine. “The
Political Element In The Works of W. Arthur Lewis.” (2006), 343.

169

Africa. In a 1937 article entitled “African Economic Problems,” Lewis concluded that
the reckless and unregulated quest for wealth that manifested in the industrial revolution
in Europe threatened to impoverish the African continent.302 By the mid-1940s, Britain
was forced to come to terms with this reality, as it turned to its underdeveloped colonies
to replenish its post-war economy. As a result, there arose a new emphasis on long-term
economic planning to stimulate economic growth.303 This culminated in the Colonial
Office ordering ten-year development plans be submitted by the colonial Governors in
1944.
In July 1948 Lewis assessed the viability of these ten-year development plans, in
a Manchester Guardian article entitled, “Colonial Development: The Defects of the
“Plans.” In the article, he argued that these plans were unequivocal failures because they
had not grappled with the magnitude of what for him was the problem of development.
For Lewis, this was the failure of colonial governments to help the people in the colonies
to master their environments to make better use of their resources.304 In his opinion, “the
cart was put before the horse,” as governors draw up these ten-year plans without
surveying the prospects for economic development and necessitating mass education
amongst the peasantry to optimize the agricultural sector.305 Furthermore, in many
cases, these plans overlooked the central problem of colonial development, which Lewis
observed to be the challenge of reforming the existing peasant agricultural sectors.
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Lewis expounded upon his position on the centrality of agriculture to colonial
development in his 1949 pamphlet The Principles of Economic Planning, in which he
explored the disputes between planning by direction and laisser-faire economics, issues
of nationalization, and planning in “backward” colonial societies. Since industrialization
was the key to economic development in the colonies, Lewis framed agriculture as “the
crux of the problem.”306 He argued that economic progress in colonial societies
necessitated an optimized large-scale agricultural sector, which required fewer laborers
and would consequently supply a seemingly infinite labor force to the industrial sector to
thrive on. While economic planning was the focus of the pamphlet, Lewis was also
beginning to identify the linkages between surplus workers in the traditional agricultural
sectors and industrialization. He began to take a particular interest in the large reservoirs
of cheap and unskilled labor in the West Indies, Africa, and Asia, compared to the limited
and unskilled labor in the English countryside a century and a half ago prior to the
industrial revolution in Britain. These initial ideas served as the basis for his dual
economy paradigm, which came to be known as the Duel Sector Model, the concept most
strongly associated with Lewis to this day.
This model was expounded upon in Lewis’ most influential academic publication,
“Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” which Lewis’ sought to
address why some countries were wealthy and others were underdeveloped with largely
impoverished populations. More importantly, Lewis set forth his own theory on how to
raise the living standards of the Third World’s poor. In this article Lewis, divided the
undeveloped colonial economies into two primary sectors, the
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modern/capitalist/industrial sector, and a backward/traditional/agricultural sector, and
stressed the multidimensional nature of economic growth, arguing that no sector should
be permitted to progress more rapidly than others.307
Lewis’ notion of dual-sector development centralized the significance of the
unlimited supply of labor for the capitalist industrial sector being drawn from the
traditional agricultural sector. Lewis envisioned the main sources of labor for the
industrial sector consisting of surplus laborers from the optimized agricultural sector,
casual labor, petty trade, domestic service, and migrant labor. Additionally, Lewis
included wives and daughters in the household, which was progressive for the time as the
divisions of labor in colonial African nations confined women to the agricultural sectors
and market economies, thus precluding them from participating in the industrial
workforce in many cases.308 Furthermore, since this labor in the industrial sector would
be available at the minimum wages of the agricultural sector, the economy’s employment
would expand along with capital formation, making rapid capital accumulation possible.
Additionally, for Lewis, the inefficiency of food production per man in the
agricultural sector was the cause of such low prices for exported commercial produce. As
a result, Lewis argued that raising the efficiency of “food production would automatically
make commercial produce dearer” in international markets and cheaper domestically.309
Thus, productivity gains from the agricultural sector and the reinvestment of profits in the
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industrial sector would lead to growth in the total output of goods. This, according to
Lewis, was one of the senses in which industrialization was dependent upon agricultural
improvement; as it was not profitable to produce a growing volume of manufactures
unless agricultural production is growing simultaneously.310 It was also why Lewis
suggested that “industrial and agrarian revolutions always go together, and why
economies in which agriculture is stagnant do not show industrial development”311 As
such, under Lewis’ model, the capitalist sector expands, with profits growing relatively,
and an increasing proportion of national income being re-invested in the nation’s
economy. 312 This was the result that emerged from the Duel Sector Model.
Lewis’ “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor” was possibly
the most influential essay in the field of development economics as one of the most cited
essays of the 1950 and 1960s, and still read by aspiring economists to this day. The
notion that broadly rising prosperity requires concurrent productivity growth in
agriculture and industry, made possible by unlimited supplies of labor from the
subsistence sector, had a place not only Lewis but the field of Development Economic on
the map of the economic profession. Lewis’ centralizing of “the concept of ‘agrarian
excess’ or ‘surplus population’ or ‘disguised unemployment in agriculture’ was what
distinguished him from economic literature of the past, and the immediate impact of the
article placed these concepts in fore of all conversations regarding economic planning
and development in the colonials.313
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A year later, Lewis expounded upon his ideas on development further in his text,
Theory of Economic Growth, which soon became a major contribution to the emerging
field of development economics. Focused on economic growth, or rather the growth of
output per head, Lewis drew on his extensive knowledge of history, humanities, and
economics to emphasize that all elements of society, including social structures, political
systems, scientific knowledge, and religious doctrine, have a direct impact on economic
growth.314 Seeking to understand the fundamentals of economic growth, as well as why
that growth was confined to certain societies, Lewis identified three primary causes of
wealth and poverty including the will to economize, the accumulation of knowledge, and
the accumulation of capital.315 In doing so Lewis, underscored the significance of the
fundamental changes in attitudes, belief systems and institutions to cultivate the will to
economize, the greater importance to mass education for the accumulation of knowledge,
and the role of the government as an instrument of capital accumulation.316
In addition to this, Lewis reiterated his belief in government-directed economic
planning, which he envisioned to include government spending on public works and
utilities working in tandem with regulated private sector initiatives. Still, Lewis, was
wary of the shortcomings of centralized government planning in that all too often become
“undemocratic, bureaucratic, inflexible, and subject to error and confusion” as
governments became overly ambitious in their plans. Lewis preferred a “piecemeal
planning” approach that focused on a shortlist of initiatives such as capital formation,
food production, or industrialization and “leaving the rest of the economy to adjust itself
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to demand and supply.”317 Furthermore, beyond shortages of capital, skilled labor, and
foreign exchange, the particular political and social conditions faced by underdeveloped
colonial nations necessitated individualized government plans for economic
development.
The Theory of Economic Growth was concise and written to appeal to a broad
audience of non-economic specialists; however, for economists, the text had broken new
ground and provided hypotheses and theoretical models for an emerging field that were
primed for testing as decolonization escalated. As a result, in the 1950s Lewis quickly
emerged as one of the most innovative and prominent scholars of development
economics. His views on economic planning, his “Theory of Economic Growth,” and the
significance of optimizing the agricultural sector as a prerequisite to industrialization had
become attractive not only to his students and colleagues in the academy, but to the
British Colonial Office, the United Nations, and colonial governments pushing for
independence as well. Lewis became well sought especially among African nationalists,
many of which were educated in London where his reputation as a scholar and extensive
work in the Colonial Office, the League of Coloured Peoples, and The Keys placed him in
high regard. Having participated in the Pan-African movement as a member of the
League of Coloured Peoples, and working alongside George Padmore, C.L.R. James, and
Ras Makonnen in the past made him, Lewis an ideal candidate for Kwame Nkrumah to
consult on matters of economic development in Ghana.
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Lewis’s Contributions to the Gold Coast Revolution
Two years after addressing the Fabian Colonial Bureau’s conference on relations
between the FBC and the Colonial Office, both Lewis and Nkrumah had departed
London to further their careers. Lewis, after being denied a professorship at the
University of Liverpool for being of African descent, had been hired at the University of
Manchester in 1948, becoming Britain's first Black University Professor. Whereas
Nkrumah had returned to the Gold Coast to serve as the United Gold Coast Convention’s
General Secretary and deliver the final blow against British colonial rule. While
Nkrumah was organizing a nationalist mass movement, winning elections from prison,
and by 1951 entering an era of what historian, Ama Biney, called the “Dyarchic
Partnership,” reflecting the sharing of power-sharing between Nkrumah and the CPP ,
and the colonial governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, Lewis had been gathering his
thoughts for his Dual Sector Model, and training a new generation of African and Asian
economists at the University of Manchester.
In addition to this, Lewis was heavily involved with the Black activist community
in Manchester. The site of the storied 1945 Pan-African Congress, Manchester the home
of the Pan-African Federation’s headquarters and during the early 1950s, Lewis
collaborated with Ras Makonnen, a seasoned Pan-African activist and mentor of Kwame
Nkrumah, on several initiatives for the Black community in Manchester. Lewis and
Makonnen’s work included collaborating with several organizations including the West
Indian Social Club, the Negro Association, the African Students Union, and the Gold
Coasts Brotherhood. Lewis was also regularly featured in British print media and the
British Broadcasting Corporation speaking on the state of colonial economics, especially
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in Africa. As a result of his notoriety in Britain as an expert on colonial and development
economics, his ongoing work with Makonnen, as well as his distinguished reputation
amongst the African Nationalists living in Britain, Lewis’ expertise and services were
requested by Nkrumah as the Gold Coast entered the phase of decolonization and
independence approached.
In the early 1950s, Gold Coast society possessed extremely high political,
regional, ethnic, and religious tensions and division; however, it was a colony with
tremendous economic potential. As Nkrumah built a populist-nationalist movement with
a political base in the southern coastal region, the Asante region was home to the
colony’s largest source of cocoa production as well as Nkrumah and the CPP’s largest
and most formidable opposition. Seeking to use the profits generated from the booming
cocoa sales of the post-war years for economic diversification and development, the
British and nationalists in the Gold Coast viewed cocoa as the colony’s key to
industrialization and modernization.318 Regarded as the model African colony, the Gold
Coast had a relatively high standard of living compared to other tropical colonies,
heighten prospects for economic growth, a multigenerational tradition of educated elites
with strong connections to British colonial officials, established private British firms, and
no white settler population.319 Furthermore, while it was believed that the Gold Coast had
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more opportunity for development than anywhere else in Africa, the British Colonial
Officials charged with overseeing economic planning were adept in finance (i.e. creating
budgets and tax codes) but possessed very little background in creating the
comprehensive plans for long term economic growth that were now being addressed in
the emerging field of development economics.
As Lewis had observed in 1948, the ten-year plans for the colonies were
unequivocal failures and in its review of the plan for the Gold Coast, the Colonial Office
deemed a bad plan that was weak on economics, agriculture, and use of land.320 Sir
Andrew Cohen, then the Colonial Office’s Assistant Undersecretary for African Affairs
observed that there were good relations between the government and the people, plenty of
money and great economic potential; however, there appeared to be little thought
“devoted to the problem of developing the natural resources,” which he perceived as “a
gap in what I think is an otherwise thoroughly happy picture.”321 The current plan which
devoted 59 percent of expenditures of railways, harbors, education, and public, and a
mere 17 percent to industrialization and agricultural development, risked the colony
facing rising annual expenditures with no guaranteed sources of revenues if or when the
post-war cocoa boom waned.
Cocoa was king in the Gold Coast during the decolonization era. From the Great
Depression until World War II, world cocoa prices were low and controlled by British
colonial marketing boards; however, once wartime rationing came to an end the world’s
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overindulgence of chocolate and its price both skyrocketed.322 As a result, the Gold Coast
Marketing Board, to the dismay of the Gold Coast cocoa farmers, chose to pay cocoa
farmers well below the world price and placed cocoa profits into gilt-edged securities –
high-grade bonds issued by the British government to generate post-war revenues – in
London to be used in case the world prices plummeted and for development projects.
J.B. Danquah, a prominent leader of the UGCC and a representative of the Gold Coast
cocoa producers on the board, opposed cocoa surpluses being used for long term
development projects. Danquah charged the Gold Coast Marketing Board with being
more interested in development rather than the welfare of the cocoa producers, which was
an accurate assessment as increasing profits to export-import firms and expanding
harbors were logical objectives of any colonial economy.323 Nonetheless, the state
embraced the idea of using the cocoa surplus for development to spur economic
diversification, transform the Gold Coast’s dependence on a single export crop economy,
and raise the nation’s standard of living.
Once Nkrumah had been elected Leader of Government Business in February
1951, he and the Colonial Governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, were in agreement that
with regards to the cocoa industry, it was the government that should control all matters
of policy that affected national interests, including cocoa prices and surpluses.
Furthermore, after forming the new government, Nkrumah swiftly passed legislation that
reduced the membership on the cocoa marketing board from twelve to seven and place
the board under the authority of the Minister of Commerce and Industry, K. A.
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Gbedemah, whom Nkrumah had appointed himself. Nkrumah reorganized the board
seats with the goal of placing national interests above all other agendas as opposed to
“the extreme sectoral and regional representation” of the formerly Danquah led boards.
As the cocoa industry experienced unprecedented prosperity, surpluses approach £80
million, Danquah who believed the funds should be invested in gilt-edged securities
instead of being “frittered away by power-drunk politicians in their wild-cat schemes of
unreal paradise for Ghana.”324
Danquah’s comments reflected a growing discontent between Nkrumah’s central
government and Asante, the nation’s largest cocoa producing region, over not only the
use of cocoa profits but more importantly the future of the nation. In spite of these
disagreements, the Colonial Office maintained that economic progress was vital for any
prospects of decolonization and the eventual transfer of power to the Gold Coast
Nationalists. As such, these new developments in the cocoa industry necessitated a
reassessment and revision of the colony’s ten-year plan with a particular emphasis on
industrialization. Taking up this task, Nkrumah and the CPP allocated more funds to
economic growth and development, and Nkrumah himself was named chairman of the
new development committee. With control over the direction of development, Nkrumah,
in search of an expert to draft plans for industrialization, turned to W. Arthur Lewis.
Industrialization in the Gold Coast
In 1950, Lewis concluded that while colonial peoples were eagerly interested in
the prospects of industrial development and that in several cases it was vital to their
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progress; however, the ten-year plans approved in the mid-1940s showed at most token
provisions to implementing modern techniques of state-sponsored industrial
development.325 As such, when Nkrumah and the Gold Coast government requested
Lewis’ assistance in investigating the prospects for industrialization, he eagerly accepted.
Entering the politically charged economic situation was the optimistic Lewis, who along
with his wife and daughters visited the Gold Coast from December 15, 1952, to January
4, 1953.326 On this trip, Lewis traveled the colony extensively. Covering 1,800 miles by
road and air to visit industrial establishments and speak with as many people as possible.
All of his research culminated in a seventy-page report that was published by the Gold
Coast Government for wide circulation in 1953.
Lewis wasted no time as he opened the report with a concise overview of the best
ways to industrialize the Gold Coast, which in his view started with: (1) the processing
for export of primary products (agricultural or mineral); (2) manufacturing for an
expanding home market; and (3) manufacturing for export of light manufactures, often
based on imported raw materials.327 At the time, Lewis concluded that the third
component of industrializing was out of reach as the Gold Coast did not possess the
cheap skilled labor for light manufacture exporting; however, this was the case for most
developing nations. As it concerned the processing of primary products for export, Lewis
noted that, outside of cocoa and palm kernels and oil, the only processing industry with
promise was the industry, as the Gold Coast was equipped with large forests and cheap
labor to cut and process the timber for export. Coming as a shock to most of the radical
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nationalists in the CPP , Lewis viewed the Gold Coast’s number one priority to
industrializing was in agricultural improvement.
Years before his article “Unlimited Supplies of Labour” was published, Lewis
argued in his Report on Industrialization and the Gold Coast that “If agriculture is
stagnant, industry cannot grow.”328 While the Gold Coast’s primary export of cocoa was
believed by most to have unprecedented economic potential, Lewis’ concluded from his
survey that productivity in the agricultural sector, including cocoa, showed very little sign
of an increase and “almost certainly stagnant.”329 In his opinion, agricultural production
per person outside of the cocoa industry was constant, and probably in decline for the
cocoa industry. As such, Lewis asserted that the key to industrialization in the Gold Coast
was to take aggressive means to increase food production, which he believed to be the
surest was of creating a large demand for manufacturing without which there could be
little industrialization. In addition to this, Lewis understood that high standards of living
could not be reached in an economy in which half of the people are scratching the ground
for food with a hoe. Thus, for Lewis, a food industry that optimized production with
fewer farmers producing more, would eventually provide labor and stimulate the
industrial sector of the economy.
In his assessment of the industries to be invested in, Lewis found that the home
market to be restricted. The industries with favorable prospects were salt, beer, lime,
bricks and tiles, cement, and industrial alcohol. Lewis deemed cigarettes, foundry
products, weaving cotton and rayon, and rubber manufacturing, as marginal industries.
These lists were so short first because the Gold Coast did not have many industrial raw
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materials, and second because the demand for textiles was rather small; however, he
believed the list would grow as the standard of living rose. Lewis placed the investment
figures for these industries at £3 million per year; however, it was not the state that he
believed should undertake the investing. Since squeezing £3 million a year out of the
people of the Gold Coast could not be done without lowering their standard of living,
cause discontent among the masses with any government, Lewis recommended
government funds be invested in the agricultural sector. As a result, it was clear to Lewis
that industrialization was impossible in the Gold Coast without foreign private capital and
the knowledge of expatriates. Furthermore, Lewis maintained that the most pressing
question would always be the terms on which foreign enterprise came and how much of
their own capital they would invest.330
Concluding the report, Lewis prioritized agricultural modernization since
agricultural productivity per man was stagnant. Doing so would increase productivity,
and provide the market, the capital, and the labor for industrialization. Lewis
recommended next prioritizing improving public services, which would reduce the cost
of manufacturing in the Gold Coast and attract new industries. He also maintained that
while increasing the manufacture of commodities for the home market deserved support,
it should not be a priority and any major programs for it should be implemented once the
nation was prepared to carry it out. Very many years, Lewis concluded, would have to
elapse before it became economical for the government to make major investments of its
own resources towards industrialization. As such, foreign capital was necessary and
should only take place on favorable terms for the Gold Coast government. This presented
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a number of conundrums for the Gold Coast as it sought to sever its ties to Britain, as
doing so with an assertive or contentious stance could jeopardize access to British capital.
On the other hand, acquiescence to the terms of British capital could potentially
undermine the modernization aspirations that Nkrumah possessed for building an
industrialized and economically independent nation and raising the living standards of
Ghanaian citizens.
Furthermore, among the terms, proposed by Lewis were only supporting
industries that could be established without large and continuing subsidies, working with
firms that were willing to train and employ Africans in senior posts, free transfers of
profits and dividends, and fair compensation if nationalization took place.331 In addition
to this Lewis recommended the government establish an Industries Division in the
Department of Commerce, abolish import duties on industrial raw materials, construct a
first-class hotel in Accra, and increase the staff of the Industrial Development
Corporation for research, advising new industries, administering industrial estates, and
operating government-owned factories.332
Lewis’ report was well received by the staff in the Colonial Office, who praised
the pragmatism of his recommendations. For the radical members of the CPP , who had
been enamored by the writings of George Padmore, Marx, and Lenin, the conservatism of
Lewis’ report and his recommendations for attracting foreign private capital for
industrialization to take place must have been difficult to read. The report was still
respected and held in high regard in their public pronouncements. In a letter in June
1952, K.A. Gbedemah, Nkrumah’s appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry,
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thanked Lewis for a “lucid and comprehensive document” that “will be of the greatest
value to the Gold Coast Government in formulating an economic policy for future
industrial development.”333 A month later he wrote Lewis again to inform him that the
Gold Coast government had approved the report for publication at once.334 Still, when
Gbedemah mentioned the government, he was referring to the government that had been
put in place by Nkrumah and the CPP that was now partnering with the British Colonial
government.
While Nkrumah and the Colonial Office praised Lewis’ findings, the report and
Lewis himself became a regular topic of debate in the Legislative Assembly, as ongoing
debates on development and industrialization took place. When asked about the
government’s plans to encourage development and the establishment of industries in the
Gold Coast, Mr. E. K. Bensah, the Ministerial Secretary to the Ministry of Commercial
and Industry, announced that the government had adopted a general policy of promoting
development and establishing new industries through the Industrial Development
Corporation (IDC). He maintained; however, that the IDC could not cover the total costs
of financing this development and industrialization and, that it would be the
government’s policy to seek investment from foreign capital.335 This general policy of
the government, Bensah reiterated, was to be presented in full once Professor Lewis’
Report on Industrialization and the Gold Coast, was completed.
Once the report was published and placed in circulation, it was regularly cited by
representatives for matters of development and industrialization, but also for the on-going
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debates over Africanisation of the Civil Service in the Gold Coast. In November 1953, J.
K. A. Quashie, a CPP representative of the Volta region, referred to Lewis’ report in
support of the training that was necessitated by Africanisation. Specially Quashie quoted
Lewis’ recommendations of sending young people abroad to firms in Britain, India,
Japan, or any country that would agree to have them for training. And upon their return,
these specialists would have received enough training and experience to go into business
on their own, work in existing firms, or in Government service.336 Quashie’s comments
reflected not only the prolonged debate regarding the employment and promotion of
qualified and experienced Africans in administrative and supervisory positions in the
civil service, but also the applicability of Lewis’ report to varying issues of Gold Coast
society.
When the Legislative Assembly debated the budget in February 1954, Nkrumah
announced that the government had accepted Lewis’ report and his recommendations for
industrialization. Nkrumah seemingly resolved to Lewis’ findings announces that “it will
be many years before the Gold Coast will be in a position to find from its own resources
people who combine capital with the experience required in the development and
management of industries. It is therefore apparent that the Gold Coast must rely to a
large extent on foreign enterprise, and the government is anxious to give it every
encouragement.”337 Nkrumah appeared to be enthused and in agreement with the report
assessments as he echoed Lewis’ recommendations on foreign firms training and
promoting African personnel, welcoming foreign investment, promising to place no
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restrictions on the repatriation of profits, and fair compensation if nationalization were to
take place in the future.
Although Nkrumah had built a mass nationalist movement and was the Colonial
Office were in agreement with Lewis’ observations and sounds recommendations for
industrialization, the Gold Coast was still in political turmoil. In spite of Lewis’
acclaimed report, J. B. Danquah, leader of the UGCC opposition party, unable to object
to the report, was confined to complaining that the CPP did not know what to do about
industrialization until “a West Indian Negro called Professor Lewis came here for a
fortnight’s visit and made a survey of the country’s needs.”338 Declaring that Lewis had
not told them anything they had not already known, Danquah argued that actually what
the nation needed was a new government that would carry out these industrialization
schemes with vigor.
Reflecting the politically charged speech of an oppositional party leader with an
election year approaching, Danquah took this as an opportunity to denounce the efforts of
Nkrumah and the CPP , and assert that if his party were in office “we would change the
face of the country.”339 Shortly after this Kwame Nkrumah and the CPP would go on to
sweep the Gold Coast’s 1954 elections, and swiftly freeze the price paid to cocoa farmers
at 72 shillings a load, even though the world price was sharply increasing.340 This
prompted the formation of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) in the Asante
region, which was followed by nearly two years of violence between CPP and NLM
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members, in the form of bombings, assaults, and several political murders. In the midst
of this political unrest, Lewis’ services were requested on a regular basis by Nkrumah
and his administration.
What Would Lewis Do?
Lewis would continue to visit the Gold Coast throughout the rest of the 1950s, as
Nkrumah and Gbedemah would turn to him for his advice regarding issues of economic
development, industrialization, and the Volta River Scheme. Although Lewis’
recommendations allowed for the emerging ideas from development economics to
influence many of the economic programs in the final years of colonialization, the official
architect of economic development in the Gold Coast was Kenneth Tours. The
Cambridge educated, British national, Tours had been loyally serving in the Gold Coast
colonial administration since 1931. Holding several positions during his nearly thirtyyear tenure with the British Colonial Office, he was appointed Minister of Finance in
1954 for a brief period and served as the government’s Economic Advisor from 1954 to
1956. While this was the very position that Lewis would hold in the near future, Tours’
appointment was ultimately counterproductive to Nkrumah’s economic aspirations as he
was far from an expert in development economics, nor was he an economist.
Tours’ predecessor and former Minister of Finance, R. P. Armitage, believed that
the Gold Coast needed, for his replacement, a financial and economic adviser with vast
knowledge and experience in financial and economic matters not only in Africa but other
parts of the world. Armitage appeared to be describing an individual of Lewis’ stature;
however, the Colonial Office, in spite of his bold and seemingly reckless financial
proposals for the Gold Coast’s surging cocoa surpluses, opted to promote Tours instead.

188

Far from a trained economist, Tours’ rarely considered the political implications of his
proposals, which he himself characterized a “nuts,” as the Gold Coast nationalists became
increasingly divided on the question of cocoa in the mid-1950s.341 Additionally, his
promotion, no doubt, contributed to the frustrations regularly expressed in debates in the
Gold Coast Legislative Assembly regarding the Africanization of the civil service.
Nonetheless, Tours began his tenure as Minister of Finance in 1954 with the backing of
not only the Colonial Office, but also Nkrumah, and Gbedemah, both of whom were
seeking transformative proposals for rapidly developing the Gold Coast’s economy.
In his first budget speech in February 1954, Tours underscored the necessity of
becoming more than a single crop exporting economy. Seeking to capitalize on the
booming cocoa prices on the world market, Tours thought it best to increase cocoa
production and for the state to retain the surpluses to carry out the ten-year economic plan
as rapidly as possible. Tours and Nkrumah were both in agreement about it being
counterproductive to return funds back to the cocoa farmers and preferred making the
nation, as a whole, the beneficiaries of the cocoa industry. He also increased government
expenditures to £2 million a year for projects with immediate payoffs. Tours believed
this would enhance tax revenues and enable the government to set aside special funds to
finance its second development plan and the Volta River Project, which was a focal point
of Nkrumah’s plans for industrialization and nation’s future as the epicenter of PanAfrican unity for the African continent. While, the Colonial Office was skeptical of these
plans from their initial proposals; however, they offered no objections in fear of
jeopardizing Tours’ influence on Nkrumah.
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By 1955 it had quickly become apparent that Tours’ plans had gone awry. His
plans ignored Lewis’ recommendations, as they placed an overemphasis on
industrialization, neglected agriculture, and further alienated the cocoa-producing regions
of the colony, which by that time had consolidated under the National Liberation
Movement. Additionally, Tours had overlooked Lewis’ suggestions on keeping
government expenditures low and by late 1955 feared funds from the increased cocoa
duty would be swallowed by the rapidly rising recurrent annual expenditures. The Gold
Coast’s worrisome financial situation was made clear in the government’s 1955
Development Progress Report, which revealed that resources were stretched thin and the
ten-year plan was behind schedule. Interestingly enough, the Report cited Lewis’s report
on industrialization several times regarding the nation’s desperate need to increase food
production for economic development to take place. According to historian, Robert
Tignor, Tours seemed haunted by Lewis, as the economic planners in the Gold Coast
government increasingly referred back constantly to Lewis’ report as a guide and with a
disposition of “what would Lewis do?”342
The same was true for Tours, who throughout his tenure as Minister of Finance
and Economic Advisor, remained in contact with Lewis from whom he sought approval
of his plans. One such example of this came in early 1955 when Tours wrote to Lewis
regarding his own ideas on lowering the nation’s Company Tax. Also since Lewis had
also been consulting the Gold Coast government on the Volta River Project (VRP) since
1952, Tours requested that Lewis verify that his calculations based on Lewis’ most recent
report “meets the case as you meant it to be met.”343 In his response to Lewis noted that
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his reaction was negative, as Tours’ proposal for the Company tax made it “too easy to
evade” and created unfair taxation between certain companies.344 Lewis maintained that
no country had these kinds of taxation for these reasons. Regarding the new VRP, Lewis
noted that Tours’ calculations were premature as the 1956 budget had not yet been
approved and negotiations had not concluded. Furthermore, while Tours believed his
ideas to be innovative and radical for spurring economic development, his proposals
merely revealed his own nescience to economic planning.
Lewis’ perfunctory responses reflected the dynamic of the relationship between
him and Tours. On multiple occasions during Lewis’ visits to the Gold Coast to consult
on the VRP, Tours was known to chase “Lewis like a bloodhound” between meetings
from seminar room to seminar room to hastily present his ideas for Lewis’s approval.345
Conversely, in situations where Lewis objected to his plans, Tours would often dismiss
Lewis as “an ivory-towered academic [who was] out of touch with the harsh political and
economic realities of the Gold Coast.”346 Reflecting the deteriorating outlook on the
Gold Coast’s prospects for capitalizing on its cocoa surpluses, Tours reported to the
Colonial Office that Lewis confessed he “thanked God that he was not responsible for
that [the Gold Coast finances].”347 Lewis’ remarks were corroborated when Tours
reported that all of the Gold Coast’s revenue sources, including the cocoa duty, would be
used to balance the new regular budget.
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Interestingly, this budget was expected to go into deficit and cocoa prices were
projected to plummet during the next fiscal year, which also conveniently coincided with
the nation achieving independence. When the Colonial Office declared the prosperous
years over in the Gold Coast at the end of 1956, Tours quickly departed, blaming his
failures on Lewis’ influence on Nkrumah, and racial stereotypes, claiming the African
habit of mind was predisposed to “always lives beyond income.”348 However, it was not
lost on the Colonial Office, nor Lewis, that even with Tours’ economic plans depleting
the cocoa surpluses, the Volta River Project seemingly dead in the water, and the
development plan in disarray, Ghana’s great economic potential endured, if the country’s
resources could be operationalized efficiently and creatively.
Independence and Courting Lewis to Work in Ghana
Despite Tours’ handling of the economic situation, the British granted
independence in March 1957, and Lewis, like several prominent figures from the African
world, was in attendance for the celebrations in Accra. The same euphoria brought on by
independence and a promising future on that Ghana represented for the African continent
and the diaspora was not lost on Lewis. His own Pan-African sympathies dated back to
his childhood when his father would take him to hear Marcus Garvey speak. During his
time in London, Lewis regularly collaborated with the Pan-African Federation and its
founding members, a number of whom were still close advisors to Nkrumah since he
returned to Ghana in 1947. Among these advisors was C.L.R. James and George
Padmore, whom Lewis met with regularly when he lived in London and received regular
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updates on Nkrumah’s progress towards achieving independence throughout the 1950s.349
Additionally, with Ghana in need of a new Economic Advisor, Lewis’ activist work in
London and his standing as a foremost expert on development economics made him a
natural candidate for the roster of prominent Pan-African figures that Nkrumah was
assembling for his administration.
As such, in the weeks following Ghana’s independence celebrations, Nkrumah
offered Lewis a position as the endowed Chair of Applied Economics at the University of
Ghana. Lewis rejected this initial offer, admitting that he had been at research
institutions his entire career and that instead of teaching undergraduates at the University
of Ghana, his next career move would likely be into administration, as he was already
serving as the Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies at the University of
Manchester.350 He had also recently rejected an offer of the position as Principal of the
University College of the West Indies, citing unfinished research that he needed to
complete. However, since his attempts in the 1930s to work for the Colonial Office in
the West Indies, Lewis maintained a strong commitment to contributing to the
development of the region he called his home. As such, he admitted to Nkrumah that he
expected “if the job is offered to me [again], I shall probably accept and do the best I
can.”351 Still, Nkrumah was persistent in seeking Lewis’ services in Ghana.
Next Nkrumah offered Lewis a lifetime contract to serve as the Ghanaian
government’s Economic Advisor. This was a position that piqued Lewis’ interest, as
Ghana stood to be a perfect testing ground for his theories on development economics.
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Furthermore, racial liberation and remedying the issue of economic under-development
in the impoverished nations of the world were two of Lewis’ passions, and advising the
first African nation to achieve independence presented an alluring prospect. As such,
Lewis tentatively accepted the position on May 29, 1957; however, understanding the
intertwined nature of economic policy and politics, Lewis was wary of being too closely
aligned with the leader a ruling party in a nation as politically divided as Ghana. As a
result, Lewis requested that Nkrumah seek his services through the British Government
or the United Nations, who had placed Lewis amongst its own select “Group of Experts
on Under-developed Countries in 1951” and had appointed him as a consultant to the
Gold Coast Government in 1953.352 Acquiescing to Nkrumah’s request, the United
Nations Technical Assistance Administration assigned Lewis to work in Ghana in the
Office of the Prime Minister to “give advice on such questions as the Prime Minister
refers to him from time to time.”353
After Lewis was assigned a top U.N. salary at the time of $12,000, the University
of Manchester granted Lewis’ request for a two-year leave of absence and his position
was official. Subsequently, while the British government recognized that Lewis
possessed extensive knowledge of the economic situation in Ghana, his socialist
principles were a cause of concern. Still, they had observed “Lewis is a socialist, but a
moderate one,” and with his influence on Nkrumah, they believed that Lewis could “be a
useful counterweight” to the lefts, like George Padmore and Geoffrey Bing, that
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Nkrumah was stocking his government with.354 Thus, while Lewis’ past work with both
the U.N. and the British government encouraged them to believe he would be a
“moderating influence in Ghana,” upon his arrival they were quickly made aware of
where his loyalties lay.
Seeking the Economic Kingdom:
While Lewis accepted his appointment as Nkrumah’s Economic Advisor in May
1957, he was unavailable to begin working until October of that year, as he had been
living in California where he had been a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) at Stanford University since 1956. Leaving Stanford in
late July 1957 Lewis to make his way to Ghana, the demand for his expertise was placed
on display. On his journey, he stopped in Mexico to deliver a lecture, traveled to a
conference at the University College of Jamaica, and then to Trinidad to spend five
weeks advising the Trinidad government, where his old friend from his student days in
London, Dr. Eric Williams was serving as Chief Minister and leading an independence
movement of his own.
Demonstrating the high demand in which Lewis’ economic advice was regarded,
Williams had offered Lewis to serve as his own Economic Advisor back in 1955, which
Lewis most likely regrettably reject in order to complete his research projects at the
time.355 After this Lewis, his wife and two daughters left Trinidad by ship for England.
There the Ghana High Commissioner in London would arrange for Lewis to meet with
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members of the Bank of England who had advised on the central bank that Ghana was
establishing, officials of the Board of Trade working on the Common European Market,
officials of the Cocoa Marketing Board, and anyone he felt it necessary to meet with.356
In these meetings, Lewis intended to make the acquaintance and ascertain the views of
the people with whom he would be dealing with as he guided Ghana in its assertion of
economic independence.
Arriving in Ghana on October 30, 1957, Lewis was prepared to use his expertise
to place his Pan-African ideals in to practice. He was in full embrace of the nationalist
cause of the nation, as Nkrumah and Ghana looked to Lewis to advise them on which
aspects of the British system to retain, discard, and expand as he devised financial
programs to harness Ghana’s storied economic potential. In a welcome letter in 1957,
Nkrumah expressed his pleasure and enthusiasm for Lewis’ arrival and spelled out his
intentions for his tenure as Economic Advisor.357 After initially surveying the country
and a general stock-taking of Ghana’s entire economic and financial policy, Nkrumah
instructed Lewis to focus his attention on the 1958-59 Budget; the Volta River Project;
Industrialization, particularly smaller industries; the construction of the new port at Tema
and its new Township; and most importantly to construct a Five Year Development Plan
to commence in June 1959.
In addition to these high priority programs, Nkrumah also requested that Lewis
assists in resolving the problem of how revenue-earning Government Departments and
Corporations could be made more profitable; serve on the Standing Development
Committee, and most importantly to train two or three young economists that could carry
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on the programs he initiated following his departure. What was clear was Nkrumah’s
aim to deploy Lewis’ expertise in every capacity possible, as well as the high stakes
riding not only on the success of the nation to make a strong entrance into the modern
global economy but on himself. With the world’s eyes gazing upon Ghana, Nkrumah
laid his nation’s economic and financial challenges upon Lewis, having visited Ghana
four times and advised his government since 1952, was perhaps the most qualified
individual for the task.
Exposing Britain’s Mismanagement of Ghana Investments
In addition to the welcome letter from the Prime Minister, waiting on Lewis’ desk
in Ghana was a cautionary report issued by the World Bank, which corroborated the
pessimistic views of the British Colonial Office regarding Ghana’s economy. The report
underscored that a “serious readjustment” was needed in Ghana’s fiscal field as the
ambitious goals of the ten-year plan resulted in rising recurrent expenditures that were
now drawing on finds that had been earmarked for development to balance the ordinary
budget.358 The report also noted that while nation reserves were still substantial, they
were unlikely to remain so for long. In spite of these conditions, Lewis’ concerns over
Ghana’s economic situation were quelled by the prospect of the nation approximately
£200 million in sterling reserves, which he believed could be deployed to formulate a
pragmatic five-year plan at the cost of £100 million “without blinking an eye-lid.”359
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Ghana’s Minister of Finance, K.A. Gbedemah, however, did not share Lewis’ confidence
in the nation’s reserves.
Observing that the reserves had been invested in low-risk, long term, gildededged British securities, Gbedemah believed these securities would better serve Ghana’s
budget and development plans if they were liquidated and reinvested in commercial
bonds that yielded larger returns. While Gbedemah was perhaps the most knowledgeable
of Ghana’s financial and economic matters at the time, he was hardly an expert as his
highest level of education had been in secondary school. His position as Minister of
Finance as a result of his involvement in Nkrumah’s nationalist movement, in which he
served as Vice Chairman of the C.P.P and ran the party’s newspaper, the Accra Evening
News. As a result, when the self-taught Gbedemah traveled to London in September
1957 to discuss his concerns with officials of the Bank of England, they swiftly dissuaded
him from transferring the sterling reserves on the grounds that Ghana stood to lose
heavily if the assets were sold at that moment. For the moment the experts at the Bank of
England believed they had silenced the Minister; however, after reassessing the reserves
Gbedemah found that the value of sterling reserves that had been invested and managed
by the British Government’s Crown Agents had “been severely depressed by the recent
rise in the United Kingdom Bank rate and the general lack of confidence in the pound
sterling.
After informing Nkrumah, Gbedemah was sent back to London, this time with an
expert of his own in Lewis. Reflecting the haste with which decisions were being made,
Lewis “was given twenty-four hours’ notice to accompany the Minister of Finance to
London, on a mission the purpose of which was not announced until after we had left
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Ghana.”360 While he had no prior knowledge of how Ghana’s sterling reserves were
invested, Lewis quickly recognized the Crown Agents’ mismanaging of the funds.
Ghana’s reserves fell into three categories, two of which had been mishandled. The first
category consisted of £70 million in sterling balances that Ghana had accumulated from
its contributions to British efforts in World War II and from budgetary surpluses from the
cocoa revenues in the post-war year. The second category of reserves was from the
Cocoa Marketing Board, worth around £40 million, and the third totaling in £41millions
from the holdings of the Ghana Currency Board. It was discovered that the Crown Agents
had mismanaged these funds and incurred substantial losses as the first category of
sterling reserves had shrunk from £70 million to £61 million in 1957, and the £40 million
investment from the Cocoa Marketing Board had suffered a 25% decline in value.
Arriving in back London less than three weeks after his initial departure for
Accra, Lewis was deeply critical of the Crown Agents’ investment strategy. In the
meeting, Lewis noted that while these funds had been channeled into long-term
securities, that would indeed incur substantial losses if sold at the present time, it was
discovered that Ghana had lost one-seventh of its original £150 million in reserves and
surpluses.361 He expressed that these heavy losses of Ghana’s surpluses had shaken the
confidence of the Ghanaian government in the competence of Crown Agents’ ability to
safeguard Ghana’s interests. In addition to this, it was discovered that of the over one
thousand different funds managed by the Crown Agents, totaling nearly £1,000 million
had depreciated as well.362 Upon his arrival in London, Lewis received a letter from a
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colleague at the University of Manchester, informing him that the British newspaper,
“Guardian” reported that these talks of the sterling reserves would be Lewis’ first official
act as Ghana’s Economic Advisor.363 It was clear that his endeavors in Ghana were
being observed not only by the British government and professional economists but also
by academics and the general public.
Understanding the implications for the international standing of the British
sterling if this embarrassing news of the failings of the Crown Agents were to become
public, Lewis leveraged his and Gbedemah’s knowledge of the situation to remove
Ghana’s funds from the Crown Agents and place them under a Ghanaian management
team. Additionally, the Commercial Bank of Ghana was endowed with the authority to
manage the nation’s reserves and chose to no longer make investments through the
Crown Agents. Subsequently, the Commercial Bank of Ghana along with Lewis oversaw
the process of selling off the British securities and purchasing of other investments that
would be available for liquidation when and as the Ghanaian government needed them.
Until this point, Ghana’s surpluses, which their plans for economic development
and industrialization rested, had been heavily invested in the British sterling, as it was
championed as a steadfast currency; however, the losses suffered during World War II
and the rise of the United States as the world’s dominant economic power contributed to
the sterling’s decline in the post-war years. The Bank of England and the Commonwealth
Relations Office were relieved that Nkrumah had “an advisor of such impeachable
reputation and ability as Professor Lewis,” and preferred his discretion to Gbedemah’s
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“wild ideas about what could and should be done” in response to the British Crown
Agent’s lack of stewardship.364
It was apparent that the British, in the post-war years, sought to sure up their own
depleted economy using funds from their empire, and to later funnel resources back into
the colonies. However, the British had not expected the push for decolonization, let
alone independence, especially in Africa, to arrive so quickly. Consequently, the
realizations from these meetings stripped away the elation of political independence that
had overcome Ghana months prior. In fact, it reinvigorated Nkrumah and the Ghanaian
government’s drive to assert its economic independence, which now because of Lewis’
expertise, had full control in the managing of its investments, and sought to free itself
from the bounds of a supposedly rock-solid international currency by establishing a
currency of its own.
Lewis’ Reception in Ghana:
Lewis’ endeavors in the reorganizing of Ghana’s sterling balances, corroborated
the legitimacy of his observations in his 1953 Report on Industrialization, that Ghana
must reduce its dependence on cocoa for economic development. The gravity of his role
as Economic Advisor to the first African nation to achieve independence set in as his first
assignment required that he take on the Bank of England and expose the decline of the
British sterling. It was more apparent to Lewis that his “usefulness here [Ghana] depends
on my having the confidence of the prime minister”365 While Nkrumah’s trust in Lewis
was apparent in the long list of tasks, projects, and policies that his advice was sought for,
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including his last-minute mission to London to reorganize the sterling balances, Lewis
was still a foreigner and an expatriate working in Ghana.

Nkrumah’s embrace of Pan-

Africanism for Ghana extended beyond a racialize imagined community standing in
solidarity with each other. Rather, a fundamental principle for Ghana’s government under
Nkrumah was the practicing of Pan-Africanism in government. Although Ghana became
the epicenter of Pan-African activity following independence, Nkrumah’s Pan-African
endeavors and recruiting of foreigners, including those from the African diaspora, were
not supported everyone in Ghanaian society. This was exemplified best in the case of
George Padmore, the Trinidadian who was serving as Nkrumah’s Advisor on African
Affairs and was regularly slandered in Ghanaian print media and scorned by Ghanaian
politicians because of the power and influence he wielded. This was not the experience
for Professor Lewis in his role as Economic Advisor.
Upon his return from the meetings with the Bank of England, Lewis was finally
able to focus on the Ghanaian economy and along with this came his ingratiation into
Ghanaian society. Early on Lewis’ reception by Ghanaian society was, on the whole,
positive experience as letters of support and requests for his presence were sent to this
office. In a December 1957 letter from a Ghanaian nationalist, named J.B. Ferguson,
Lewis was welcomed “to land you rightly can claim as your own.”366 Several Ghanaians
had been following Lewis’ work since his Report on Industrialization in 1953 and agreed
with this belief in a firm agricultural sector being the precursor to industrialization and
economic development. While Lewis had been featured in Ghanaian newspapers since
the early 1950s, others knew of him from his BBC interviews and were struck by his
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frank, sincere, and directness when discussing African sovereignty and the development
in Africa. For many he was viewed as coming “to the aid of [his] people” and with his
“efforts [to] be fruitful in the pursuit of economic and social redemption of the African
and peoples of African descent.”367 Lewis, fundamentally concerned with raising the
standards of living of the people of underdeveloped nations, customarily honored these
words of encouragement and support with a humble reply of: “I shall endeavor to do my
best.”368
In addition to this, the Ghanaian elites were eager to entertain Lewis at club
meetings, dinners, and university programming. By the end of December 1957, Lewis
had accepted an offer to serve as Vice President of the Ghana Geographical Association,
surely not for his expertise in Geography, but rather for the high regard in which he was
held and the notoriety it would bring to the organization.369 Lewis’ presence was
constantly being requested, as clubs and organizations competed for his attendance at
their meetings. In one instance, Lewis regrettably declined dinner with the Cosmopolitan
Dining Club because he had already committed to spending the same evening with the
West African Cocoa Research Institute.370 Additionally, by 1958, he was serving as
President of the Economic Society of Ghana. People normally sought to not only use
these opportunities to speak with Lewis regarding the economic situation and challenges
facing Ghana but also to establish a relationship with a government official free of ethnic
ties and with direct access to the Prime Minister.
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Lewis was also regularly invited to speak at the University College of Ghana,
especially the Institute of Extra-Mural Studies, regarding his approach to economic
development and industrialization.371 He was also awarded an Honorary Fellowship to
the Akuafo Hall of Excellence at the University College of Ghana in 1958. With a
pristine record of Pan-African activism, working with the British Colonial Office and the
United Nations, as well as being a highly respected economist in the British academy,
Lewis distinguished himself from the radical Padmore and Makonnen, as he embodied
the respectability and Victorian values that many British educated Ghanaian elites strove
for.
Lewis’ notoriety in Ghanaian society, along with the excitement for economic
development was so widespread that the Ghana Broadcasting System featured New
Year’s Message from Lewis to be read to the nation. In his message, Lewis proclaimed
that Ghana entered 1958 with confidence for the economic future, as work on the fiveyear development plan commencing. Lewis assured the Ghanaian public that the plan
would include economic policies for industrialization, diversifying agriculture, roads,
electricity, education, health and other social services.372 Encouraging the Ghanaian
people to recommit themselves to their trades, and to seek further education and skills
training, Lewis reiterated the development was not solely dependent on the government
but also on what each individual does with their opportunities. Finally, he concluded his
message with good wishes for the people to “find peace in your heart and prosperity in
your pocket.”373 In addition to his own message, Lewis advised Nkrumah on his
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Christmas Message to the nation, in which Nkrumah declared the overall welfare the
Ghanaian people, including the abolition of poverty, improving healthcare, education,
water access, and electricity, as the measurements by which the government would be
judged.374 The overlap in Lewis and Nkrumah’s messages to the nations was apparent, as
the Prime Minister and his Economic Advisor seemingly entered 1958 in agreement
regarding the path forward. However, the year would prove to be the most difficult of
their time together as Lewis formulated the 1958-1959 Budget and the nation’s Five-Year
Development Plan.
Ghana’s 1958-1959 Budget
Having rectified Ghana’s sterling reserve balances and completing his surveys of
Ghana’s economic and financial policies, Lewis was now free to turn his attention to
drafting the nation’s budget for the coming year. Early on in the process, Lewis was
optimistic about his plans for the budget, as reflected in his New Year’s Message to the
nation. Unfortunately, by January 1958, Lewis was forced to confront his growing
frustrations with the Ghanaian government. In a letter to a fellow economist, Robert R.
Nathan, Lewis admitted that while “We have been pretty well served in Ghana on the
statistical side, including their preparation and analysis of economic statistics…We are
not so well served on the economic side.”375
By this, Lewis meant that from an administrative and resources standpoint, what
was needed was an “Economic Section, with about half a dozen professionals, doing
work of which is now done in three or four other Ministries by non-professionals.”376
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Lewis even admitted that although it was not difficult to find professionals, Ghanaian and
expatriate, who share the government’s objectives for industrialization, the real challenge
was to find half-a-dozen men who are competent to run £4,000,000 worth of state-owned
industrial enterprises.377 In addition to this Lewis feared that many of the expatriates
working in the Civil Servants were contemplating leaving Ghana, because of their own
dissatisfaction with Ghanaian Ministers and the recent decision to postpone the start of
development programs until 1959, which Lewis viewed as “a political mistake of the first
order.”378 In response to these fears, Lewis developed a plan to borrow technicians from
the government of India, which had already been approved by the Indian Prime Minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru.
Still, the primary purpose of Lewis’ mission to Ghana was to create and
implement an economic development plan for the nation; consequently, Lewis did not
take the drafting of Ghana’s budget lightly. A decade earlier, in July 1949 Lewis
authored a pamphlet for the Fabian Society entitled The Principles of Economic
Planning, in which he argued that “The budget is not the only instrument available for
planning, but it is the most important, the most powerful, and the most embracing.”379
For Lewis, the national budget was the main instrument and the foundation of economic
planning and in the case of Ghana, Lewis’ budget prioritized industrial and agricultural
development.380 In doing so he sought to address two roadblocks on Ghana’s path to
economic transformation: the increasing recurrent expenditures in place from the
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previous ten-year development plan and the now declining cocoa prices that were once
thought to possess unprecedented potential and easily capable of funding Ghana’s
development projects. Early on Lewis struggled to get recurrent expenditures under
control, as they had increased 60% in the past four years. Lewis feared that if they
continued to rise at such a rate the nation would soon be bankrupt. As a result, his “cry
[was] for less in the ordinary budge and more in the development budget. The second half
of this cry” Lewis admitted was “more welcome than the first,” as several government
officials did not share Lewis’s conservative approach to government spending.381
Lewis was “also concerned about the over-reliance on cocoa revenue,” and hoped
“to get a more balanced tax policy.”382 His approach to development in Ghana consisted
of what historian, Harcourt Fuller, referred to as “industrialization by invitation,” which
sought to diversify Ghana’s agricultural sector and encourage industrialization by inviting
public and private business firms to invest in Ghana’s economy.383 As a result, the
budget also proposed tax code incentives for attracting foreign capital. Critical to the
budget was Lewis’ reorganizing of the Industrial and Agricultural Development
Corporations, which he believed were pivotal to aiding private firms in identifying
profitable projects and providing start capital for local business. Reflecting the Ghanaian
government’s commitment to innovation, Lewis believed the Industrial and Agricultural
Development Corporations to be the key to economic development as they would connect
the interests of domestic and foreign private capital to those of the state.384
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Thus, while Lewis’ reasoning and planning were sound from an economic
standpoint, the budget failed to live up to his expectations, as the pressures of reconciling
politics and sound economics quickly became apparent. In The Principles of Economic
Growth, Lewis asserted that “Where corruption is rife in the Treasury, the budget is not
powerful enough for planning.”385 Unfortunately, the corruption pulsing through the
Ghanaian government soon became apparent to Lewis. After reorganizing the Industrial
and Agricultural Development Corporations, Lewis placed both corporations under the
direction of Ayeh Kumi, a successful businessman in Accra. While Lewis recommended
Kumi for his strength of character as well as his experience as a skillful businessman, he
soon gained the alias of “Mr. Ten Per Cent,” as corruption was rampant throughout the
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC).386 A key example is found in the Ghana
Bottling Company, which many believed would have been a success had 75% of its
profits been siphoned off to the CPP and the remaining 25% to the IDC.
In addition to this Lewis observed that the administrative machine was not
running smoothly, as relations between Ghanaian Ministers and the expatriates working
in the Civil Service had begun to deteriorate. He observed that Ministers had begun to
circumvent the administrative process by formulating policy without consulting Lewis or
the Civil Servants regarding administrative and technical issues. This often resulted in
policies reaching the Cabinet before meeting Lewis’ approval and even in one case,
Lewis having to ask Nkrumah to stop a policy from being implemented after it had been
passed by the Cabinet. 387 Matters were made even worse as Ministers increasing took
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“on unqualified relatives” along with “constant interference from ministers and other
politicians in the operations of particular projects.”388 These administrative woes caused
Lewis a great deal of frustration as he contemplated his future plans for not only devising
a plan for development but also implementing it. Furthermore, after the National
Assembly adopted his budget proposals, Lewis was able to devote his attention solely to
the new development plan, which would place the intertwined nature of economic
policymaking, state-owned companies, and political patronage on full display.
Preparing Ghana’s Second Development Plan
Ghana’s Second Development Plan was the most important assignment that
Nkrumah would task Lewis with completing during his time in Ghana. Lewis was
recruited to work in Ghana for his expertise in development economics and his extensive
work and research on economic planning. Lewis’ primary objective in preparing the
development plan was to promote fiscal realism among the Ghanaian politicians so that
an affordable plan could be drafted and executed in a timely fashion with immediate
economic gains. Such a plan, in Lewis’ opinion, would not exceed £70 to £80 million or
£15 million a year for five years and was easily within the fiscal capabilities of the
nation. Understanding that Nkrumah would desire as much to be included in the plan as
possible, Lewis believed that launching a £100 million plan was still pragmatic and
would have a great advantage of restoring purpose and direction to the government in
matters of economic development.389 Conversely, while Lewis advised Nkrumah and his
Ministers on the putting forth a cost-effective plan, that would draw on foreign capital
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and avoided draining the cocoa surpluses, in May 1958 the ministers prepared
departmental requests and proposals for a plan with allocations totaling £185 million.
Lewis’ recommendations for a conservative and affordable plan had fallen on deaf ears,
as Ghanaian politicians, including Nkrumah, seemed uninterested in exercising fiscal
restraint in their proposals for the plan.
Ministers and government officials viewed the plan as a vehicle for their own pet
schemes and some even began signing contracts for programs before they were even
approved by Lewis and the development committee for the final draft of the plan. By July
1958, Nkrumah released a memo to his cabinet that allocations totaling £277,804,000
represented the framework of an impressive Second Development Plan, which he wished
to see put forward for implementation over a five-year period beginning July 1959.390
Maintaining the necessity of making cuts to the swelling costs of the plan, it seemed that
Lewis represented the sole voice of reason as Nkrumah’s desire for rapid results and
extravagance went airy. In response to Lewis’ insistence on reductions to certain
programs in the plan, Nkrumah was clear that priority should be given to Industry and
Electricity, Defence, Health, Agriculture, Tourism, and the Floating Dock, in that
order.391 His favoring of Industry and Electricity come as no shock, as industrialization
and the VRP had been the basis of economic development planning in the nation since
the late 1940s. However, the priority given to allocating funds to the nation’s defense
(Army, Navy, Air Force, and Territorial Force) speaks to Nkrumah’s vision for placing
Ghana on the international stage not only as an economically modern nation but also as a
military power as well.

390
391

Minutes of A Meeting of the Cabinet, July 11, 1958, 1. Lewis Papers, box 21 folder, 7.
Ibid.

210

Still, Lewis and Nkrumah’s priorities for the plan bore a stark difference in that
Lewis sought to prioritize Agriculture and Industry, Electric power, Secondary education,
Rural water supplies, and Public Health.392 For Lewis, Agriculture and industry, as they
had since in 1953 Report constituted the most important priorities beyond all other
because they were the keys to economic development, which was needed to support
everything else. He noted that “the first development plan must be written off as a
failure,” as the nation spent £93 million on development between 1950 and 1957.393 And
while there were substantial improvements in road networks, electricity supplies, doubled
the number of children in primary schools, and reduced unemployment, the money place
into circulation did very little to increase basic production, as imports increased by 80%,
including a doubling of food imports. As a result, what concerned Lewis more so than
the prioritizing of allocation to certain programs was that, although Nkrumah claimed the
emphasis of the plan was to be economic development, only £79 million had been set
aside for non-economic schemes. For Lewis, the duel sector model was still the basis of
economic development. Thus, to achieve an increase in agricultural and industrial
output, Lewis acknowledged that they must spend less on everything else than was spent
in the first plan.
This meant that the allocations for the non-economic schemes or “prestige”
projects of Nkrumah and the Ministers needed to be drastically reduced. For Lewis, many
of these prestige projects contributed neither to production nor to the people’s welfare.
Among them were the international conference hall costing £1,000,000, a navy, air force,
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external broadcasting, and medical school costing £3,000,000, and £650,000 a year, an
elaborate University architecture, a large floating dock costing £1,500,000, airlines,
shipping lines, palaces for Regional Commissioners and innumerable embassies.394 To
tax the people of Ghana for “such frills,” Lewis believed, was to impoverish them.
Furthermore, he suggested that such extravagance would damage Ghana’s prestige
abroad, giving the impression that Africans don’t know the value of money and are
incapable of making sensible judgments.
Perhaps the largest prestige project being forced into the second development plan
was Nkrumah’s magnum opus, the Volta River Project, which featured the government’s
major hydroelectric dam. The Akosombo Dam was the largest single infrastructure of its
time and was intended to provide electricity not only to the entire nation but eventually
all of West Africa according to Nkrumah’s plans. The dam would also provide cheap
electricity for aluminum smelting project, which was intended to use Ghana’s rich
bauxite deposits to export aluminum and decrease the nation’s dependence on cocoa.
The construction of the Akosombo dam was also expected to create the largest man-made
lake in history. This lake was intended to facilitate the creation of a transport system
linking southern to northern Ghana, supply water for agriculture, and to expand the
nation’s fishing industry.395 Nkrumah believed the VRP was the nation’s key to
economic development and national prosperity; however, in Lewis’ opinion, Ghana
simply could not afford the project.
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Negotiations and planning for the VRP had been taking place since the 1940s, as
the British believed the electricity and the aluminum produced by the dam would greatly
benefit their empire as it recovered from the second World War. Following Nkrumah’s
election in 1951, he immediately reached out to Lewis for his advice through their mutual
friend, George Padmore on how the project could be financed. Always skeptical of
colonial government’s, the British enthusiasm and eagerness to provide loans for the
VRP, to Padmore, seemed to be nothing more than a ploy for them to maintain control
over Ghana after independence. Lewis’ view on the VRP in 1958 was the same as it was
in 1952, which was that Ghana’s lack of investment capital and technical expertise could
not be overcome without foreign capital.396
As he prepared the second development plan, Lewis believed the development of
the country to be more important than the Volta River Project, which he “consider to be
of only marginal significance” and entirely too expensive for the current plan. Lewis
observed that relying on the Volta Dam as the single power source to electrify the entire
country was not a practical proposition from a financial standpoint. Ghana could not
afford to do so since electricity would be sent out from the dam into the grid, and then to
transformers throughout the country to tap the grip for power. Furthermore, these
transformers and other equipment would cost $150,000 for each site where the grid
would be tapped. Lewis thought it wiser to install diesel generators for $10,000 to
$50,000 rather than spend $150,000 to tap the grid.397
Still, he believed that even if a Volta dam was built, most of the country would
still have to rely on individual generators for electric current, and apart from the VRP’s
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aluminum industry, electric power from the Volta dam is virtually irrelevant to the
general electrification of Ghana. Lewis believed that if the VRP were to materialize then
the Second development plan would need to be cut by another £25 million. Lewis and
others developing the project for the past decade had always believed that funding for the
dam would come from foreign capital. Furthermore, spending all the money Ghana had
on the VRP would surely exhaust the nation’s borrowing powers in the future and
according to Lewis, be the end of all other development in Ghana for the next ten
years.398
Lewis was aware that foreign companies were eager to invest in Ghana; however,
he believed the irresponsible spending being proposed for the development plan would
ultimately impede Nkrumah’s objective to secure economic stability in Ghana and the
liberation of the rest of the continent from colonial and foreign domination. In his
opinion, Ghana could not afford to spend more than £100 million in the next five years
and should not try to do so. Lewis worried that such an expensive second development
plan would use up Ghana’s reserves and borrowing capacity in its five-year run time,
leaving nothing for the third development plan. He recognized that virtually no
development occurred in Ghana between the 1930s and 1958; however, he warned
Nkrumah and his cabinet that the temptation to bring about all of the development that
should have occurred during the past thirty years in such a short period of time must be
resisted. Because of this Lewis believed that the plan should include programs that
address the present needs of the people and while some programs could be excellent and
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were badly needed by the people, they could be postponed until the Third Development
Plan.
In a note to Nkrumah and his cabinet regarding the current state of the
development plan, Lewis declared that “This is not a development plan, but merely a
wish list.”399 For Lewis planning was the basis of economic development. As such, he
maintained that “planning consisted of cutting one’s coat according to one’s cloth,” and
that “If ministers merely draw up a wish list of what they would like to buy, irrespective
of what is possible, they must not call it a plan.”400 Moving forward the viable plan,
Lewis believed, was to cut non-economic schemes down to an allocation of £40 million.
Doing so must not be difficult if each program considered for removal were subject to
three criteria: (1) it did not contribute to the welfare and security of the people; (b) it did
not require a department receiving a larger allocation than it can reasonably spend, and
(c) it was being funded merely because credit was readily available.
It was clear to Lewis at this point that the government had not yet decided
whether it was “merely drawing up a list for propaganda purposes, or if it is really
making a plan, that is, deciding seriously what to do with its limited resources. Making a
list of things we would like to have is not planning, and so far this is all that has been
done.”401 In spite of this neither Nkrumah nor the Ministers were willing to abate the
magnitude of their proposals and continued to pressure Lewis as he prepared the plan. As
a compromise, Lewis chose to divide the plan into two phases, the first consisting of high
priority programs that surely be achieved in five years, and a second, which Lewis
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labeled as a “wish list,” consisting of programs to be implemented if money and time
remained.402
This however did not quell the ever-increasing tensions between Lewis and
Nkrumah, who had now been in dispute for months regarding the “spending spree” that
Nkrumah and the Ministers had embarked on, as Lewis attempted to pare back their
prestige projects. As such, an inescapable moment arrived in August 1958, when Lewis
penned a letter to Nkrumah formally expressing his frustrations stating that the plan “as it
now stands is awful. It makes inadequate provision for some essential services while
according the highest priority to a number of second importance.”403 Lewis was clear
regarding the cause of the current state of the plan, attributing its lack of balance to its
“many schemes on which the Prime Minister is insisting for “political” reasons…a whole
packet of schemes, none of which develops the country or adds to the people’s welfare.”
In addition to this Lewis included an £18 million “special list” of Nkrumah’s pet
projects including a floating dock, new airports in all regions of the nation, an
international conference house, a yacht for V.I.P.s, a royal palace, external broadcasting,
new embassies, and a new medical school. Lewis then reminded Nkrumah that in order
to give him “these toys,” he and the Development Commission had to cut down severely
on water supplies, health centers, technical schools, roads, broadcast rediffusion,
irrigation, the Agricultural Development Corporation, telephones, housing and other
services which the common people need so badly. He also reiterated that the heavy
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recurrent expenditure of these pet projects would only be met by additional taxes that
would “effectively impoverish the people.”404
In his final plea, Lewis begged Nkrumah to reconsider his advice. First, he
reminded Nkrumah that the common people of Ghana loved and trusted in his decision
whether it was an international conference hall or water supplies. This Lewis believed
gave Nkrumah duty to allocate funds not to projects for swank or politics until their
essential needs had been cared for. Next Lewis begged Nkrumah “on behalf of black
people everywhere” to consider that white people have always said that people of African
descent did not know how to spend money.405 Furthermore, he reiterated that the current
plan made not just Ghana but the entire race look ridiculous for “spending on showing
off, instead of on essentials,” and that Africans in every content looked to him and Ghana
to prove them wrong.
Finally, Lewis pled “as a socialist” that while the people still had no water nor
access to healthcare, spending money on embassies, air forces, yachts, and other such
boastfulness was “downright sinful.” From the outset of his career as an economist,
Lewis’ concern had been for using development economics as a vehicle for raising the
standard of living of the ordinary of lesser-developed nations and Lewis’ committed to
these principles were on display. His words, however, had no effect on Nkrumah and by
November 1958 the cost of the development plan had swelled to over £200 million, with
at least 50% of the total expected to be financed by the Ghanaian government. What was
clear at this point was that Nkrumah viewed the plan and his prestige projects through a
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political lens, as demonstrations of the CPP’s power and security, as well as an assertion
of the political stability of his regime.
By December 1958, Lewis had taken nearly as much as he could stand, as
Nkrumah had “messed up the Development Plan” with his lavish spending on
unnecessary projects (International conference halls, airlines, floating docks, and large
embassies abroad etc.) making it “one of the worst plans ever published.” With Nkrumah
now rarely seeking or heeding his advice, Lewis was now tired of playing nursemaid to
grown men, but also growing weary of the political atmosphere, which he described as a
“fascist state [that was] in full process of creation.”406 Lewis was no doubt referring to
the new legislation prohibiting strikes and thus neutralizing trade unions, as well as the
Preventive Detention Act passed in July 1958 that provided Nkrumah with power to
deem individuals threats to the state and have them arrested for up to five years without
trial.
Expressing his frustrations to his close friend Hugh Keenleyside, director-general
of the Technical Assistance Administration at the United Nations, it was clear that Lewis’
time in Ghana had run its course. However, Lewis preferred to avoid making his
departure a public issue for enemies of Africa to seize upon. Furthermore, while it was
common knowledge that Lewis had accepted a position as a professor of Economics at
the University College of the West Indies starting in October 1959, Keenleyside provided
Lewis with cover for his departure by offering him the position of Deputy Director of the
United Nations’ Special Fund for Economic Development. Still, Lewis reached out one
more time to Nkrumah in a letter written on December 18, 1958.

406

Lewis to Keenleyside, December 11, 1958, Lewis Papers, box 8.

218

In the letter Lewis he disclosed to Nkrumah that having reconstructed Ghana’s
economic policies and institutions, completed the budget, and the second development
plan, he had completed most of what he had set out to accomplish in Ghana.407 He also
deluged that the U.N. had offered him a position that was not only an honor to Africa but
also placed him in a position of influence to look after Africa’s interests. Lewis admitted
that since submitting the first draft of the development plan in June of that year, his
advice had been ignored and had he achieved nothing to justify staying in Ghana “if the
next six months are to be like the last six months.”408 He was still; however, willing to
stay on in Ghana if Nkrumah agreed to three propositions: (1) Lewis would be sent for
and present whenever the Cabinet was discussing the nation’s economic policies; (2) the
government would not invest more than £25 million of its own money in the Volta River
Dam; and (3) the first phase of the second development plan would not exceed £120
million.
Lewis declared that he would be delighted to stay and continue to serve in every
way he could if Nkrumah accepted these conditions, but if they could not agree on these
fundamentals he believed it best that he should take accept the U.N.’s offer and “try to
help the poor countries of the world to build up their productive capacities.”409 In a brief
response Nkrumah acknowledged that the offer from the United Nations was extremely
important and that with respect for his international standing as an economist, he could
not expect Lewis to risk his reputation for political decisions he felt he must make.
Admitting that Lewis’ advice and his own decision were likely to run counter to each
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other, Nkrumah expressed, with regret, that it would be best for Lewis to accept the
United Nations’ appointment so that the two may part in a friendly manner and not on an
issue that would embarrass them.410
Gradualism or Rapid Development?
Nkrumah’s parting words to Lewis were demonstrative of the clash of
personalities that took place between the two for the duration of Lewis’ tenure in Ghana.
In his letter, Nkrumah admitted that while the advice Lewis had given him was sound, it
was essentially from an economic point of view and that as a politician he must gamble
on the future.411 This statement by Nkrumah is key to understanding the nature of the
relationship between these two men. For Nkrumah, it was up to political leadership to set
economic agendas and the role of economists was to design the programs to achieve the
goals of politicians. On the other hand, Lewis believed that economics determined what
could be achieved and outline the proper methods for attaining economic goals desired by
politicians.
This fundamental difference is what caused the major rift between the two.
Whereas Lewis lamented that Nkrumah viewed economists as mere technicians tasked to
carry out economic dreams of politicians no matter how unrealistic the demands,
Nkrumah complained that Lewis and economists, in general, were politically naïve, with
very little understanding of the demands of ruling and the pressures from the political
elites in a post-colonial nation. The primary disconnect was that Nkrumah as a leader of
a nation and a ruling political party, politics required bipartisan coalitions, strategizing
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against the opposition, and responding effectively to the high hopes and expectations of
the people that had worked so hard for independence.412
While Nkrumah believed Lewis and his economic advice to be politically inept,
he failed to grasp the political benefits of Lewis’ approach to development. Since 1952,
Lewis maintained, especially concerning Ghana, that industrialization was dependent
upon agricultural improvement; it is not profitable to produce a growing volume of
manufactures unless agricultural production is growing simultaneously.413 Furthermore,
while Lewis and Nkrumah disagreed some they were in complete agreement regarding
the state’s use of cocoa surplus to develop industry, education, health care, and
urbanization. To do this Lewis sought to capitalize on the high cocoa prices on the world
market by freezing prices in Ghana at eighty shillings per sixty-pound load. In doing so
Ghana’s Cocoa Marketing Board would direct a larger amount of profits from the
international sales to development projects. The result was a precarious political
situation for the government, as the nation’s farmers were not directly benefiting from
booming international cocoa sales and they were essentially financing the nation’s
development, which was largely confined to the southern region414
Since 1954, the National Liberation Movement, which represented the political
interests of the region that produced the majority of the country’s cocoa and of its timber
and gold for export, had presented the largest resistance to Nkrumah and the CPP
government. Nkrumah and Lewis agreed these funds should be used for developing the
nation as a whole; however, as demonstrated with the preparation of the second
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development plan, they differed on which programs should be prioritized. While
Nkrumah, seized on the moment to use the cocoa surpluses for extravagant programs in
Accra that demonstrated the C.P.P’s political power, Lewis thought it best to invest in the
agricultural sector to optimize food production and the cultivation of cocoa. Lewis’
approach would have centralized the success of cocoa producers and farmers to the
development of the entire nation, NLM’s main constituents, and made for a more holistic
development plan. Such a plan would have spread investments evenly throughout the
nation to address the needs of the ordinary people, as opposed to concentrating
allocations to the pet projects of politicians in Accra. Had Nkrumah heeded Lewis's
advice, instead of allocating funds to non-economic programs, perhaps the ethnic and
regional division consuming Ghanaian politics may have been mitigated?
Beyond the issue of how to distribute funds derived from the cocoa industry,
Nkrumah’s desire to concentrate development in Accra revealed another issue in his
vision for how Ghana would be presented to the world. Reflecting on an exchange
between himself and Nkrumah, Lewis recalled that when a draft of Ghana’s Development
Plan was completed, Nkrumah informed Lewis that he planned to allocate 50% of the
budget to the nation’s capital, Accra, which had a mere 5% of Ghana’s population.
Nkrumah justified the decision arguing, “Why not? When you think of England, you
think of London; when you think of France you think of Paris; when you think of Russia,
you think of Moscow.” In response, Lewis replied, “No, sir. When I think of England, I
do not think of London because I live in Manchester, and this is also why I know that
capital cities exploit the rest of the country”415 Here Nkrumah’s emphasis on developing
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Accra more so than any other part of the nation reflected not only the capital city’s need
for improved infrastructure but also Nkrumah’s own frame of reference for what a
modern nation looked like. The conference centers, large militaries, embassies, airlines,
and royal palaces for himself and his ministers were all signifiers of modernity for
Nkrumah, and following independence vision of development required that they are
acquired in the shortest time possible.
Nkrumah accepted some of Lewis’s advice; however, his gradual approach to
industrialization was always a point of contention for the two, as rapid industrialism was
his ultimate objective following independence.416 He was also driven by Economic
Nationalism, which was the belief that politics drove the economy and that the outside
world would always be hostile.417 This economic nationalism was influenced heavily by
Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism, as he conceived of Ghana’s independence as a prelude to the
total liberation of the African continent from colonial rule. As such, rapid development
in Ghana was meant to serve as a testament to the tangible achievements, results, and
capabilities of the post-independence Nkrumah regime.
An indicator of this was the emerging competition for influence in West Africa
with Guinea also touting a united Pan-African continent, and with Egypt who had
recently constructed its own electro hydronic dam as well. Part of Nkrumah’s PanAfrican programs included the construction of the African Affairs Center, student
exchange programs with other African nations, a $10 million loan to Guinea after gaining
their independence and sending monetary aid to African revolutionaries across the
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continent. Consequently, rapid development was also meant to bolster Nkrumah’s PanAfrica objectives for the African unit. This ultimately placed additional pressure on
Lewis to take on the expensive prestige projects in the second development plan, as
opposed to the third, to accelerate the pace of development to justify Ghana’s leading role
in Africa. Still, even after hearing Lewis’ advice, as sound and fiscally responsible as it
may have been, Nkrumah declared that as a politician he must gamble on the future and
that “We shall be justified in taking calculated risks in this matter.”418
Lewis the Reasonable Radical
For Nkrumah everything that Ghana had fought for and gained with independence
hinged on industrialism, lessening the dependence on Britain and foreign markets, and
placing Ghana on par with the developed nations of the world. However, Lewis’
approach of pragmatic and gradual development through optimizing agriculture for
industrialization, stood in direct opposition to the rapid and extravagance of Nkrumah, as
Lewis emphasized economic development through investing in infrastructure and
agriculture to help spur industrialization. Unfortunately, Nkrumah’s gambles did not pay
off as the second development plan as its final draft carried a price tag of £343 million,
with priority items budgeted at £126 million, another £104 million for phase 2 items, and
£103 million set aside for the Volta River Project. To secure foreign capital, the
government removed all control over the investment of funds and permitted firms to
remit all profits. As a result, Ghana contracted £124 billion in financial commitments
within six months of publishing the plan.

418

Nkrumah to Lewis, December 19, 1958, Lewis Papers, box 10; and Cabinet Agenda, Second
Development Plan, July 8, 1958, GNA/ADM/13/2/40. quoted in Tignor, Lewis and the Birth of
Development Economics. (2006), 162.

224

Nkrumah declared publicly that the plan would “give us a solid foundation to
build the welfare state” and “give us a standard of living which will abolish disease,
poverty, and illiteracy, give our people ample food, and good housing, and let us
advance as a nation.”419 However, in private Nkrumah feared the huge financial
obligations it had taken on would quickly drain the nation’s reserves. As such, after only
two years into the second plan, Ghanaian officials concluded that the government had
gone on “a spending spree, with no true sense of priorities, with the result that it had
depleted its resources.”420
Although Lewis departed Ghana before the plan was published it was still
recognized as his handiwork. While he had envisioned a plan stressing “rapid
development under a flexible program in an open and free economy, with much emphasis
on agriculture and the setting up of manufacturing industry.”421 However, economists
and experts aboard labeled the plan as “overambitious and unrealistic,” noting it was
clear that the plan was “intended to impress neighboring states rather than to represent a
reality likely to be achieved in five years.”422 In the British press, the plan was
deemed “singularly fruitless.” Lewis’ initial fears, expressed in his August 1958 letter to
Nkrumah, had been realized as the press seized on the failures of the second development
plan to allege a predisposition amongst Africans to corruption and overspending on
prestige projects. Furthermore, while Lewis could have easily divulged the fiscal
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irresponsibility of Nkrumah and his ministers, he instead defended his year in Ghana,
calling it “one of extraordinary success” and listing his accomplishments including
reorganizing the Industrial and Agricultural Corporations, creating new machinery for
making economic decisions at the cabinet and civil service levels, and several new
policies enacted for agricultural education industrial development, foreign investment in
agriculture, house, forest regeneration, expanding secondary education, and for
managing the government’s securities.423
Lewis also asserted that he had left Ghana simply because he has completed his
mission and made sure to refer to Nkrumah and the Ghanaian government in high regard
when publicly discussing the matter in its immediate aftermath. Conversely, in private
Lewis insisted that the development plan in Ghana “looked fairly good until the
politicians got hold of it and added £40 million of prestige projects;” however, this letter
was written weeks before the final draft of the development plan was announced
revealing that the Ghanaian ministers had added an additional £100 million to the plan.424
Additionally, Lewis repeatedly expressed his concern that in Nkrumah and his ministers’
haste to promote his big and showy prestige projects, the Ghanaian government ran the
risk of falling in the trap of failing to drive hard bargains as foreign capital poured in.
Politics, however, trumped economics for Nkrumah regarding the second
development plan, as his attraction to large scale projects (like the VRP) and their price
tags were spurred by his desire to demonstrate the symbolic strength of Ghana not only to
the western world gazing upon their progress but also to the African continent.425 It was
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for this reason that, Lewis, a lifelong Pan-Africanist refused to make a public issue of his
departure from Ghana, to avoid comforting the enemies of Africa everywhere.
Understanding the magnitude of Ghana’s position as the first African nation to gain
independence, Lewis also realized that a public dispute with Nkrumah would not only
expose his corruption, reckless decisions, and turn towards despotism, which could
potentially slow independence talks for the rest of the continent as well as the colonies in
the West Indies.
When Lewis left Ghana his planning and programs, based on a mixed economy,
were soon replaced by an economic approach that emphasized full-scale state control and
was skeptical of the free market. These changes were sparked by several things. First, the
radical left-wing of the CPP, now coming to prominence as Ghana’s civil service became
increasingly Africanized, that had succeeded in its push for a state-driven economic
development strategy that mirrored the model of the Soviet Union. Additionally, this
“lurch to the left” was aided by the failures of the second development plan; the increase
of Soviet economic experts recruited to work in Ghana and Nkrumah’s further
consolidation of power with himself and the state.
Such a shift should come as no surprise as Nkrumah had been a longtime
communist; however, the largest factor in this shift was the untimely death of Nkrumah’s
closest advisor George Padmore, who had maintained a skeptical disposition towards
communism and the Soviet Union since the1930s. It was Padmore who had been training
the young radicals in the CPP and advising Nkrumah that had kept the Soviet influence
at bay. Upon news of his death, Nkrumah once again contacted Lewis to return to give
the eulogy at Padmore’s funeral. Having been a friend of Padmore’s for more than
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twenty-five years Lewis accepted. In his speech, Lewis stated: “To George, as to
nationalists everywhere, the independence of Ghana was a tremendous emotional release.
We all rejoiced, and were anxious to serve.”426 Lewis recalled the allure of witnessing the
first African state to attain independence, and why he quickly leaped at the prospect of
contributing to Ghana’s nation-building process.
In Ghana, Lewis fully comprehended the gravity of the situation facing the new
nation and took special care in assesses the economic situation to craft a sound plan for
developing the nation. Lewis’ expertise had been recognized since the early 1950s when
Nkrumah contacted him produce a report on Industrialization for the nation. During his
time as economic advisor he more than proved to worth the nation, particularly in his
exposing of Britain’s mismanagement of Ghana’s sterling reserves and investments,
which he was able to parlay into the ensuring the Commercial Bank of Ghana’s authority
to manage the nation’s reserves and investments, and to establish a national currency of
its own.
Consequently, the legitimacy and significance of Lewis’ contributions must be
measured by the soundness of the advice and economic planning that he delivered, rather
than by Nkrumah’s propensity to heed Lewis’ counsel. As Lewis’ economic advice was
increasingly ignored by the Prime Minister and his ministers, who sought to enrich
themselves with their prestige projects, Lewis could not remain in Ghana as Nkrumah
and his ministers concentrated power amongst themselves and neglected the welfare of
the people.427 These conditions would persist as Nkrumah’s regime entered the phase of
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his benevolent dictatorship, in which the economic policies of the Lewis era were altered
and eventually replaced with the socialist economic planning and the undemocratic
governance that would bring about Nkrumah’s removal from office.
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T. RAS MAKONNEN AND PRACTICAL PAN-AFRICAN IN GHANA
Implementing Nkrumah’s Pan-African policies was no simple task and to do so
the Ghanaian Prime Minister called upon the most seasoned members of the old guard
from the Pan-African Movement to assist him. Among the Pan-African activists called to
action in Ghana was T. Ras Makonnen from British Guiana. Makonnen brought with
him a diverse skillset that was used broadly throughout Ghanaian society from building
Pan-African institutions like the African Affairs Centre, African Affairs Committee, to
advising on foreign policy with the Bureau of African Affairs, to managing state owned
corporations, like State Bakeries, Ghana Hotels and Tourism Corporation, and the Guinea
Press. During his time working in Ghana, Makonnen was also able to develop a unique
analysis of Ghanaian society, as his work enabled him to observe not only the euphoria of
Ghana’s independence celebrations, but also the persistence of Ghanaian chauvinism
amongst government officials, the implications of Nkrumah’s attempts to implement
socialism, and his nascent turn to authoritarianism. Through an examination of these
themes, this chapter argues that Ras Makonnen proved vital to Ghana as he placed his
Pan-Africanism into practice through state institution building.
Pan-Africanism From Within:
T. Ras Makonnen was born George Thomas Nathaniel Griffith in Buxton Guyana
at the beginning of the twentieth century. He was the grandson of an Ethiopian miner
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that migrated to Guyana to capitalize on the nation’s booming diamond and gold
industry. Makonnen’s father took advantage of the boom and became a concessionaire,
establishing shops along the Mazaruni River to sell provisions to prospectors traveling up
the river. Through his own business ventures and partnerships, he eventually came to
own The King George Hotel in Guyana’s capital, Georgetown. The young Makonnen
closely observed and picked up his business acumen from his father.
He also began reading Marcus Garvey’s Negro World newspaper and the
NAACP’s Crisis magazine, which provided him with a sense of Pan-Africanism and a
political education beyond that of the British colonial system. Garvey’s ability to incite
Black consciousness and connect the shared histories and conditions of millions of
Blacks in the African Diaspora was especially appealing to Makonnen in British Guiana’s
multi-racial society. As a result, at a young age, Makonnen understood the necessity of
self-determination, Black economic empowerment, and the power of print media in
international Black politics. All of these things would make him an invaluable asset to
the Pan-African movement in London and Ghana in the future.
As the son of a successful business owner, Makonnen was expected to leave the
West Indies to continue his education, studying law or medicine after secondary school.
Thus, in 1934 Makonnen enrolled at Cornell University where he was quickly embraced
by the Ethiopian student population and even changed his name to T. Ras Makonnen in
solidarity with Ethiopia as Italy prepared its 1935 invasion.428 During this time,
Makonnen had a brief flirtation with communism and was also exposed to critical studies
of British imperialism and racism through the texts of Jamaican Pan-Africanist,
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Theophilus Scholes.429 Observing that Europe would be the place where “things were
coming to a head,” Makonnen traveled to Denmark, which was known as a refuge for
many Europeans fleeing fascism. There he enrolled at Lanbo Højskole, the Royal
Agricultural College in Copenhagen; however, he was deported to London in 1937 for
protesting Denmark’s exporting of mustard to Italy, which he felt was being used for the
mustard gas in the war against Ethiopia.430
Self-Sufficiency and Pan-Africanism:
In London Makonnen immediately became involved with the Pan-African
movement’s protests against the Italo-Ethiopian War. He quickly became close friends
with George Padmore, with whom he shared a home and co-founded the International
African Service Bureau (IASB). Makonnen even drafted the IASB’s constitution and
served as Advisory Editor of the IASB’s Internationalist African Opinion, a printed
monthly paper on which he worked closely with Jomo Kenyatta and Eric Williams.
Prominent revolutionary writers like Padmore and CLR James looked to Makonnen for
topics to cover in their articles and he would sell the newspaper at protests and leftist
meetings to raise capital for the organization. According to Makonnen the purpose of
creating these organizations was to break with the old age tradition of blacks depending
on white organizations, especially as it pertained to funding.431 Furthermore, while
Makonnen had his own criticisms of Garvey, his desire to be a purist in terms of
economic empowerment and racial self-reliance were indicative of Garvey’s influence on
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his conceptions of Pan-Africanism. Makonnen’s formulation of Pan-Africanism was
based on his view that there should be solidarity amongst Africans living in North
America, Africa, and South America. He believed that people of African descent,
especially organizations like the IASB, should hold a watching brief over the African
world, constantly prepared to move whenever some case of colonial or police brutality
came to light. Makonnen called this “Practical Pan-Africanism.”432
At the outbreak of the Second World War, Makonnen moved to Manchester
where he enrolled in Manchester University to study History. Since Manchester
bolstered a large Black community, Makonnen found a prime location to place PanAfricanism into practice. Noticing the city’s limited number of spaces for Blacks,
Makonnen drew upon the business acumen he observed in his father in British Guiana.
Using his own savings he managed to open a number of successful businesses on
Manchester’s Oxford Street including three restaurants, the Ethiopian Teashop, The
Cosmopolitan, and The Orient; two night clubs, the Forum Club and Belle Etoile, and a
number of rental properties for people of African descent, and a bookshop, called The
Economist, to cater to Black students at Manchester University. Among his sixty-two
employees were Africans, West Indians, and Chinese immigrants living in Manchester.433
Makonnen was also fortunate enough to benefit from the constant arrivals of West Indian
and African seamen and African American troops passing through Manchester who
would flock to his businesses. Furthermore, it was clear to anyone walking down Oxford
Street at this time that it was Makonnen’s Main Street.
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Makonnen’s success in business even caused the staunch socialist Padmore to
jokingly say “You damn businessman; you’ll become an octopus and we’ll have to
restrain you.”434 Interestingly, while he was not an unwavering socialist like his peers,
Makonnen seemed to mimic history as his role in securing independent funding for the
Pan-African Movement paralleled Engels, whose father had become wealthy in
Manchester, which enabled him to support Marx in his scholarly undertakings.
Consequently, Makonnen understood that the movement required capital to carry out its
objectives, which caused him to neither regard his business ventures nor their profits as
his own, but rather it all belonged to the Pan-African Movement. As a result, the capital
derived from these businesses, allowed him to finance most of the Manchester PanAfrican Congress and to feed and provide lodging for most of the Congress’ attendees.435
More than anything, Makonnen took pride in the fact that “nobody could suggest
[the movement] had been produced with Moscow gold or other white funds.”436 In his
view the rapidly growing Pan-African movement should be racially self-sufficient, as he
wanted to avoid the risk of having a group of whites claim later that had it not been for
them, independence would never have been gained. Furthermore, Makonnen was
avoiding the common mistake of Black organizations with white membership that relied
on white philanthropy for funding, as had been the case for the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People in the United States and the League of Coloured
People in London.
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During his time in Manchester, Makonnen made regular trips to London where he
and Padmore founded the Pan-African Federation. In 1945 CLR James wrote a note to
him about “an exceptional fellow” named Kwame Nkrumah. According to James,
Nkrumah was “not a liberal. He’s one of the boys,” meaning that he, like the London
group, was anti-colonial in his thinking and embraced a socialist influenced PanAfricanism as fundamental to African liberation.437 Describing his first time meeting
with the young Nkrumah, Makonnen recalled that he had a mark on him that made it
apparent when one met him that he would become a leader. This was no doubt in
reference to Nkrumah’s magnetic personality and his unwavering commitment to freeing
Africa from colonial rule, which led to Nkrumah’s positioning in the movement’s
leadership as Regional Secretary of the Pan-African Federation.
Nkrumah’s connection with Makonnen and Padmore was instantaneous as the
three men spent hours in Padmore’s kitchen, sharpening Nkrumah’s ideas on anticolonialism, African liberation, and fundamentals of organizing nationalist movements
for independence. From these conversations, it was Makonnen that advised Nkrumah to
drop out of his doctoral studies at London School of Economics to become a fulltime
organizer for the Pan-African movement, which manifested in Nkrumah becoming VicePresident of West African Student Union, Secretary-General of the West African
National Secretariat, and Secretary of the Pan-African Federation’s International
Secretariat. As a result of the immediate impact and reputation garnered by Nkrumah
during his brief three-year tenure in London, he was recruited to return home to the Gold
Coast in 1948. Makonnens influence was demonstrated early on as Nkrumah returned to
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Gold Coast, not as a journalist or a barrister, but as a fulltime organizer building a mass
nationalist movement that secured independence in less than a decade, with PanAfricanism positioned as a foundational feature of post-colonial governance in Ghana.
At the foundation of Makonnen’s Practical Pan-Africanism was the belief that
wherever they were and whatever their country of origin, blacks should be able to look
after each other. In addition to leading the larger Black community to complete
economic, social and political control of their own destinies, he believed that PanAfricanism was also about dealing with individuals at the grassroots. As such, regardless
of all the property and business success he had so quickly amassed in Manchester,
Makonnen was prepared to leave it all behind just as fast at Nkrumah’s request for his
services in Ghana. Having concluded at the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress that
the time had come for people of African descent to “make our freedom, assert our
freedom in the land we have been defending all along,” it was clear that Africa would be
the staging ground for the next phase of the movement.438 Thus, in 1957 Makonnen
accepted Nkrumah’s invitation to aid in building the first independent Sub-Saharan
African nation by working in Padmore’s Office of the Advisor on African Affairs and in
several other capacities that furthered Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy and vision for
Ghana.
The African Affairs Center And the All-African Peoples Conference
Makonnen was a part of the collective of prominent figures from the African
diaspora that were in attendance for Ghana’s independence celebrations in March 1957.
Regarded as “a man of fantastic energy and organizational gifts,” Nkrumah would use
438

Ibid., 168.

236

Makonnen’s abilities in a variety of aspects in Ghana.439 Once the parades and cocktail
parties with foreign dignitaries had ended, Nkrumah and his government set out to place
Ghana on par with the other modern nations of the world. Central to Nkrumah’s plans
for rapid development was the Industrial Development Corporation which had as a
general policy promoting development and establishing new industries in Ghana.
Makonnen’s first placement would be in the Industrial Development
Corporation’s State Bakeries. In less than a year, Makonnen was able to not only register
the first profit the State Bakery had made in years, but to also expand the operation
beyond Accra, building a chain of ten mechanical bakeries with distribution in major
Ghanaian towns like Tamale, Ho, and Kumasi.440 According to Padmore, Nkrumah’s
Advisor on African Affairs, Makonnen was “doing an excellent job” with State Bakeries
and making it more profitable; however, by August 1958 he advised Nkrumah to “see
Makonnen more often” and to chat with him on general matters.441
The “general matters” Padmore was referring to involved his Office of the
Advisor on African Affairs and Nkrumah’s new Pan-African policy. The aim of Ghana’s
Pan-African policy was to attract as many African liberation movements as possible to
Ghana and Nkrumah’s ideologies with the ultimate goal of forming a united front of
nationalist parties to establish a continental government.442 Following the independence
celebrations African nationalists, many of whom were contacts from the London days,
began to flock to Ghana for various reasons and providing accommodations for them
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became a struggle for Padmore. Padmore first realized this during Ghana’s first
independence anniversary celebration in March 1958, as he noticed there was no
institution capable of hosting African nationalists like Nnamdi Azikwe and Djibbo
Bakary.
By August of that year, the issue had become unmanageable and could no longer
be ignored. Padmore wrote to Nkrumah noting the difficulty in finding accommodation
for nationalists from various French territories scheduled to meet with him to discuss
certain matters.443 Ghana could not live up to its promises to aid African freedom
fighters, nor could it place itself among the modern nations of the world if they could not
even adequately host its visitors. At the time groups from various countries were coming
to Ghana and “living like kings, taking a bottle of whiskey here and there, and charging it
to the government.”444 With his office being overwhelmed with requests for
accommodation, and local hotel bills becoming excessive, Padmore consulted Makonnen
regarding the situation.
Ghana’s lack of the infrastructures to host African freedom fighters and
dignitaries was a critical issue that was not lost on Makonnen, especially since he was on
the chair of the planning committee of the quickly approaching All-African People’s
Conference (AAPC). After discussing the matter with Padmore, Makonnen quickly
informed him that there were a number of empty government houses in the Cantonments
that could be set aside for use when these African nationalists visited Ghana. Given
Nkrumah’s significance to African decolonization Makonnen maintained that “if we in
Ghana were going to provide any lead, it was essential that there should be facilities
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whereby visiting revolutionaries or freedom fighters could be accommodated and made
useful themselves and to the development of an African ideology. There had to be
accommodating structures, and this was a desperate need.”445 Furthermore, given his
success in Manchester in the restaurant business and managing hostels for the Manchester
1945 Congress, Nkrumah agreed with Padmore that Makonnen was the most qualified to
oversee the operation. As such, with Nkrumah’s approval, Makonnen was charged with
building the African Affairs Centre to be a facility that accommodated visitors and
provide a space for them to congregate and strategize for Pan-African liberation.
Being in September 1958, Makonnen formed the Centre through his own
initiative finding a facility near the Accra airport with twenty-five chalets. Its proximity
to the airport also made it a perfect location, as it provided for quick entry and exit by
African revolutionaries seeking asylum in Ghana. Since the buildings did not need
serious renovation, most of Makonnen’s resources could be focused on furnishing the
facility. He quickly made use of his restaurateur expertise by establishing a field kitchen
on the grounds and hiring women to wait on guests, whom he trained himself. While the
Centre operated under and received funding directly from Padmore’s Office, Makonnen
refused the appropriation to deal with the costs of furnishing the Centre. Instead of
directly receiving money, he merely requested the right credit from the government for
the things he needed. Once his permission to credit was granted he ordered hundreds of
sheets, pillowcases, and utensils; and hired the Public Works Department for the
construction of a mess hall that could hold one hundred people, and a larger hall to
accommodate two-hundred people. Admittedly, since the budget for the Centre was not
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large, Makonnen also approached a contractor who was making an exorbitant profit from
the government and blackmailed him into giving concrete and building materials free of
charge. According to Makonnen, he was even able to squeeze £10,000 in blocks and tiles
out of a single vendor.446 The result was that the Centre was more than prepared for the
AAPC, where its true purpose would be placed on display.
The African Affairs Centre and Pan-Africa
Makonnen being assigned to establish the African Affairs Centre was also fitting,
given that he was also serving as the Chairman of the Planning Committee and the
Financial Committee for the All-African People’s Conference. As a result, he was
responsible for securing accommodations for delegates from twenty-eight countries, and
sixty-two nationalist organizations meeting in Ghana for the purpose of further
strengthening African unity by encouraging the various African nationalist political
movements to support each other in their colonial territories in their struggles for
independence. Nkrumah’s speech at the conference reiterated that for the final objective
of Pan-Africanism to be achieved, freedom and independence must be achieved; unity
and community between African states must be fostered, and the economic and social
reconstruction of Africa must take place.447 He also argued that African liberation was
the task of all Africans and Ghana would serve as a base for creating a broad united front
for the speedy liberation of Africa. The AAPC brought together a diverse group of
African freedom fighters including African nationalists in non-independent colonies;
leaders from revolutionary African states; and Leftist opposition movements in
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independent western puppet states, all culminating in a rededication to the ideals of PanAfrican unity. Furthermore, the conference has been called the true successor to the PanAfrican Congress in Manchester, and just as Makonnen played a key role in 1945, he did
the same in Ghana in December 1958.448
Reflecting on the conference, Makonnen recalled that the AAPC signified the end
of the old pan-Africanism of five thousand miles away, and the beginning of a new breed
in Africa itself. More importantly, it was taking place on African soil and presented an
opportunity for Ghana to share what they had learned about the role of former colonial
powers in post-colonial states. Chief among the lessons learned in the nation’s infancy
was the bitter experience of having white advisors and civil service employees in place of
undertrained Ghanaians, and the realization that the fight for freedom would not end
immediately upon gaining independence. In addition to this Makonnen observed that two
types of meetings took place at the conference: the official one at the conference hall
where the heads of states would be surrounded by foreign press and talking in general
terms about the future of Africa; and the unofficial meetings at the African Affairs Centre
with trade union leaders mixing with ideological groups from various countries to discuss
practical questions of liberation. The Centre quickly become not only a hostel for refuge
but also an institution for spreading Nkrumah and Padmore’s ideologies of PanAfricanism to other liberation movements in attempts to bring them under the influence
of Ghana’s leadership.
While the various elements of the African liberation ideological spectrum were
finally in conversation with each other at the Centre, Makonnen did notice that the
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Egyptian delegation was hard at work making a determined bid for the loyalty of some of
the freedom fighters in attendance. In response to this Makonnen met with members of
the planning committee and declared that “we’ve spent all this money bringing these
various delegations to Ghana, so we don’t want the damn Egyptians using the opportunity
to spread their influence with theirs cells, Muslim Brotherhoods, and God knows what
else.”449 While Makonnen was accused as being too chauvinistic, this was the same
message of self-sufficiency and purism that he promoted in Britain, as he maintained that
the African revolution Ghana was waging must be controlled by Africans and not those
elements in Egypt who had one foot in Africa and another in the Middle East. This also
reflected the rivalry among independent African states for influence throughout Africa,
especially Egypt and Guinea, and brings context to the urgency with which Nkrumah’s
Pan-African policy was being pushed throughout the continent. Makonnen viewed his
work and that of the other Pan-Africanists in Ghana as part of a great tradition, that
demanded the preservation and proliferation of their ideologies and influence to support
African liberation. As such, more than anything, Makonnen was personally invested in
the work that he was doing in Ghana and viewed his work at the Centre as a vital
component of the current phase of the Pan-African Movement.
Cultivating Pan-African Ideology:
In addition to providing a place of refuge and space for freedom fighters to
congregate during their time in Ghana, Makonnen was also intent on providing training at
the African Affairs Center. From the time he was assigned the task of building the
Centre Makonnen’s concern was that:
449
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Ghana should have something to instil [sic] in our kinsmen in other lands. They
should receive from our example the feeling that now they had a duty to perform;
they were not any longer to wait meekly for independence to be handed to them on
a silver platter, but to work for it with an awaken conscience.450
Additionally, he believed that if Ghana was to lead, it needed to provide facilities for
visiting revolutionaries to develop an African ideology. More importantly, he foresaw
that Ghana had to provide training as well as a refuge and that Nkrumah and Ghana
would be fools to let the communists or Nasser, President of Egypt, train these
revolutionaries and instill in them their own particular biases.
In June 1960, Nkrumah officially named Makonnen the Director of the African
Affairs Centre and instructed him to “formulate vital programs to meet the needs of our
African kinsmen,” which he had already been doing under his own initiative.451
Nonetheless, Makonnen recognized that the Centre had been operating without a precise
list of objectives and in response, he wrote to Nkrumah:
I would like to know really what role or function would you like the Centre to
undertake. Do you my dear Prime Minister like the Centre to be a closed shop – a
seclusive retreat for people with a mission known only to you and your exclusive
lieutenants, or do you want it to be a hospitality centre for dedicated nationalists
and their allies in revolt against colonialism and its endemicills? For those who
have found it impossible at present to carry on the struggle in their own country and
have retreated temporarily to rehabilitate and return to the struggle at a time
considered suitable to them? Or would you want the Centre to take on the
appearance of prevailing centres to be found in other countries […] Each while
appearing to be dissimilar in function nevertheless had a common objective
depending on the needs for which they are created to serve. Upon your instructions
I shall endeavour to prepare a workable programme to conform with your
demands.452
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There is no record of a response to Makonnen’s letter from Nkrumah, which may reflect
the faith that Nkrumah had in Makonnen’s expertise in institution building. It could also
point to Nkrumah’s trust in Makonnen as a Pan-African revolutionary of the “old guard”
to build what would be the site from which Ghana’s Pan-African policies and ideologies
would emanate to the rest of the continent.
For Makonnen, Ghana was to be the vanguard of the African revolution and an
ideological message had to be conveyed to visitors to demonstrate what they were about.
This ideology message placed an emphasis on the use of Pan-Africanism and socialism as
a vehicle for independence, industrialization and economic freedom, with the eventual
goal of a Union of African States predicated on the adoption of the African personality
and the maintenance of world peace.453 These basic messages and principles for African
liberation would later formulate the basis of the ideology known as Nkrumaism. As a
result, Makonnen set about educating the Centre’s visitors on these ideologies and
objectives by organizing specialized lectures for these hardened freedom fighters three
times a week at the Centre. Using Padmore and Nkrumah’s books Makonnen explained
the nature of British, French and other imperialists as decolonization became a larger
issue.454 Makonnen also had the Ghanaian government pay to have two thousand books,
originally intended for Kenya, shipped to Ghana since they were collecting dust while
being “tied up at the docks in Mombasa.”455 Along with these, an additional fifty-six
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books were donated by the Israeli government, and a substantial book collection was
amassed that eventually became the George Padmore Memorial Library.456
Also, buses were chartered to take visitors into Accra daily to experience
Ghanaian culture, engage trade union affairs, or visit CPP party headquarters. Makonnen
even organized language groups to improve the visitor’s English and training in animal
husbandry, co-operative dressmaking for the women, and even military training.457
These were the ways that Makonnen ensured that Ghana was living up to the promises of
the AAPC and Nkrumah’s own Pan-African policy, which was committed to supporting
in every possible aspect the struggles of African liberation across the continent; however,
the realities of government bureaucracy soon reared its head in the affairs of the Centre,
and its ability to render service to the visitors that were pouring into the nation.
Furthermore, just as Ghana was prepared to open its doors to the refugees from across the
continent, the nation found itself in competition with other independent states like Guinea
and UAR who were also hosting African liberation groups in their nations.
Issues of Protocol and Procedure:
It was clear that Nkrumah’s call to the Africa liberation movements had gone out
and been heard near and far, as hundreds of refugees arrived at Ghana’s borders, many
without passports or documents. For many of these visitors, they had to be given clothes,
food, and a place to sleep and it as left to the Centre to ensure to provide these things,
look after them during their time in Ghana, and to keep the police updated on who was
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entering and exiting the country. Just as Padmore felt weighed down by the processes of
Ghanaian governmental bureaucracy, so too was Makonnen in dealing with the issue of
refugees and the lack of a clear protocol on how to select host the visitors flocking to
Ghana. As hundreds of refugees arrived, the Ministry of External Affairs and the civil
service was unprepared to deal with the matter and Padmore forced the debate over the
issue of a selection process, provisions of political asylum for freedom fighters, and
matter of granting Ghanaian passports to refugees. As Padmore and the Ministers
debated the matter, Ghana remained without a clear policy or legislation and began to
risk losing its standing as the leading nation influencing African liberation, as nations like
Guinea were swiftly granting passports to refugees passing through the nation.
The issue of bureaucracy, policy and protocol in this situation was observed by
Makonnen in his comments on Nkrumah, noting instead of being bound by the red-tape
of bureaucracy, Nkrumah was a rebel who would cut through the talk saying “What’s all
this? We have a job to do. We have created this state, and its citizenship is ours to do
what we like with.”458 While Makonnen seemingly praised Nkrumah here for his rebel
approach to cast aside bureaucracy, there was merit in establishing and maintaining
chains of command and legitimate processes for governance. Without these, the
government could descend into chaos as it operated at the whims and wishes of its
ministers and heads of state. Ultimately, this chaotic style of governing would come to
characterize Nkrumah’s approach to governance in Ghana in his later years and
contribute to his removal from office.
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Although Nkrumah supported Padmore’s position, the process of adopting an
official policy on refugees emerged after months of proposals and debates, which left
Padmore’s Office embarrassed and demonstrated that the urgency of Nkrumah’s PanAfrican was not a priority of every person working in the Ghanaian government. This,
however, did not stop Padmore and Makonnen from providing aid to African liberation
movements that were arriving in Ghana. Refugees were received by Makonnen at the
Centre and completely in his care from that moment. The issue of policy and protocol
was indeed a pressing matter as the expenses of their accommodations and time in Ghana
were being covered completely by the government. In most cases, these groups were
outfitted with clothes, funding, military training, and offices to operate in Ghana.
Still, this Makonnen overcame this bureaucratic struggle and succeeded in
carrying out Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. In May 1959, the Centre hosted its first
registered refugees with the arrival of minority nationalist movements, the upécistes
(UPC) from the French Cameroons, and the Comité de Défense du Sanwi Libre
from Côte d'Ivoire. Groups like these often represented minority national parties that
were defeated in elections. Another group hosted by the Centre was the Sawaba Party
from Niger, which had been banned in Niger for opposing the majority party and
welcomed to Ghana. These groups were welcomed and supported by Nkrumah and
Ghana primarily because they were aligned with Nkrumah and the principles of
Nkrumaism.
The Sawaba Party, who possessed a political affinity to the CPP’s Pan-African
ideals, were even granted party members upon arrival in Ghana.459 This was
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demonstrative of the mission of Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy and the purpose of the
African Affairs Centre, which was to expand Ghana’s influence across the continent by
welcoming freedom fighters into Ghana and exposing them to the political ideologies and
strategies used by Nkrumah and the CPP to attain independence. Consequently,
Nkrumah’s support of minority political factions, in the form of funding, military
training, and refuge in Ghana, often heightened tensions in foreign relations between
Ghana and other African governments. An example of this was demonstrated in 1962 the
Action Group of Nigeria were granted asylum in Ghana after being convicted of
conspiracy against the Nigerian government.460 Nkrumah’s investment and support of
opposition parties in other nations lead to many African nations viewing Ghana and
Nkrumah as power-hungry and with an agenda are ruling the entire continent themselves.
In many ways, Ghana’s support of foreign opposition parties led to further
division rather than the unity that Nkrumah was seeking, particularly in West Africa,
amongst the Benin States where it was rumored that nations like Nigeria, Dahomey, and
Togo were seeking to establish a union of states without Ghana.461 As a result, national
security became a pressing issue as it pertained to the selection process for freedom
fighters to take refuge in Ghana. This presented a difficulty as the identities of refugees
needed to be cross-checked and verified upon arrival. Recalling the struggles of this
issue, Makonnen maintained:
[…] the tragedy of our policy was that we took too much for granted when someone
applied for a visa to enter Ghana. If he happened to have been a trade unionist, we
dignified him as a Marxist; if he was an ordinary nationalist who failed to get into
office, we called him an anti-colonialist. It was a terrible thesis and provided cover
to a number of people who were barefaced opportunists.462
460

Grilli. Nkrumaism and African Nationalism. (2018), 150.
Makonnen. Pan-Africanism From Within. (1973), 232.
462
Ibid., 230.
461

248

In the case of a group of South African freedom fighters arriving at the Centre in
February 1960, Makonnen, who by then had amassed an extensive network of African
freedom fighters, had no other choice than to consult a South African Group that had
already been in Ghana for a preliminary screening before allowing the new gained
entrance.463 This speaks to the difficulty of Nkrumah’s open border policy, as identities,
criminal records, and political affiliations needed to be verified for these individuals, and
from a security standpoint, Ghana was taking a substantial risk in the process. Thus,
while Makonnen and Padmore complained of the difficult and time-consuming process of
political screenings, these procedures were necessary as spies or intelligence agents for
imperialist nations posed a legitimate threat to Ghana, especially if they were being
housed at the Centre.
Makonnen’s Contribution:
Nonetheless, Makonnen’s work with the Centre must be viewed as nothing short
of a success and received international acclamation in October 1963 when the Centre was
visited by Prince Sabbruddin Aga Khan, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for
Refugees. Following a tour conducted by Makonnen, he praised Nkrumah for his
foresight in establishing the Centre early on in his term as head of state.464 While
Nkrumah received the praise, it was the initial recommendations by Makonnen in August
1958 that initiated the Centre and his own labor and vision that built it into the institution
the Prince was able to observe. Furthermore, when Nkrumah first approved of the
Makonnen’s building of the Centre, he envisioned it would follow a similar pattern to
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that of the International House in London and New York or the West African Student
Union house that he briefly stayed in as a student in London.
Makonnen always felt that the Centre’s emphasis was not solely for freedom
fighters but to also serve as an institution where visitors to Ghana who may not be in a
position to afford the expenses of hotel accommodation could find board and lodging at
convenient rates and be in no way a disturbance. An example of such a visitor was
exhibited in Mr. James M.K. Sengabi, a student from Uganda, seeking enrollment in
Ghana’s Flying School who stayed and was given accommodation at the Centre in
December 1959.465 Sengabi, whose attempts to enroll in the British Air Force, Kenya Air
Force, and the Indian Air Force, prompted him to offer his services in Ghana, and as he
awaited approval he boarded at the Centre. This use of the Centre was in line with
Makonnen’s vision. He foresaw that once the African continent had been liberated, the
Centre could be used in a number of capacities as either: a training institute for industrial
education; a retreat for writers or journalists seeking solitude; a training site for
government employees; or merely an overflow location for visitors. 466
Makonnen carried out his objectives in conjunction with Nkrumah’s wishes and
evidence of his success manifested in the expansion of the property during his time as
Director of the facility. Over the years Makonnen was able to add more buildings to the
Centre and it became a popular spot in Ghana with thirteen houses named after parties
hosted and eventually, after the nations they represented such as Ghana, Liberia, Guinea,
Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Ethiopia, Togoland, Tunisia, UAR, Algeria, Nigeria, and
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Cameroon. In addition to this, Makonnen had managed to construct an open-air theatre,
and even a restaurant, with bands playing nightly. Eventually, the Star Hotel was built on
the same site and by time Makonnen’s years of management came to an end the
government had gained an institution three times more valuable than when he took it
over. By all accounts, Makonnen over-delivered on his endeavors and surpassed
expectations with the African Affairs Centre. As a result, he became one of Nkrumah’s
closest advisors, a consistent presence in his committee meetings, and had a large
influence on Ghana’s Pan-African Policy as it was implemented by the Bureau of African
Affairs.
The Bureau of African Affairs and the Multi-Talented Makonnen
Makonnen’s achievements in London and Manchester gave him notoriety in the
Pan-African movement that made him one of the first candidates agreed upon by
Nkrumah and Padmore to work in the Office of the Advisor on African Affairs. After
being assigned to build the African Affairs Centre and exceeding all expectations,
Makonnen became one of Nkrumah’s most valued advisors on African affairs. As a
result, upon the untimely death of his friend, George Padmore, in September 1959,
Makonnen found himself among the collective of individuals selected by Nkrumah to
form the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) as a replacement to the Office of the Advisor
on African Affairs and to continue the work begun by Padmore on a permanent basis.
With the passing of Padmore, Nkrumah’s closest friend, mentor, and advisor, Nkrumah
maintained his distrust of the Civil and Foreign Service believing that its ministers and
expatriate civil servant employees were merely in Ghana to serve the interests of
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Britain.467 This distrust of ministers and government employees also contributed to
Nkrumah’s growing desire to consolidate power with himself. As such, the Bureau was
formed not only to continue carrying out the work of advancing Ghana’s Pan-African
policy but also for the institution and its actions to be directly under his control.
Ghanaian Intelligence:
As one of the Bureau’s six board members, Makonnen served on the Bureau’s
African Affairs Committee, which functioned as an advisory board to share and discuss
relevant topics, questions, and strategies on African Affairs. It was in these weekly
Committee meetings that Makonnen's influence on Ghana and Nkrumah’s Pan-African
policy was most prominent. With the African Affairs Centre now operating under the
Bureau’s control, Makonnen was placed on the Bureau’s Finance and Management
Committee, which allowed him to oversee the funding of the Centre and gave him the
ability to be a part of the vetting processes for refugees, like the Sawaba Party, seeking
accommodation at the Centre.468 As a result of Makonnen’s interactions with African
nationalists and refugees passing through the Centre, he had built up an extensive
network of contacts and was more knowledgeable about foreigners visiting Ghana. Since
he was part of the preliminary screening processes for these individuals he was also
informed on the political situations in their nations of origin, which made him a valuable
asset in the formation of Ghana’s first “Intelligence Service.”
The formation of an Intelligence Service was an idea that Padmore was in favor
of, as the information gathered from this service would assist in formulating concrete
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plans for accelerating the achievement of African Unity. Furthermore, one of the
service’s initial concerns arose with the political situation taking place in Congo. It was
Makonnen that was aware of a Congolese female national living in Ghana that could
possibly be retained for the purpose of producing reports on Patrice Lumumba’s
Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) and Joseph Kasavubu’s Alliance des Bakongo
(ABAKO). However, fearing that her reports may “undeliberately be influenced by her
tribe,” Makonnen recommended that two Ghanaians be selected to be sent to Congo
“under disguise to find out the shades of opinion of the various political leaders in the
Congo.”469 Reflecting not only Nkrumah’s trust in Makonnen’s contacts and intelligence
within Ghana, but the African Affairs Committee also turned to him to select the two
suitable and qualified individuals for this mission.
At the Bureau’s Beck and Call:
In addition to establishing an institution for intelligence and helping Ghana
become a staging ground for Pan-African liberation with the African Affairs Center, the
Bureau regularly dispatched diplomatic and peace missions throughout Africa and the
world. Part of Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy was to seek African unity, which prompted
the Bureau to send peace missions to quell clashes between African nations and in some
cases political parties. An example of these missions came the Bureau’s involvement in
settling border disputes in North Africa between Algeria and Morocco, and in East Africa
between Ethiopia and Somalia.470 Based on his own contacts made in Ghana at the
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Centre and during his time in Manchester, Makonnen was able to advise Nkrumah on
critical questions of Ghana-Togo relations and offered to make informal contact with
Togo’s Prime Minister, Sylvanus Olympio, when violence erupted at the Ghana-Togo
border. Recalling how he conceived of his service to Nkrumah, Makonnen in his
autobiography expressed that: “I am at your beck and call. If you want me to go to
Central Africa, or to go to Nyerere or Obote to take the message then let me go. That’s
my job.”471 Consequently, the Bureau and Nkrumah sent Makonnen on a number of
diplomatic and peace missions to Guinea, Cuba, Israel, and British Guiana, his country of
origin.472
Because of his success as a businessman in Britain and turning around the State
Bakeries, Makonnen was viewed as someone that could assess and improve the
operations of certain industries in Ghana. In early 1960, Makonnen was appointed
President of the Industrial Co-Operative Society (IDUSCO) LTD. He approached this
position with urgency as he immediately undertook a tour of the nation to obtain a
general picture of the economic feasibilities of projects being proposed, to collect data
and necessary information, and to scout provision site for future projects.473 He also
sought to promote development education through the IDUSCO by partnering with
representatives of the German Democratic Republic Foreign Trade to open an exhibit
showcasing educational equipment dealing with biological science and engineering in
hopes of them being installed in schools throughout Ghana.474
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Eventually, Makonnen was also called upon by Nkrumah to serve Ghana as
Managing-Director of the Hotel and Tourist Corporation, no doubt because of his success
with the African Affairs Centre and in the restaurant business in Manchester, it was
believed that he could also make this institution profitable. Makonnen took the position
seriously, making the best fiscal decision for the corporation by opting to sign contracts
with foreign firms with the best quality items for the best price, instead of merely taking
contracts with British firms because of past relationships.475 He was also responsible for
coordinating the accommodations for foreign dignitaries and public figures visiting
Ghana, such as Yvonnen Whyte, Miss Jamaica in 1964.476 While he was in this position
for less than a year, Makonnen was relatively successful in his endeavors as ManagingDirector, as he regularly cut expenditures, improved daily operations, oversaw the
expansion of multiple hotels, and snuffed out corruption amongst hotel numerous hotel
managers.477
Makonnen and Ghanaian Media:
In reference to the multitude of ways that Nkrumah and the Bureau made use of
his contacts and expertise, Makonnen acknowledged that: “It’s an endless process.”478
As Nkrumah sought to spread his Pan-African political thought throughout Africa, he
understood that media would play a large role in this process. As a result, in 1959 he
directed Padmore’s Office to establish the famous Radio Ghana to broadcast political
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messages and to serve as a platform for African revolutionaries taking refuge in Ghana to
broadcast important messages. Nkrumah was explicit in directing the Broadcasting
Department that each news broadcast begins with the signature call: “This is the Voice of
Africa coming to you from Radio Ghana, Accra.”479 In December 1959, the African
Affairs Committee decided that a select group of its members would deliver Radio
Ghana’s daily radio commentary, with Makonnen being assigned to personally deliver
messages on African Affairs over the airways every Saturday evening.480
Making use of radio broadcast to spread Pan-Africanism and anti-colonial news
was a new development; however, as a youth in British Guiana, Makonnen regularly
acquired his news of the international Black liberation movement through print media
outlets, like Marcus Garvey’s Negro World and the N.A.A.C.P.’s Crisis Magazine.
Understanding the significance of print media in spreading news and fostering political
agency, Makonnen replicated these outlets in his publishing ventures in London with the
IASB’s Internationalist African Opinion. Additionally, during his time in Manchester,
Makonnen managed to raise capital to establish the Pan-African Publishing Co. Ltd, to
publish a monthly journal for the Pan-African Federation called, Pan-Africa, which
Nkrumah, Padmore, CLR James, and several other notable Pan-African figures
contributed. As a result, Makonnen was called upon by Nkrumah and the Bureau to aid in
building up the media component of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. In January 1959, well
aware of his extensive experience and success in editing newspapers and managing
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publishing companies, like the Pan-African Press, Nkrumah appointed Makonnen to
serve as editor and head of the Guinea Press.
As the official publisher of Padmore’s Office, he and Nkrumah were sure that
Makonnen was the ideal candidate to deal with the tremendous amount of labor that a
press needed. According to Makonnen, he was meant to help get the Guinea Press out of
the red, because of the questionable spending practices of its former managers. Early on,
it was not difficult for Makonnen to see where the money was going, as the former
manager had twenty cars and a fleet of large trucks delivering its publications.
Makonnen quickly reduced this to two buses, a few motor bicycles, and made more use
of railways for deliveries.481 Even though he was able to cut costs early on, Makonnen
admitted that it was nearly impossible to work out a budget for the Press, as Nkrumah
directed over £60,000 of its profits to be sent out to London to back a future publication
in Britain. These funds would later be raised as a topic of discussion during Makonnen’s
imprisonment in the coup of February 1966, as the final destination of the funds sent to
London were called into question.
In addition to overseeing the Guinea Press, Makonnen was also appointed by the
Bureau to serve on the Editorial Committee of its official publication, The Bulletin on
African Affairs.482 This publication was a monthly magazine on African Affairs geared
towards providing the Ghanaian public with news and commentary on international
matters concerning Africa. The Bulletin provided concise articles and the foreign speech
by Ghanaian politicians on issues of the African political scene; however, in a January
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1960 meeting of the African Affairs Committee Nkrumah instructed the Editorial
Committee that the contents of the Bulletin should remind its readers of their place in
world politics and conform to CPP’s political ideologies and the government’s foreign
policy.483 Such a publication was indeed necessary as the Bureau, in its accumulation
and dissemination of information on Africa Affairs to further Ghana’s Pan-African
Policy, needed to ensure that Ghanaian citizens were informed of the current event in
Africa as well. Unfortunately, Makonnen’s time serving on the Bulletin’s Editorial
Committee was short-lived because of Nkrumah’s directions for him to give full attention
to the African Affairs Centre.484 While Nkrumah appeared to be asking Makonnen to
focus on the Centre because of its significance to the Bureau and Ghana’s Pan-African
policy, he was also attempting to quell some of the tension between Makonnen and the
Bureau’s Secretary A.K. Barden.
Barden, Ghanaian Chauvinism, and Nkrumah’s Consolidation of Power
In spite of Nkrumah’s attempts to develop Ghana and create a sense of
nationalism and collective investment in the building of the nation, Makonnen recalled
that many Ghanaians could not get away from being a “big man” and that most
government employees were on a constant search in the corridors of power.485 This made
the training of disciplined revolutionaries difficult, as according to Makonnen, CPP party
members praised Osagyefo(Kwame), but in actuality, they all wanted to be Osagyefo.
There was a common expectation among CPP members that the revolution was to pay off
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in some way, especially with those that had been trained up in the party’s ideals of
revolutionary socialism and Pan-Africanism since the early 1950s.
For many, the CPP’s movement and party membership were viewed as a
profession, which caused a considerable degree of opportunism to manifest within the
CPP and the government itself. Having so many contestants for every government
position tended to cause more fragmentation and division in Nkrumah’s regime than
unity, which became an inhibitor as Nkrumah’s political philosophies began to shift
further to the left. This posturing by party members fostered what Makonnen referred to
as the “colonial mentality,” in which those in prominent positions in Ghanaian society
sought to stock individuals from their own ethnic groups within government institutions.
In addition to the tribalism still plaguing Ghanaian society, Makonnen, like Padmore
before him experienced a degree of resentment because of his influence on Nkrumah, but
also because of his West Indian origins.
Makonnen recalled that during this time in Ghana, one was inevitably the object
of envy if you held a number of positions and were not Ghanaian. Since he was qualified
to do so many jobs and shaping Ghanaian society from State Bakeries to its Intelligence
Service, Makonnen naturally was the target of intrigue and resentment, from opportunists
within the Nkrumah government. He observed this opportunism particularly in A.K.
Barden, a Ghanaian ex-serviceman that Padmore had brought on as his assistant and
stenographer. Padmore took to Barden quickly and poured into him the same mentorship
he afforded Nkrumah in their London days. He trained Barden to be a radical PanAfricanist, and in doing so Barden was able to form a close relationship with Nkrumah,
through Padmore, and upon the untimely death of Padmore, Barden was selected by
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Nkrumah to lead the Bureau of African Affairs. Several of Nkrumah’s advisors and
ministers protested his appointment, as many believed he lacked the experience to lead.
Makonnen, who viewed as little more than an opportunist and “a police boy,” found
himself among these individuals that were taken by surprise when Barden was named as
Padmore’s successor.486
Early on he observed Barden serving as Padmore’s stenographer, using the
information from letters between Padmore and Nkrumah to integrate himself with those
who wanted to be in the know. As a result, while Barden had gained Nkrumah’s trust,
Makonnen remained suspicious of him, even after he became Secretary of the Bureau of
African Affairs. Nkrumah also reorganized the Bureau, replacing the African Affairs
Committee with a Board of Directors comprised of Makonnen, five other individuals, and
Barden running the organization. This allowed Barden to become one of the most
powerful persons in Ghana in a short period of time. Makonnen maintained that upon
being appointed, Barden quickly moved to push him out of the Bureau to fill the board
solely with Ghanaians of his choosing.487 Barden’s immediate appointing of his close
associate David Bosumtwi-Sam, to serve as Administrative Secretary of the Bureau on
the grounds of “his skills,” may have been demonstrative of Makonnen’s observation. In
addition to this Makonnen believed that Barden had his eyes set on bringing the African
Affairs Centre under his control as well.
In Nkrumah’s reorganizing of Padmore’s Office, he was sure to allow the Bureau
and the African Affairs Center to function independently of each other. This did not stop
Barden from disrupting Makonnen’s business at the Centre with visiting African
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nationalists. Makonnen recalled Barden’s attempt to sabotage his relationship with
Kenyan nationalist Jaramogi Odingo and Mbiyu Koinange once he demonstrated his
extensive knowledge of the struggle in Kenya. According to Makonnen, once Odinga
declared maybe “we should borrow this Makonnen for a spell, since he is so
knowledgeable about Kenya,” Barden warned him that: “Makonnen is somebody of
dubious origin. Don’t trust yourself with these foreign Africans.”488 Similar to Padmore,
Makonnen’s character and morals were attacks simply because of his West Indian
origins. Furthermore, the fact that Makonnen had known Nkrumah for decades, lived in
Ghana since independence, and even married a Ghanaian woman, he was still subject to
this Ghanaian chauvinism.
Makonnen saw this same resentment of not only non-continental Africans but also
in the reception of non-Ghanaian Africans working in Ghana. During his time as
Managing-Director of Ghana’s Hotels and Tourism Corporation in Spring 1964,
Makonnen was also responsible for managing the Black Star Line, which was based on
the Marcus Garvey’s original vision of promoting Pan-African commerce throughout the
African diaspora. Furthermore, when the first Black Star Liner ship arrived in Takoradi,
it was discovered that the majority of the sailors hired in Manchester had been Nigerian
as opposed to Ghanaian. This prompted Kodwo Addison, head of the Kwame Nkrumah
Ideological Institute and also a close associate of Barden, to urge Ghanaians to protest the
foreign African seamen and demand that they are thrown out of the nation. Makonnen,
having been present, immediately stepped in to address the seamen and said:
Most of you seamen know who I am: I was with you in Cardiff, Merseyside and
other places. Take no notice of people who are trying to disturb the unity between
488
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Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. We envisage a Black Star Line that will be
manned by African regardless of a particular group.489
These sentiments from Barden and Addison reflects drastic departures from Nkrumah’s
own ideologies regarding his embrace of the diaspora and the unity of Africa. Perhaps
there was a sense that since it was Ghana that was spending the money for African
liberation, these positions should belong to Ghanaians. Thus, having the Secretary of the
Bureau of African Affairs, which was responsible for promoting Ghana’s Pan-African
policy, and the head of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, which was responsible
for instilling a political education in the Ghanaian people based on Nkrumah’s own
ideologies, possess such views of non-Ghanaians contributing to work in Ghana, calls
into question their commitment to Nkrumah’s ideology.
In doing so it augments Makonnen’s claims regarding opportunism within the
Nkrumah government. Furthermore, the rebuking of people of African descent because
they were not part of the Ghanaian family structure, directly contradicted Pan-Africanism
and represented a form of Ghanaian nationalism that was becoming increasingly
exclusionary rather than inclusive. Makonnen admits that eventually some of these
attitudes made Nkrumah cautious about being too close to certain outsiders since they
were not part of the Ghanaian family structure. Furthermore, in June 1960 when he
officially appointed of Makonnen as Director of the African Affairs Centre, his
instructions to devote his full attention to the Centre and to report directly and only to
him, was less about separating the Centre from the Bureau or Makonnen from Barden,
and more so about Nkrumah consolidating power and directing the flow of all
information and decision making through himself. Another indicator of this
489
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consolidation of power was displayed by the fact that the Bureau’s African Affairs
Committee held its final meeting on March 17, 1960, as Nkrumah opted to discuss issues
of African Affairs and Ghana’s Pan-African Policy in private meetings with Barden.
It became increasingly apparent that Barden did not receive this position on his
merit. Rather, Nkrumah’s confidence in Barden stemmed not from his competence or
unique qualifications, but rather from “his willingness to respond at all times to the many
demands that were made, on his courage and loyalty in the liberation cause.”490 This
blind and unwavering loyalty was reflected in Barden’s General Office Instructions that
we sent out to each staff member of the Bureau, in which the first directive prescribed
that “You will be loyal to the president of the Republic, the Nation, the Government and
the CPP”491 While such a command may seem normal on its face, it suggests that
steadfast loyalty and, above all else, obedience to Nkrumah and his decisions were
requirements from anyone involved with the institution. Nkrumah’s increasing emphasis
on loyalty and obedience, and his curtailing of the channels through which information
traveled, marked a clear departure from the representative mass-based political approach
to governance that defined the CPP’s movement and Ghana’s early days of
independence.

Makonnen observed that these same demands of loyalty and obedience

went far beyond the Bureau and began to permeate throughout Ghanaian society as
Nkrumah’s a shift towards the Russian model of centralizing governance began to
manifest.492
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Socialism Without Socialists and Ghana’s Benevolent Dictator
In 1954, Nkrumah declared that any person found to be an active Communist
would be refused employment within the Gold Coast government.493 This stance was
derived from Nkrumah’s strategy of “Tactical Action” during the transitional period of
apprenticeship governance under which the provisions for independence were being
negotiated. By 1960 Ghana had ratified its Republican Constitution and officially
severed all political ties with Britain. Faced with the task of building a nation, Nkrumah
pivoted from his 1954 proclamation and declared socialism as a fundamental component
of his vision for the new republic. Nkrumah also began to move away from African
socialism, based on the “African Personality,” which he favored since his days in the
Pan-African movement.
During that time, Padmore and Makonnen were always critical of Nkrumah’s
double-dealing in the Pan-Africanism movement and the Communist Party of Great
Britain. Makonnen had always maintained that regarding socialism people of African
descent should: “Buy the book, Don’t join the club!” meaning that if he was interested in
socialism, he should extract what he needed from the ideology and apply it without the
direction of British or Russian commissars.494 With the passing of Padmore, his
ideological mentor and closest political advisor, Nkrumah’s embrace of scientificsocialism, coincided with an increase in foreign advisors that facilitated his emergent ties
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with socialist nations like, the Soviet Union and China, who stood as examples of
thriving industrial socialist states.495
In the early 1960s, Ghana formed political “Friendships” and a symbolic treaty of
economic and cultural ties with both nations.496 The Soviets, in particular, were held in
high esteem for their handling of two themes that were directly applicable to Ghana.
First, the USSR was praised for its anti-tribalism, as the Soviet Union united 600 million
peoples with distinctive ethnic and national backgrounds, dialects and cultures under a
common heritage and forming “the greatest federation in world history.”497 Secondly, the
Soviet people were lauded for pooling their resources together to develop into a socialist
state “reflecting the best in humanity, leading scientific and technical progress in our
modern age.”498
In his reverence of Lenin, Nkrumah maintained that for Lenin “revolution was
always for him a moral issue for the realization of social justice…he succeeded in
establishing a new social system that had made a remarkable impact on the course of
world history.”499 As a result, Nkrumah modeled much of his socialist policies and
rhetoric from Lenin and the Russian model for development and modernization. From
the Russian view, there was little to distinguish Nkrumah’s idea of socialism from the
Russian brand of orthodoxy and consequently, the Russians looked upon the general
direction of Nkrumah’s policies with favor.500 Receiving the Lenin Peace Prize by
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Russia in 1961, Nkrumah and government officials like Kofi Baako, then Minister of
Defence and Leader of the House, viewed the achievement as recognition and
legitimation of his plans for Ghana’s ongoing socialist revolution.501
As a result, socialism was characterized as an ideology that sought to abolish
exploitation and create a classless society free of oppression. In his seminal text,
Consciencism he argues that the ideology of society displays itself in the particular
political, social, moral, and historical context of that society.502 As a result, he
maintained that any attempt to build socialism in Ghana needed to be pragmatically
developed and adapted to the specific conditions and social factors present in Ghanaian
society. Promising to apply socialist ideas to address African problems, Nkrumah was
anointed “The Lenin of Africa,” as socialism was promised to bring free healthcare,
education, state farms, and nationalization of industry.503
The Russian model of the one-party state that became Nkrumah’s socialist
program was based on “work and happiness” which was cast as the only viable path to “a
healthier, happier and more prosperous life for us all.” Stressing the ideology’s ability to
uplift, socialism was said to provide the opportunity for the Ghanaian masses to once
again make their contribution towards the fulfillment of our national purposes.504 While
Nkrumah’s socialism had shifted specifically toward scientific-socialism, his promotion
of the concept centered around its framing as an African brand of Socialism, which
presented it as an expression of solidarity with the anti-imperial world; non-alignment
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with the western or eastern blocs; a social synthesis of human values, communalism, and
modernization; and the view of the nation-state as an extended family system.505
Socialism or Tradition?:
Nkrumah and the CPP made innumerable attempts to inculcate Ghanaian society
with socialism through ideological institutions, state-owned press, and party propaganda;
however, Makonnen astutely observed that one the primary reason that socialism failed to
take hold in Ghana was simply because “You can’t build socialism without socialists.”506
Central to this suggestion was the fact that, as Nkrumah sought to apply socialist
principles to Ghana’s economy, he failed to realize that the transactional nature and profit
motive in Ghana’s local economy had existed prior to colonialization. In Ghana,
Makonnen observed a nation of people that had been engaged in international trade with
a reciprocal relationship in commerce for centuries. As such, while it was easy to
identify the foreign import-export companies during the colonial era as explicit forms of
capitalist exploitation, that same analysis was not applied to what Makonnen referred to
as the “Primitive Capitalism” that had existed in Ghanaian society.507 He observed this
primarily in, what he called, the “mammy system,” which was run by the market women
in Ghana since the days of colonization. Recalling his time in Ghana, Makonnen
provides the example of the Market Women in the Asante capital, Kumasi, in reference
to the primitive capitalism that Nkrumah was up against in his attempts to implement
socialism in Ghanaian society.
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These market women in Kumasi were vital to local economies in Ghana since the
city’s central location within the nation made it a major transfer point for imports, for
local manufactures, and food crops.508 Makonnen, acknowledged their significance to
local Ghanaian economies since market women often personally cultivated and mediated
economic connections, with European import and export firms, such as the United Africa
Company, to conduct their own independent business. He deemed these market women
enterprises as “primitive” because of their “under-capitalized” nature, which paled in
comparison to their European counterparts that were able to establish joint-stock
companies with share capital. Central to his conception of capitalism was the exploitation
of workers, from which capital was derived and accumulated, in both European and
African contexts. As substitutes for expensive shops or showcases, Makonnen observed
that these market women used their ten to fifteen children to tour a locality daily, with
commodities to the doorsteps of potential consumers.
Likening these girls to the “match-girls” of Victorian England, Makonnen
suggested there was a connection between the mammy system and child prostitution, as
market women would instruct their pawns not to return with unsold goods, which
provided for young girls to be taken advantage of in some cases. Makonnen regarded this
system as a primitive form of capitalism; however, he alleged that in his discussions with
colleagues and even Nkrumah the response was usually: “That’s African socialism.
Where are the exploiters?”509 While this was viewed by most Ghanaian as “good
tradition” or “family development,” Makonnen viewed this as exploitation within the
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domestic circle, as it was also children that awoke from their mats outside family houses
to begin working on the kenke and pounding pepper to be sold. From Makonnen’s
perspective, the absence of industrial development in Ghana caused those analyzing the
Ghanaian economy to look elsewhere for largescale exploitation; however, in his view,
one did not have to look any further than the traditional family structure in Ghana to find
exploitation.
In his view, African socialism became a line of propaganda used to explain away
or mitigate what Makonnen perceived as exploitation in traditional Ghanaian society. In
addition to this, Makonnen believed socialist sloganeering, in part, was being directed to
the wrong sections of society, as European imperialism was viewed as the sole
perpetrator of capitalist exploitation. It was Makonnen’s perception that his criticisms of
alleged primitive capitalism in Ghana garnered responses such as:
You’re a bad man, coming here to pry into our family affairs. How can you be so
inhuman as to attack those various relations who nursed me and brought me up to
be the beautiful woman I am?510
What Makonnen, and ultimately Nkrumah, faced was a clash between traditional
Ghanaian economic systems and modern conceptions of both capitalism and socialism.
While there may be merit to Makonnen’s position on exploitation, his notion of primitive
capitalism is flawed as it fails to consider the perspectives of Ghanaians continuing a
traditional approach to local commerce, nor the use of the capital derived from what he
perceived as exploited labor. Ghanaians themselves judged these local economies by the
livelihoods it provided. Moreover, they viewed these systems as operating with a
commitment to mutual survival and dignity as they provide accessible entry points to
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ordinary citizens and incomes that were used to sustain communities and family life.511
As such, since these children, he viewed being exploited, were ultimately being cared for
and contributing to the communal system of traditional Ghanaian society in which
everyone possessed value in society, it was simply viewed by most as a form of African
socialism.
Calling attention to this condition also raised a conundrum for Nkrumah, as the
market women were among his strongest supporters during the early days of the CPP’s
nationalist movement. Furthermore, an attack on their system posed the threat of further
disillusion with the government or even rebellion, which was increasingly plausible as
corruption pervaded the government and Nkrumah consolidating power with himself. As
a result, the CPP party’s members' use of African socialism in their anti-colonial rhetoric
served an additional purpose of legitimizing traditional Ghanaian social and economic
structures to maintain the loyalty of the Ghanaian masses.
Makonnen believed that socialism should have been applied to directly address
the needs of the Ghanaian masses, which required socialist planning to address
underproduction and inefficiency in the agricultural and budding industrial sector. What
he soon discovered was that there were very few serious attempts to examine the state of
Ghana’s economy. He called this “the worst of both worlds,” as there was an abundance
of socialist rhetoric in Ghana without actual socialist planning. Instead, he suggested that
Nkrumah and the CPP government were more so interested in state capitalism than
socialism, as demonstrated with overspending on development plans, and projects like

511

Gracia Clark. “Consulting Elderly Kumasi Market Women (2009), 108-109.

270

the Volta River Project that served to enrich western capitalists and ultimately continue
their exploitation of Ghana’s natural resources.
By the mid-1960s the Ghanaian government was full of Nkrumah’s loyal
sycophants and drenched in corruption. In Makonnen’s view, socialism in Ghana had
become a cliché, as Nkrumah’s ministers and powerful party men, once the colonized
masses parked their Cadillacs and Mercedes Benzes outside their government-funded
bungalows; hosted foreign dignitaries on yachts; and awarded building contracts to
foreign firms for their own benefit. 512 As such, while socialism pervaded Ghanaian
society and state media, the government had no apparent intention of putting it into
practice, as the government and most individuals promoting socialist rhetoric were
steeped in capitalism. Observing these conditions, Makonnen found it difficult to bring
his concerns to Nkrumah, his former mentee, as Nkrumah had grown cautious of being
too close to certain outsiders since they were not part of the Ghanaian family structure.
Still, when Makonnen attempted to confront Nkrumah on the endemic levels of
corruption in Ghana’s political-economy he was demoted from Director of the African
Affairs Centre and Managing-Director of Ghana Hotels and Tourist Corporation,
removed from the African Affairs Committee, and sent back to State Bakeries.513
While Makonnen, returned to his former post and remained loyal to Nkrumah
because of his commitment to Pan-Africanism, this act was demonstrative of the
authoritative turn that Nkrumah had taken in the 1960s. Furthermore, while socialism
purported to encourage open societies with a free press, the right of collective bargaining,
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and transparency in governance, Makonnen noted that by this time Ghana had instead
become more of a closed society.514 By 1965, Nkrumah had achieved political
centralization with a one-party state and consolidated the power of the state with himself
as he micromanaged domestic, foreign, and Pan-African policy. Nkrumah had become
what Makonnen referred to as “power sweet,” as his economic and Pan-African policies,
which Makonnen in large part contributed to building, had culminated in the deterioration
of faith in the Ghanaian government and Nkrumah himself. This was the Ghana that,
fellow Guyanese intellectual-activist, Jan Carew was invited by Nkrumah to enter as the
final days of his rule approached.
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BLACK MIDAS AND GHANA’S BENEVOLENT DICTATOR
By 1965, Ghanaian society was facing an imminent crisis and the end of the
Nkrumah era. As Ghana pressed on it was confronted by growing discontent amongst its
citizenry and forced to deal with the implications of Nkrumah’s use of authoritarian
legislature to central power with himself. These were the conditions encountered by PanAfrican intellectual-activist, Jan Carew, as he entered “the turbulences and infelicities of
the chaos that is Ghana.”515 Carew was an internationally known author, artist, and
activist that, like Padmore, Lewis, and Makonnen, had intimate knowledge of the Black
experience from the West Indies, to the United States, and Europe. A man of their ilk,
Carew was brought into Ghana to aid in building Ghana’s Pan-African media platform
and directly advise Nkrumah in his final days in power. This chapter argues that Carew
entered Ghana at a tumultuous moment and upon witnessing the fruits of Nkrumah’s
despotic turn and failed financial planning, he provided sagacious and astute counsel to
Nkrumah prior to his removal from office in a coup d’état in February 1966.
The Gentle Revolutionary:
Few West Indian Pan-Africanists of the mid-twentieth century have been able to
amass a comparable international network, influence, and respect to that of Jan Carew.
Born in the small town of Agricola Rome, in Guyana in 1920, Carew was the only son

515

Letter to Carew, on January 20, 1966. “Correspondence from Others who were in Ghana (1966),” Jan
Carew Papers.

273

and middle child of Ethel Robertson and Alan Carew. His father, Alan, was a British
Empire Loyalist, believing wholeheartedly that living under the British crown was the
greatest blessing that life had to offer.516 On the other hand, his mother was a nationalist,
meaning that she believed colonial rule to be an abomination, that fostered racial
stratification and promoted the hierarchy of color, caste, and class in Guyana’s
population.
In addition to experiencing the conditions of British colonialism and the racial
tensions between Africans and Indians in British Guiana, Carew learned of the
implications of racial domination from his mother, who experienced jim crow racism in
the United States. Early on in life, Jan found that growing up in a multiracial British
colony brought about an acute awareness of race. Being of African, Indigenous, and
European ancestry, Carew embodied the nuances of West Indian identity, as he found
himself having to constantly reconcile the cultural and historical meanings of
enslavement, emancipation, and human progress.517 He also carried with him the
inextricable phenomena of living between the backward colonial society of British
Guiana and traversing the modern world as a British subject, cultivated in Victorian
English values as well as the revolutionary spirit of resistance that emanated from San
Domingue and throughout the greater West Indies.
In 1944, Carew, like his West Indian comrades in Ghana, left his homeland in the
West Indies to receive his education abroad. Like Padmore, Carew first attended Howard
University and was quickly introduced to Jim Crow racism for the first time when he was
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harassed by the DC police. Similar to Makonnen, Carew’s studies eventually took him to
Europe after earning a scholarship to study at Charles University in Czechoslovakia.
During his time in Europe Carew passed through London where he met George Padmore,
whom he considered a mentor for his generation who inspired in them a spirit of
insurrection against the imperial binds of Europe. Carew like many Pan-African
revolutionaries of the time had read Padmore’s articles and books and heard the legend of
his “007-type of escape” from Stalin’s hitmen in the Soviet Union.518
Like Padmore, Carew came to spend a great deal of his time in London where he
also became part of the Pan-African activist community and demonstrated nearly every
day during the late 1950s and early 1960s on a number of issues from immigration to
South African apartheid. As atrocities like the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya, the
Sharpville Massacre in South Africa, and Patrice Lumumba’s assassination in the Congo,
became increasingly common, Carew observed that “What is happening is that the slums
of the Empire are coming too close to the doorsteps of the English.”519
The horrific murder of Lumumba, the first democratically elected Prime Minister
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular, affected Carew more than any
other political tragedy of the era, stirring within him a desire to seek violent action
against whites on the streets of London. However, he instead opted to join other anticolonial activists at the Ghanaian Embassy in London to draw up a policy statement in
support of Lumumba and calling for the demobilization of the Force Publique, which had
brutalized the Congolese people since the days of the Conference of Berlin. Carew’s use
of the Ghanaian Embassy speaks to the Pan-African resources and institutions that Ghana
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and Nkrumah were providing, not only for African liberation movements in Africa but
for anti-colonial activists in the home of the Empire as well. In doing so, Nkrumah was
able to spread his and Ghana’s influence on revolutionaries and activists throughout the
African diaspora, allowing for the Pan-Africanism emanating from Ghana to be carried
the boundaries of the third world.
The Caribbean Writer in Exile:
In addition to his activism, in London, Carew gained a reputation as a
“Renaissance Man” because of the breadth of his talents and capabilities as an actor,
playwright, art critic, broadcaster, journalist, and activist. Struggling to make ends meet,
Carew turned to journalism, serving as a columnist for the Kensington Post, London
Observer, served as an Art Critic for the Art News and Review, and wrote book reviews
for John O’London’s Weekly. Showcasing his acting skills, Carew joined the Lawrence
Oliver Company and appeared in plays throughout Britain and the United States.
Throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s, he regularly contributed to BBC broadcasts on
art, literature, and current affairs on programs like Caribbean Voices, Home Service, and
Third Programme. As he traveled the modern world, Carew always kept Guiana close to
his heart, and position his homeland as the backdrop for his first major publication, Black
Midas. In this seminal text, Carew highlights Guianese folk myth, language, and explores
the nuances of race and class in post-colonial Guiana, through the perspective of porkknocker (a small-scale gem prospector) as the nation’s natural wealth was exploited
through its emergent diamond and gold industry.
The success of Black Midas, led to its publishing in several languages including
Russian, causing Carew to travel to the Soviet Union as a guest to the USSR Writers’
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Union in 1963. While Carew had been aware of the Soviet Union’s embrace of people’s
struggles in the third world, part of the reason for his visit was that he had amassed
royalties from Black Midas but since the Soviets had not signed the Berne copyright
agreement the funds from his royalties could only be spent in the Soviet Union.
Following a second visit to Russia, Carew was inspired to write another major text,
entitled Moscow is not my Mecca, which explores the anti-black racism experienced by
Black students living in Moscow. Determined not to author “a knee-jerk anticommunist
work,” Carew intended to disrupt the prevalent propaganda of Russia being a communist
utopia and to “tell the truth about the rise of racism in the Soviet Union.”520 In doing so,
the novel demonstrates how the presence of these Black exchange students from the West
Indies and Africa, incited an inferiority complex derived from prevalent racial stereotypes
in Russian society claiming these visitors from the third world were:
[…] hungry and illiterate, victims of imperialist greed and oppression … we were
never told that some of you had travelled to New York, Rome, London, Paris, and
that we would envy you your clothes, your way of talking freely about things we
don’t dare to mention.521
Relying on the accounts of Black students, in Moscow is not my Mecca, Carew dismissed
the USSR’s persona as a model for newly emerging post-colonial states by depicting
racist attitudes in Soviet society.
By highlighting experiences of Black exchange students with Russian students
spitting in front of them, calling them “Black monkeys,” and reports of racial violence,
Carew continued a tradition of denouncing the popular Soviet propaganda of the time,
that presented the USSR as a revolutionary, non-racist, and humanitarian alternative to
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imperialist nations of the West. As a result, Carew, placed himself in step with George
Padmore (Pan-Africanism or Communism), whom he believed would have approved of
the book, noting Padmore’s emphasis on the significance of operating in a race first
capacity, rather than the strict class-based approach preferred by many in the USSR and
the international communist parties.
During this time, Carew also gained prominence within the London PanAfricanist network, befriending the likes of Jomo Kenyatta, Claudia Jones, Paul Robeson
and W.E.B. Du Bois, who was on his way to Ghana to live permanently to work on the
African Encyclopedia. Had Carew moved to London a decade earlier, there is no doubt
that he would have been immersed in the Pan-African movement working alongside
Padmore, Lewis, Makonnen, and Nkrumah. In 1965 Carew fleshed out his own PanAfrican ideals with Malcolm X during his visit to London. The two men, both the sons of
socially conscious West Indian women, became instant friends and spent his entire weeklong visit together in London discussing his pilgrimage to Mecca, race relations in
England, and Malcolm’s monotonous meetings with Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana.522
In their discussions, Carew declared that he was “a socialist, a Pan-Africanist, a
Black Marxist, a nationalist who believed in the cultural unity of the black world…”523
His Pan-Africanism had been demonstrated not only in his activist work in London but
also in his work in the West Indies. A prime example was displayed in his call for unity
within the West Indies following the failure of a Federation of nation-states to be formed.
In a December 1962 article, entitled “Federation: Shadow or Substance?” Carew wrote:
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Individual West Indian leaders, while trumpeting their advocacy of the idea of a
centralized government, made sure that enough power remained in their hands to
make this impossible . . . . The West Indies can no longer afford to carry on by
plastering sores; cures must now be affected in the bloodstream of society. We live
in an age of emergent coloured peoples, of revolutionary social change… The logic
of a federation with a strong central government, planning for the whole area,
giving to an uprooted peoples who were drawn from all over the earth a sense of
nationhood, of identity, still remains unassailable.524
For Carew, a West Indian Federation, like the United States of Africa envisioned by
Nkrumah was the most viable course of action for liberating the region and its people
once and for all. However, as Nkrumah was also learning at this time with the
Casablanca and Monrovia Blocs, these notions of unity and regional/continental
federations, while logical and economically viable, were unattainable primarily because
the leaders of these territories preferred to keep power over their government and nations
with themselves.525
Carew also revealed to Malcolm, his believed that socialism was the only system
through which the true histories of people of African descent could be sufficiently
articulated, analyzed, and restored. As Malcolm was still refining his understandings of
socialist ideology, he asked “What kind of socialism?.” Having observed the varying
forms of socialism practiced in Russia, the international Communist parties, and those
emerging in the third world, Carew reiterated that his socialism was a “humane and
resilient socialism that is sensitive to the rhythms of life and to all human needs–material,
cultural, psychological, spiritual, collective, and individual. Above all, it must be a
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patient and tolerant socialism”526 This is the vision that many anti-colonialist and Black
socialists of the era, especially those conceiving of African Socialism, possessed as they
envisioned a post-colonial world based on egalitarianism, humanism, and selfdetermination. Unfortunately, Malcolm X would not be able to see this post-colonial
world, as he was assassinated less than a week after he left London. Following
Malcolm’s death, Carew, fed up from the racism in England and in need of respite,
retreated to Ibiza, Spain to unwind and write in solitude, where he remained until
receiving an invitation to work in Nkrumah’s Ghana.
Guiana Comes to Ghana Again
On a brief trip to handle some business in London in Summer 1965, Carew
received a telegram stating that the Director of Ghana’s Publicity Secretariat wanted to
interview him for an Editorship position in Ghana.527 The telegram had been sent by
African American Pan-Africanist, Julian Mayfield, who had been working with Nkrumah
in Ghana since 1961 as founder and Editor of the African Review and serving as the
Director of Ghana’s Publicity Secretariat. He had been in London as a member of a
delegation that Nkrumah sent to the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference.
Mayfield managed to track Carew down through his political network in London and
invited him to breakfast at the Imperial Hotel. Speaking with an air of alertness, Carew
could tell that Mayfield had not simply invited him to breakfast for a friendly
conversation on the Afro-British and Afro-American experiences.
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Downing a gin and tonic, Mayfield confessed that he needed a reprieve from the
fray in Ghana and that unless he could go somewhere quiet to recharge he would burn
out. He then shared that President Nkrumah had agreed to let him take his leave, on the
condition that he was able to convince Carew to take his place as Director of the Publicity
Secretariat.528 Carew was flattered but confessed that he had retreated to Ibiza also for
the purpose of taking respite. Well aware of Carew’s reputation in Pan-African circles as
an energetic and motivated activist, Mayfield admitted “We [in Ghana] know you were
directly involved with the Mau Mau campaigned and the protest over Lumumba’s
assassination. You’ve hardly been under a rock.”529 Handing Carew a contract, Mayfield
told him he needed to report for duty in a month. This was an offer that Carew could not
refuse, as all of his activism had been leading him to this moment.
Recalling his time with Nkrumah, Carew noted that he was very open to
everybody and wanted to embrace the entire diaspora. Carew’s presence in Ghana was a
testament to Nkrumah’s desire to practice Pan-African in this government, as well as his
desire to actually seek out those with the best skills in the Black world to help build
Ghana. Because of this Carew reveled in the chance to have an African leader with a
Pan-African vision.530 Carew also counted himself among the many that believed that
Nkrumah possessed the resources to realize the dream of a truly free African diaspora.
As such, Carew never returned to Ibiza, and instead flew directly from London to Accra
on Ghana Airways, via Rome. When Carew landed in Accra, it was his first time on
African soil and the final days of Nkrumah’s administration.
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African Review, the Publicity Secretariat, and Press Censorship:
While Mayfield stayed on in Ghana for the first few months of Carew’s tenure,
Carew was extremely busy in his new position. He was immediately thrown into
Mayfield’s hectic schedule as Director of Nkrumah’s Publicity Secretariat and Editor of
the African Review. Mayfield founded and edited the African Review as a magazine of
political economy that featured a radical analysis of the events in the United States and
the African world.531 It was truly a major Pan-African magazine of the time with an
internationalist strategy, as it sought to function as a forum for African and Third World
revolution with a critical analysis of issues like neo-colonialism, the assassination of
Malcolm X, apartheid in South Africa, and U.S. imperialism.532 Reflecting Nkrumah’s
own embrace of the African diaspora, the African Review was essentially a Ghanaian
publication outfitted by diasporic blacks with Mayfield and Shirley Graham Dubois as
co-editors, Jean Carey Bond providing editorial assistance, and contributing members
from across the diaspora such as Preston King, Maya Angelou, St. Clair Drake, and
Africana Historian John Henrik Clarke, who provide vital updates on matters in the
United States.
Carew had also been a contributor to the African Review since its first issue in
1964, and prior to moving to Ghana. He had been a regular contributor to the magazine,
having his most recently submitted article published in the magazine in October 1965.533
This article was a tribute to Malcolm X, as Carew derived the topic from his discussion
on racism and politics in Britain. As such the article examined how the Windrush
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generation’s migration to Britain, following World War II, had caused the issue of race
and immigration to become a deciding factor in the nation’s 1964 general election,
specifically in the town of Smethwick.534 During his time in London, Malcolm expressed
that he was profoundly concerned with these developments and made it a point to visit
Smethwick for himself, following his lecture at the London School of Economics.
In his Review article, Carew honed in on the industrial British town of Smethwick
where Peter Griffiths, a Conservative Member of Parliament of Smethwick had recently
won a Labour seat with “racialist clichés from the sewers” and the slogan: “If you want a
nigger for a neighbor, vote Labour.”535 This rhetoric bored a stark resemblance to the
racial ideologies manifesting across the United States in response to the Civil Rights
Movement. Subsequently, its emergence in Britain coincided not only with the mass
influx of West Indians and Africans to British society but also as the British government
was severing its ties with its former West Indian and African colonies. Understanding
the racial violence that routinely followed this rhetoric in the United States where the
Civil Rights Movement was at its peak, the comments made by Griffiths, as well as his
victory, should have been a concern of the Africa world and Carew ensured that the
African Review facilitated this conversation.
The magazine was extremely popular, with at least 15,000 copies of African
Review in circulation by February 1966 for international consumption and subscriptions
in diplomatic corps, embassies, etc.536 Among the magazine’s foreign correspondents
was David Dubois, the stepson of W.E.B. Du Bois, who had died in Ghana on the eve of
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the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963. Supplied with a new printing
press from East Germany, the African Review was able to produce a high-quality
publication; however, by February 1966 due to the chaos of Nkrumah’s final days in
office, the Africa Review was terribly behind schedule. In a letter to Carew, Doris Davis,
who was over Art and Production for the magazine suggested that the “March issue may
have to be dated April unless a miracle happens.”537 Before being sent out, the new
issues went first to Nkrumah’s office and then on to international markets for
consumption, and to African nations still under the colonial rule where the magazine was
often banned by colonial governments.
Taking over Mayfield’s responsibilities in the Publicity Secretariat, Carew mostly
produced unsigned material for broadcasting and reproduction in the national
newspapers. In this capacity, Carew expected to occasionally be called upon to assist in
drafting speeches or documents to be presented at international conferences.538 Prior to
Carew’s arrival, the African Affairs Committee, under the direction of Nkrumah
mandated that institutions like the Bureau of African Affairs, The African Affairs
Secretariat, and the All-African Trade Union Federation Secretariat should submit special
programmes, feature articles, radio broadcasts, and general press regarding African
Affairs and both domestic and international Ghanaian politics to be proofed by the
Publicity Secretariat.539 Furthermore, the policy of the African Affairs Committee
regarding press was that when in doubt, the Ghana press, specifically print media outlets
like the Ghanaian Times, should consult the Publicity Secretariat for fact-checking, and
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authentication of statements and positions taken by Ghanaian politicians.540 This was to
ensure all press releases were in line with the Nkrumah and the CPP government’s
policies and initiatives; however, it was also reflective of the increasing control that the
Nkrumah had begun to exert over the press in Ghana.
An irony of this era in post-colonial Ghana was that Nkrumah, who founded and
edited the Accra Evening News as a private newspaper prior to independence, turned his
back on the very notion of press freedom upon which his nationalist movement was built.
By the 1960s, as he began to consolidate power with himself, he increasingly refused to
tolerate dissenting views or those that diverged from his own in the Ghanaian media.
Following the 1960 referendum on the Republican constitution, which severed all
political ties to Britain, all Ghanaian journalists were warned in an Evening News article
that: “the Union will not tolerate misrepresentation and distortion of facts by journalists”
and would recommend severe punishments without hesitation for any journalists that
deliberately published a story ridiculing the government.541 Shortly thereafter, the
National Assembly approved of a constitutional amendment enabling Nkrumah to use
executive powers to inhibit the publication of any critical content that could potentially
tarnish public opinion against the government or was “contrary to public interest.”542
While the state-owned Evening News’ framed this amendment as a positive development,
the amendment actually made it illegal to sell or distribute any newspaper, book, or
document, which was considered contrary to the public interest and punishable with up to
three years imprisonment.
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Additionally, in 1961 the National Assembly passed a bill imposing a fine of 500
pounds and/or three years imprisonment, on anyone convicted of publishing defamatory
or insulting matter which might bring hatred, ridicule, or contempt upon Nkrumah.543
Among the Ghanaian newspapers affected by this law was the Kumasi-based Ashanti
Pioneer, which had regularly criticized Nkrumah and the CPP since the 1950s.
Following the government’s censoring of the paper, the CPP government shut down the
Pioneer in 1962. Also, the Pioneer’s editor was detained for seven months, and the
Pioneer’s city editor sentenced to four and half years in prison for being critical of
Nkrumah’s government. Broadening this encroachment on the freedom of the press, the
Newspaper Licensing Act was passed in 1963. This act required newspaper editors and
publishers to obtain a license, from the government and made it virtually impossible to
operate a paper without government authorization.
By the time Carew arrived in Ghana, these policies had been in effect for years.
Furthermore, it is possible that these restrictions on the press, along with the corruption
raging through Ghanaian society, contributed to Mayfield’s seemingly desperate need for
respite, as he had been working in Ghanaian media from the moment they had emerged.
This censorship even extended to the University of Ghana, which became a stronghold
from which criticism of Nkrumah and the government emanated. As a result of the
government’s interference and attacks on academic freedom, a number of foreign
professors, including Pauli Murray and Conor Cruise O’Brien, eventually resigned in
protest. It was clear that Nkrumah understood the power of the media and controlling the
narratives and flows of information being disseminated within and out of Ghana. These
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were among the early manifestations of repressive legislation that facilitated the growth
of corruption and Nkrumah’s turn towards authoritarian governance in Ghana and the
political environment that Carew had to navigate.
Corruption and the Path to Despotism
Carew originally stayed at the Star Hotel when he arrived in Ghana. This hotel
was built on the same compound on which Makonnen chose and built the African Affairs
Centre and oversaw the expansion of as Managing-Director of the Ghana Hotel and
Tourism Corporation all those years ago. When Mayfield left Ghana, he and Carew had
switch places literally and figurately, as Mayfield took up residence in Ibiza, and Carew
moved into Mayfield’s home in the Cantonments section of the Accra suburbs. The
home was a multi-room bungalow, that was possibly one of the prefabricated homes that
Padmore had negotiated far back in 1951 to set the tone of infrastructure development
and expand opportunities for investment in the Gold Coast. Carew felt guilty about living
in a lavish home owned by the government and moved into the stewards’ quarters, a
small two-room cottage on the property.
Assessing the Cantonments area, Carew saw that upon independence the new
African elites in Ghana had taken over and become Blackface copies of their former
colonial masters so much so that locals referred to them as “Afro-Saxons.”544 This
corruption had been festering in Ghanaian society dating back to the late 1950s as signs
of mismanagement, espionage and bribery began to circulate amongst the new Ghanaian
petit bourgeoisie. In addition to the yacht parties, Mercedes Benzes, corruption had
consumed the Ghanaian government as well as the CPP, the largest corruption scandal of
544
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the era had been the purchasing of a £3,000 golden bed by Mary Edusei, the wife of a
senior CPP minister in London, Krobo Edusei.545 Echoing Makonnen notion of the
“colonial mentality” that pervaded Ghanaian society, Carew’s observation placed on
display historian, Terence Ranger’s, argument that European invented traditions were
vital in the creation of the new educated African bourgeoisie in the 1950s and 1960s that
would outdo colonial whites in their dedication and loyalty to these traditions.546
These observations by Carew were foreseen by George Padmore, Nkrumah’s
Advisor on African Affairs, before his death. Padmore witnessed the corruption and the
factions of resistance to Nkrumah’s political ideologies and objectives for the future of
Ghana and Africa, and advised Nkrumah on the necessity of imposing a “transition
period of a “benevolent dictatorship.” For Padmore, this temporary dictatorship was
essential since there was “so much mess to be cleaned up that no other way but the strong
government” could complete the task.547 This notion of strong government was derived
from Padmore and Nkrumah’s commitment to socialism and the model of the Soviet
Union as a modern socialist nation. As one of Nkrumah’s closest advisors since 1945,
Padmore impressed upon him the necessity of a strong government that could ‘direct’
development and mobilize resources in Ghana. Unfortunately, along with the progress
that resulted from Nkrumah’s benevolent dictatorship, came press censorship, the
implementation of the repressive legislature to eliminate opposition, accusations of
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embezzlement, and voter manipulation in nationwide elections that resulted in the further
consolidation of power within a single-party government.
Although the CPP was organized around the principle of “democratic centralism,”
in practice, it became less evident as Nkrumah gradually consolidated power with
himself. The democratic aspect of this principle faded, as decisions were increasingly
handed down from Nkrumah for implementation.548 As appointed party officials were
imposed on members and used as subservient tools to manipulate the populace, it became
clear that the “one man, one vote, one nation” democracy espoused by the CPP had been
sacrificed for national “unity” and under the guise of Nkrumah’s whimsical decisions and
policies. In essence, the shift was merely a movement towards concentration of power
with the CPP and ultimately the personal dictatorship of Nkrumah.
Before Carew arrived in Ghana, Nkrumah and the CPP began promoting the idea
of, single-party government, which had been in Nkrumah’s plans since becoming
President in 1960.549 In October 1962, the Ghanaian National Assembly unanimously
accepted and sealed the motion calling for the introduction of a one-party system of
government for Ghana. This was justified by the claim that “there should be in the State
One all-embracing political movement or party which will serve as the principal guide for
the people’s leader and representative in their governmental duties.”550 As a result, the
influence of the Russian model of centralized governance was apparent as Nkrumah and
the CPP were successful in implementing a single-party government system, arguing that,
as a young state, Ghana could not afford to dispute its national efforts through the
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senseless wrangling brought through political opposition and it contended it was through
opposition parties that colonialism and imperialism sought to perpetuate their hold on
Ghana.551 Thus, the one-party system was proclaimed as the truest form of democracy,
while multiparty governance was denounced as the chief cause of subversion within
Ghana.552 By February 1964, the CPP government posed a Referendum on the proposed
one-party state. In its reporting of the voting result, the state-owned newspaper, the
Accra Evening News, foreshadowed the nature of the new single-party system.
Along with charges of a coming dictatorship, came accusations of voter
manipulation, as the Evening News’s coverage of the 1964 Referendum reported a 100%
majority vote for the one-party system in several constituencies. It even went so far as to
claim that in Sekondi and Ashanti regions, there was reportedly not a single ‘no’ vote
recorded.553 This result proved especially suspicious because the Ashanti region was a
primary site of resistance to Nkrumah and the CPP since the early 1950s. Furthermore,
voter anonymity had also been precluded, as voters were given slips numbered according
to their numbers on the electoral roll, which allowed for the identities of voters to
potentially be traced by party officials for retaliation.554 Fear of such retaliation,
particularly in the Sekondi-Takoradi area was warranted considering Nkrumah’s handling
of overt opposition three years earlier.
In September 1961 a general strike in the Sekondi-Takoradi region sparked a
nationwide worker’s demonstration in response to widespread worker disillusionment
with the Ghanaian government and the nation declining economy. In response to the
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failures of the Second Development Plan, rising corruption amongst government
officials, and serious economic grievances including falling wages, rising prices, and a
government-imposed five percent compulsory saving deduction, railway and
dockworkers in the Sekondi-Takoradi area launched a 17-day strike that quickly spread
across the nation to include the masses of commercial employees, civil servants, and
market women throughout Ghana.555 In response to the strike, Nkrumah returned from a
two-month peace mission to Russian and China and deployed the 1958 Preventative
Detention Act, to deem the strikers as a threat to national security and imprison over 50
strike leaders for four years.556 This moment has been viewed as the turning point of the
Nkrumah regime, as the strike was viewed as an overt rebuke of the CPP government.557
As a result, the Sekondi-Takoradi General Strike was a reflection of the Ghanaian
masses’ disillusion with Nkrumah and the CPP government, which had become corrupt
and unresponsive to the needs and interests of Ghanaian workers.
Since the government deemed the Sekondi-Takoradi strike as an attempt to
overthrow the government, soon thereafter, a Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill was
passed, establishing a special court to try political offenses with judges appointed by
Nkrumah, and with no appeal against their judgments.558 Continuing to concentrate
political power with himself, Nkrumah ultimately responded to the people’s complaints
of wage deductions and lack of genuine worker control of the workplace by
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compromising the integrity of the nation’s legal system. Nkrumah took this further in
January 1963, when he formed a Special Criminal Division of the High Court with
Nkrumah serving as chief justice along with two other judges appointed by Nkrumah
himself.559 This Special Criminal Division of the High Court was created to hear cases of
treason, sedition, rioting and unlawful assembly, from which there could be no appeal to
the outcome.560 Nkrumah was empowered to, “in the state’s interest,” set aside verdicts
reached through majority opinions in the Special Criminal Division and order a re-trial.561
Also, as a High Court judge, Nkrumah now had the power to pass judgment on those
suspected of orchestrating the recent assassination attempts on his life.
In order to legitimize this Special Criminal Division and more importantly to
uphold the appearance of democracy, Nkrumah and the CPP dominated government
included a Judiciary Amendment to the nation’s constitution as a provision in the 1964
Referendum. In addition, as part of the 1964 Referendum, the Evening News once again
reported that the Ghanaian people had approved the constitutional amendment giving
him the “power to remove from office a judge of the Supreme or High Court or reasons
which appear to him sufficient.”562 Similar to Nkrumah’s whimsical use of preventative
detention in the Sekondi-Takoradi General Strike, this amendment reflected Nkrumah’s
complete control over Ghana’s judicial system, as it now operated in accordance not with
the law itself but primarily with the program of the state. Thus by 1964 Nkrumah had
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secured a one-party government with his party in complete control of the state, he had the
power to imprison and prosecute any opposition to his government.
These developments were not lost on the international community, whose eyes
had been fixated on Ghana and Nkrumah since March 1957. Shocked by the news of the
creation of the Special Criminal Division in Ghana, Nkrumah’s mentor from his days as a
student at Lincoln University, C.L.R. James, stated: “You can poison a Chief Justice:
[but] you cannot dismiss him for a decision from the Bench… By this single act,
Nkrumah prepared the population for the morals of the Mafia.”563 Following Nkrumah’s
dismissal of the Chief Justice for a decision given from the bench, James ended an over
twenty years of association with the Ghanaian President. He could no longer publicly
support Nkrumah or the CPP, which had effectively destroyed constitutionalism in
Ghana.
James’ comments reflected not only his own disappointment with the trajectory of
Nkrumah’s Ghana but also that of many of the recent nations to gain independence,
particularly in Carew and Makonnen’s homeland of British Guiana. In a February 1964
issue of the Evening Post, a Guianese daily newspaper, it was stated that Nkrumah had
shown himself to be of the ordinary breed of 20th century destroyers of democracy, a little
carbon-copy Hitler. I am shocked to and shamed to see that democracy cannot survive in
Negro hands!”564 Noting that Nkrumah had dismissed a Chief Justice; abolished habeas
corpus with the preventive detention act; outlawed all opposition and declared a oneparty state; jailed his opposition leaders including J.B. Danquah; and seemingly
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compromising the notion of free elections, the Evening Post declared that “The first free
African Dominion has returned to the jungle. Democracy lies dead there, slaughtered by
her Osagyefu.”565
In response to a peace mission sent by Nkrumah to British Guiana to quell the
violence being waged between the racially divided political parties of Cheddi Jagan
(Indo-Guianese) and Forbes Burnham (Afro-Guianese), it was said that the Ghanaian
mission “can only advise on matters concerning a dictatorship, a police state and
suppression of rights, but they are incapable of advising on matters of peace and
goodwill.”566 As the world looked on at the nation and man that held the hopes of the
entire African world, it was now apparent that both Ghana and Nkrumah were on a crash
course. By 1966, his dictatorship had been neither temporary nor benevolent, and with
the nation in social decay, the economy in the brink of collapse, and aspirations to
become harbinger of peace in the emergent Cold War, Nkrumah was faced with the threat
of a military overthrow.
A Final Meeting With Nkrumah
Nkrumah seeing himself as a peacemaker, believed that as a non-aligned
President of an African nation, he could act as a disinterested and effective intermediary
as the cold war rage on between the East and the West. In 1966, during the height of the
Vietnam War, Nkrumah decided that it was the proper time to set out on a peace mission
to Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi. Carew, in what was destined to be his last meeting with
Nkrumah recalled that he advised the President that while the idea of a peace mission was
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a good one, he should seriously consider postponing his trip as the timing could not be
worse. Facing Carew from behind his large desk and with a large portrait of Lenin
behind him, Nkrumah asked belligerently, “Tell me something, were you elected?” He
then cut off Carew’s reply, declaring “Well, I was elected. I campaigned in every city,
town village and hamlet in this motherland of mine, and a majority of my people voted
me into office. So what gives you the right to criticize me and my government?”567
Following a long and awkward pause, Carew contended that widespread
discontent among the people was on the rise because of the worsening economic
situation, and the tensions with the military were at a high due to the military situation in
Rhodesia, which Nkrumah appeared reluctant to acknowledge. What is apparent here is
that by this point Nkrumah was unable to comprehend the gravity of the domestic
situation in Ghana, as a coup was on the horizon. The following sections will explore the
causing of the internal strife in Ghana brought on by the dwindling of support for the
government and Ghana’s Pan-African policy, failed development plans, and the
alienation of Ghanaian armed forces.
Losing the People:
In this final meeting Carew suggested that with a new and even more strict budget
coming, the discontent caused by the economic crisis alone could easily transform into
rebellion. Nkrumah responded citing the overwhelming support he received at a speech in
Black Star Square two weeks prior to commemorate the fifteen-year anniversary of his
release from prison in 1951 for promoting illegal nation-wide general strikes, boycotts,
and noncooperation with the British colonial government. According to President
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Nkrumah, the over half-a-million people in attendance was clear evidence that the people
were loyal to him; however, Nkrumah had mistaken the people’s silence and the lack of
public outrage for loyalty, obedience and support. Nkrumah’s suggestion that he had a
secure grip on the loyalty of the Ghanaian people reflected a particular disconnect
between himself and his citizenship, which he had been ruling over through authoritarian
means since the turn of the decade.
It is worth noting that by the mid-1960s partial fruits of Nkrumah’s socialist
agenda began to manifest. In the industrial sector, the state constructed a major
steelworks plant, two sugar refineries, two cocoa refineries, a meat processing plant, a
glass factory, and several other enterprises.568 Significant achievements were made in
education with over a million Ghanaian youth attending primary, middle and secondary
schools, while the number of university students had increased to 8,000 by 1966.569
There was also an expansion of hospitals and rural health clinics including five new
mental hospitals, four urban polyclinics, and six district hospitals by 1966. In
comparison to life under colonial rule, Nkrumah’s state represented a qualitative
improvement; however, for those who felt neglected in these developments or failed to
embrace the socialist ideals of the government in the early 1960s in Ghana, it was not
safe to express their dissent.
Furthermore, while the press reported overwhelming majority support for
socialism, due to discrepancies in education, literacy, and access to political training in
the ideals of socialism, Ghanaian elites were more likely to view socialism as being able
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to provide a sense of community and a return to traditional African culture, identity, and
social egalitarianism. Whereas, the Ghanaian working masses were more likely to view
socialism in Ghana as socialism for the rich since it featured a small percentage of the
population receiving high and ever-increasing salaries, the embezzling of public funds,
and illicit bribery and corruption within the government. Such views of socialism failed
to cultivate a sense of community nor a return to the romanticized egalitarian nature of
traditional African societies and culture. Observing these condition in the mid-1960s
Julian Mayfield suggests:
[…] most, even among the educated elite, had not the faintest notions of what the
word socialism meant. They identified socialism with all of the excesses and
corruption of the Government and the Convention People’s Party, and they wanted
none of it. But fearing prison, they had no outlet for their angry disagreement. Thus,
an ugly schism developed between those who were in and those who were out. No
dialogue existed between the government and its severest critics.570
The CPP’s emphasis on discipline, obedience, and vigilance in the workforce
became a primary issue as the government attempts to implement socialism never took
place on a large scale among the nation’s citizenry, whose discontent with the
government worsened. By this time any dissent or criticism of the CPP or Nkrumah was
believed to be anti-state and based on the one-party state’s philosophy, which cast the
Nkrumah controlled CPP as a direct representation of Ghana. The result was that all
diversity in the larger political discourse had been curtailed as Nkrumaism preached
conformity and obedience, and individuals wanting to voice their dissent were forced to
consider the economic and social consequences not merely for themselves but their
families as well.571 Furthermore, since Nkrumah prioritized urban development and
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resources were focused on the southern regions of the nation, the lack of comprehensive
results from the development plans represented a failure for the government as the threefourths of Ghana’s population in the towns and villages lost farming lands to state-run
institutions like the Builders Brigade and state farms.572 As a result, the average
Ghanaian worker, by the mid-1960s, was incredibly frustrated by the nation’s economic
and political situation, as rent increased, wages stagnated, and corrupt businessman,
police, and government officials routinely feasted on the “fruits of fraud,” drinking the
finest alcohol, dined on imported food, and drove big cars. 573
In addition to the failures of Ghanaians to latch onto Nkrumah’s vision for a
socialist society, several Ghanaian citizens found themselves in direct opposition to
Nkrumah's foundational ideology of Pan-Africanism. While the nation was headed for
economic crisis it was also providing funding for Nkrumah’s Pan-African initiatives.
Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy, while it sought to give pride and dignity to Ghanaians
and Africans as a whole, also devoted considerable resources to Pan-African projects,
like the Bureau of African Affairs’ funding of African liberation movements for which a
£2 million Consolidated Fund was established.574 Some in Ghanaian society came to
characterize these initiatives as the fool’s errand of “liberat[ing] the whole of Africa.”575
This was also seen in Ghana’s hosting of the OAU conference in 1965.
In addition to commissioning the unnecessary construction of the new conference
hall for the conference, Nkrumah also instructed the government to fill the nation’s shops
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with imported items so that every African visiting Ghana be made to see the fruits of
independence. As a result, many Ghanaians believed that Nkrumah was investing too
much in African liberation instead of focusing his resources on properly developing the
nation, which caused people to ask: “Why should you give it [money] to African people
[outside of Ghana] They should take care of themselves. We should take care of
ourselves.”576 Such wasteful spending and large-scale projects were responsible in part
for the departure of W. Arthur Lewis in 1959, as he warned about overspending on
prestige projects and Nkrumah’s Pan-African projects would bankrupt the country. By
the mid-1960s, Ghana was well on its way to economic collapse.
Ghana in Economic Crisis:
Following his 1961 trip to Russia and China, Nkrumah was intent on building a
socialist society with a centralized government to direct economic planning through stateowned enterprises. By 1963 Nkrumah chose to abandon his failed development plan
after four years and commissioned a new plan to be drawn up. Drawing heavily on the
Russian and Chinese models of development and economic planning, the new SevenYear Development Plan for 1964-71 emphasized large scale industrialization and
mechanization of agriculture as the foundation of a socialist society. The Seven-Year
Development Plan also pledged to deliver old-age insurance for nearly all, free medical
services for all, and free education as well as eradicate unemployment. Additionally, the
Ghanaian citizenry was promised full stomachs, good homes, postal agencies, day
nurseries, better sewage systems and a significant increase in literacy.577 Still, from an
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economic standpoint, the plan was supposed to reorient the economy from the
weaknesses of past plans; however, it was never destined to succeed.
The largest hindrance was the sharp decline in cocoa prices on the world market.
Although the plan called for greater emphasis on the nation’s productivity, this was all
contingent on the productivity of a national economy that was overly reliant on its cocoa
industry. Unfortunately, between 1959 and 1966, the annual cocoa export earnings
totaled £110 million in losses.578 This was felt especially felt by Ghana since the prices
of manufactured goods had risen and Nkrumah was still “frantically buying modern
goods to modernize,” Ghana in his attempt to emulated the Stalinist philosophy of
“catch[ing] up with” if not surpassing the advanced nations of the world.579 By 1965 the
rapid decline and stagnation cocoa prices had disrupted Seven-Year Development Plan,
as world market prices fell to £142 a ton, domestic cocoa harvests had fallen from
580,000 to 410,000 tons a year, and the prices paid to cocoa farmers was at its lowest
since the end of World War II.580
In addition, the implementation of the plan and its policies were mishandled as
projects were wrongly appraised or over-funded, insufficient attention was paid to
agricultural production; and with the departure of his conservative Minister of Commerce
and Industry, K. A. Gbedemah in 1961, there was no one left to restrain Nkrumah, as the
plan projected an excessive £G1 billion in foreign investment. Furthermore, the Bank of
Ghana’s accounts had fallen to £2.5 million, Ghana’s sterling assets stood at a mere £74
million, leaving the nation with reserves equivalent to a single month’s worth of
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imports.581 As a result, the prospects of this raising this much in foreign investment
capital for Ghana, a nation on the brink of bankruptcy, were highly unlikely. Another
implication of Gbedemah’s resignation was that Nkrumah had begun preparing the
budget himself, which resulted in Ghana incurring its largest budget deficits between
1961 and 1965. For example, the 1965 budget expenditure, initially placed at £200
million, had to be scaled back considerably as cocoa sales had fallen. Finally, exchange
reserves were virtually nil and Ghana’s export deficit was met by a mass of short-term
credit from western companies and the soviet bloc, which were still increasing as Ghana
found itself unable to pay its foreign debts on time.
As 1966 approached, Nkrumah visibly looked like a tired man as the pressures of
office had taken their toll. With the nation’s budget deficit expanding and cocoa prices
still in decline, and foreign reserves dwindled down to 500,000 pounds, Nkrumah was
forced to acknowledge that he had indeed bankrupt the nation, leading him to shed tears
and retreat to his office for a half an hour.582 By February 1966, consumer prices were
estimated to have risen 75 percent since 1960.583 Ghana’s foreign reserve had dried up,
external debt was estimated at £120 million, and with the nation bankrupt major foreign
suppliers were reluctant to offer new credit. Additionally, western nations approached by
Ghana refused new loans or temporary moratoriums on debt repayments in 1965,
particularly because of Nkrumah’s ideological and political shift towards socialism and
the Eastern bloc. Unfortunately, by the time the IMF/World Bank’s recommendations,
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including an overall diminishing in the state’s role in the socioeconomic process,
Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy had exacerbated tensions with the military.
Alienating the Armed Forces:
Nkrumah’s alienation of the military and the police represented yet another fatal
flaw in his final days as his attention on international and Pan-African affairs cause him
to overestimate the loyalty of the military apparatus. With African governments being
overthrown left and right, the most recent in Nigeria, Carew also warned that the
possibility of a coup d’état was a real threat from the regular army. In a final plea to
Nkrumah, Carew argued that the soldiers would only obey their officers up until society
was being torn to shreds, “and only at that juncture are they likely to turn their guns on
their officers and join a popular.” Continuing, Carew concluded by reminding Nkrumah
that soldiers “will shoot whomever their officers order them to shoot.”584 Nkrumah was
reluctant to accept this fact as well, as he called Carew a Judas before dismissing him.
Earlier that month, Nkrumah addressed the National Assembly referencing the
uptick in military incursions into the political life of independent African nations.
Suggesting military coups were caused not by African life and traditions, but by “the
manoeuvres [sic] of neo-colonialism,” Nkrumah argued that the most viable defense
against military takeovers lay in the one-party system.585 It was clear that Nkrumah was
severely misjudging the entire nation’s dedication to the government. Still, while Carew
feared the people would spark a rebellion in Nkrumah’s absence, it was with the military
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and the police that his concerns should have been, as Nkrumah had been alienating them
since 1962.
This alienation of the armed forces began in the months following the SekondiTakoradi strike in 1962. A month after the strike was suppressed, Nkrumah was traveling
through the countryside and had stopped to greet school children in the northern village
of Kulungugu. As he approached the children a bomb exploded about two and a half
yards from him, causing Nkrumah to receive extensive shrapnel wounds. A month later a
grenade exploded near both Nkrumah’s home and his office in Accra. This time it was
clear that the malcontents in the nation posed a serious threat to his life and he was facing
the threat of violence for the first time since the mid-1950s. In 1964, another
assassination attempt came when a policeman shot at him in a point-blank range inside
his office building at Flagstaff House, killing the building’s chief security guard.
These attacks appeared to affect Nkrumah more mentally than physically as he
grew more suspicious of the people around him. The President that once walked among
the people daily, now paranoid and concerned for his safety, retreated to the large desk in
his office where he conceived of plans to build up his own personal security forces. A
number of senior military and police officers were implicated in these attempts, causing
Nkrumah to lose trust in the nation’s military and police institutions. In 1963, Nkrumah
introduced the Security Service Act, which brought several intelligence and military
services under his direct control. Three military services were formed after the passing of
this act including the Military Intelligence (MI); the Special Intelligence Unit; and the
Presidential Detail Department (PDD), which was charged with securing the personal
safety of Nkrumah.

303

Beyond the troubling notion of creating a personal guard units that were
independent of the regular military, Nkrumah’s formation of the Special Intelligence Unit
demonstrated the persistence ethnic-driven favoritism within Ghanaian society. In the
creation of this personal guard, Nkrumah specifically favored the recruitment of Nzima
and Fanti men for the Special Intelligence Unit.586 With Nkrumah being of Nzima and
Fanti descent, his stocking of his personal guard with his kinsmen and men he shared
linguistic ties demonstrated the persistence of tribalism within Ghanaian society. This
was a common theme throughout the CPP and the Ghanaian government, as Nzima and
Fanti men were advanced to lesser positions within the party and in government minister
positions. In these instances, tribalism manifested not in the formation political
opposition parties based on ethnicity or religion, but from the nation’s President himself,
which reflected a particular hypocrisy in his political philosophy which stressed a PanAfrican unity and a Ghanaian national identity that transcended ethnic and religious ties.
Additionally, the ethnic make-up of the Special Intelligence Unit was not included in his
analysis of tribalism that appeared in his 1970 text, Class Struggle in Africa, thus
displaying either an imitation or failure a to reflect upon his own contributions to discord
in Ghana.587
Furthermore, an implication of the 1964 assassination attempt was the creation of
the President’s Own Guard Regiment (POGR), which served as Nkrumah’s own personal
army of 1,142 men.588 The creation of these parallel institutions further strained the
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relations with the military and police, as Nkrumah’s forces received better quality
equipment while the regular armed forces endured shortages. As a result, the regular
army considered Nkrumah’s creation of the POGR and the PPD to be a direct threat to
their existence.589 In addition, Nkrumah’s Police Service Act of April 1965 caused
particular resentment with the police as it gave Nkrumah the authority to appoint and
dismiss members of the police force as he saw fit. After dismissing top military officials
in 1965 for their suspected involvement in another conspiracy to overthrow the
government, Nkrumah, believing himself safe from overthrow, turned attention to the
international front. This proved to be a critical oversight with Nkrumah becoming
oblivious to the threats brewing within the military, as his attention was wrapped up in
the Rhodesia issue.
In one of his final Pan-African initiatives, Nkrumah tried to lead the protests
against Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965, claiming
it was a violation of the democratic rights of the Southern Rhodesian authorities. As a
result of the declaration, Nkrumah called for African nations to contribute troops for the
formation of an African High Command to remove the British backed, illegal, minority
regime of South Rhodesia. Nkrumah’s diminished influence among his fellow state
leaders on the African continent was also demonstrated here as Guinea was the only
nation willing to pledge troops to this initiative. With the conflict bringing Ghana and
Britain to a showdown, in an emergency session of the National Assembly, the Africa
Defense Bill was passed, conferring upon Nkrumah the power to send the nation’s forces
“wherever the peace and security of Africa is threatened.”590 Shortly thereafter, Nkrumah
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called for volunteers in Ghana for a People’s Militia to be sent along with troops to
Rhodesia. This according to Lt. Colonel Afrifa of the National Liberation Council, which
deposed Nkrumah in February 1966, was the final straw, prompting a coup as military
officials believed it criminal and purposeless to dispatch Ghanaian troops and civilians to
Rhodesia in an unnecessary war.591
Black Midas and the Coup
Nkrumah was correct in stating that the soldiers would obey their officers;
however, it is a wonder as to how he could have misjudged the armed forces and the
police after receiving Carew’s counsel. This proved to be a grave mistake as the armed
forced waited until Nkrumah departed for his peace mission in Hanoi via Peking, on the
invitation of Ho Chi Minh, to propose an ending for the war in Vietnam. Carew
maintained that his presence would have been better served in Washington D.C. since
there were no Vietnamese occupying forces in the United States.592 Nonetheless, on
Monday, February 21, 1966, Nkrumah departed Ghana for the final time. Carew was not
invited to see him off. Two days later the National Liberation Council (NLC) was
formed in the northern Ghanaian city of Tamale, where they launched “Operation Cold
Chop,” the military coup d’état that removed Nkrumah from office. They began their
long march south to Accra, sure to bivouac far away from major towns and villages
during the day and only making use of the main roads in the early morning hours.593 The
following day NLC troops surrounded and took the Burma Camp, the headquarters of
Ghanaian armed forces located outside of Accra. After capturing the airport, fighting
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broke out when the NLC arrived at the Flagstaff House, where Nkrumah’s personal
security forces and presidential guards were caught off guard and the compound was
swiftly taken.
By six in the morning, the army walked into the radio station and announced in a
national broadcast that they had seized power and the nation had been taken over by the
National Liberation Council of army and police officers. Eliminating what they called a
“One Party dictatorship,” the NLC called upon Ghanaian citizens to assist in the arrest of
party heads, chairmen, and secretaries of the now-dissolved CPP. Nkrumah’s party was
caught off guard by the coup, having no contingency plan for mobilizing an armed
response, nor a means for alerting the President’s Own Guard Regiments of the NLC’s
presence. Furthermore, most accounts suggest that there was little resistance from the
masses and much surprise to the NLC at the popular support for their actions. The rage
and frustration of the people were directed not at the NLC, but rather at the leader who
had failed them, and with the sycophants and corrupt government officials that had been
siphoning off the nation’s wealth for their own personal gain. As such, when the NLC
seized power, many of the eight hundred people detained in Ghanaian prisons were
released; however, over two-thousand people were arrested or placed in “protective
custody.” Carew and Makonnen would find themselves among this number in the days
following the NLC’s national broadcast announcing their takeover.
The morning of the coup, Carew went to Geoffrey Bing, Ghana’s former Attorney
General, to assist with a resistance to the NLC’s campaign. For the moment, the concern
of Nkrumah loyalists was in getting everyone to safety before the NLC located and
detained them. With the coup underway, Carew wrote a letter signed “Black Midas” and
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gave it to Anthony Abrahams, a Jamaican BBC correspondent in Ghana to cover the
opening for the Akosombo Hydroelectric Project. Abrahams was flying to England the
next day and Carew asked him to deliver the letter to London based Jamaican novelist,
Andrew Salkey, who would know what to do. The NLC had been searching for Carew
for days; however, he had been staying at the Star Hotel since the outbreak of the coup.
Three days into the coup Carew was arrested by the NLC and taken to the upper floors of
the Police Headquarters in Accra. As a prisoner at Police Headquarter, he experienced
the sole instance in which he recalled being made to feel like an outsider in Ghana.
Once inside Carew was told remove his shirt, shoes, and to lie face down on the
floor, as drunken soldiers amused themselves walking across the prisoner’s bare backs,
some of which were bleeding where they had been pricked with bayonets during their
arrests. At this moment, Carew pointed to the men on the floor and declared to the drunk
soldiers: “My ancestors left Africa like that, but this time, I intend to leave standing up. If
you want me to lie in the slave position you’ll have to shoot me.” The major, with a
malicious smile, replied, “I forgot that you people are descended from slaves, and yet you
put on all kinds of airs… A week ago you were lording it over us, and now we’re in
charge.”594 The major’s response displays a similar sentiment that Padmore and
Makonnen experienced from Ghanaians when they were labeled detribalized outsiders
with no morals. In the meantime, Abrahams had delivered Carew’s message to Salkey in
London and a piece ran in the Evening Standard, newspaper reporting on his arrest.
As demonstrations demanding Carew’s release commenced in British Guiana, the
Guianese newspapers reported on the pre-dawn army coup and the dancing in the streets
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as Ghanaians tore down Nkrumah self-gratifying statues.595 The Guiana Graphic daily
newspaper printed the letter Carew had delivered to Andrew Salkey, which read:
“Making bid to leave. Contact BG Commissioner and Prime Minister Forbes
Burnham.”596 The letter was signed “Black Midas,” which in fact assured Salkey that the
message came from Carew. This resulted in a collective from The New World magazine
in Guyana cabling Major General Ankrah, head of the NLC military, expressing the
grave concern over the safety of the well-known Guyanese author, Jan Carew.597
Members of the group requested Carew’s safe treatment and early release. Additionally,
several West Indians in London wrote to their contacts in Ghana asking for any
information on the whereabouts and condition of Carew; however, days since the
Carew’s letter was published and no word from the NLC had been heard by the Guyanese
government or someone inquiring about Carew.598
Soon word got back to the new Chief Secretary of the National Liberation
Council that the world press had gotten news of Carew’s arrest. The international outcry
from the Pan-African community that facilitated the passing of messages and various
press campaigns demanding Carew’s release was a reflection of the Pan-African network
that was very much still intact and willing to mobilize for Carew. As a result, Carew as
deported to England four days after the NLC caught wind of the international outrage. In
that short time, Carew attempted to gather belongings and the contents of his office;
however, on his attempt to go to the African Review offices and retrieve what he could
but the police confiscated key manuscripts and documents and refused to hand them over,
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claiming they would forward them to him directly on request.599 Furthermore, due to his
contract of employment with the Publicity Secretariat, it was stipulated that the Ghanaian
government would cover his flight ticket home, and the NLC surprisingly purchased his
ticket to London since he was still a British colonial subject.
On March 25, 1966, the Guiana Graphic was able to report that Carew had been
released from prison and was now safe in London. As Carew’s incarceration was ended,
so too was the Pan-African undertaking in Ghana, with the nation in chaos and the former
President, once called Africa’s “Redeemer,” never to return to the nation he loved.
Although Carew’s time in the nation was short, his investment in the Pan-African project
of Ghana was undeniable. He made an immediate impact in his contributions to the PanAfrican media endeavors of the African Review and service Ghana’s media sector as
advisor to the Publicity Secretariat. Additionally, while unable to penetrate Nkrumah’s
sense of reason, Carew, in a time when Nkrumah surrounded himself with sycophants,
observed and meritoriously advised him on the imminent threat of rebellion caused by the
converging conditions of authoritarianism, economic failures, and Nkrumah’s alienation
of the Ghanaian people and military.
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CONCLUSION: PAN-AFRICANISM AND PRAXIS
The unit of analysis for this dissertation was the praxis of Pan-Africanism,
observed through the prism of West Indian intellectual-activists working in Ghana during
the age of decolonization. Through the experiences, ideologies, and observations of these
intellectual-activists, this dissertation assessed how Pan-Africanism was practiced in
governance as Nkrumah came into power in 1951, began to consolidate power with
himself in 1960, and eventually lost power in the coup of February 1966. In doing so it
merged the discourses of African history, African diaspora history, and the emergent
Black Internationalism paradigm to evaluate the case study of Ghana as a continuation
and culmination, of the revitalized Pan-African movement of the post-Italian invasion of
Ethiopia era.
The failures of the League of Nations and the major nations of the world to come
to Ethiopia’s aid in its hour of need, placed the racism of these nations on display for the
Black world to see. With another World War on the horizon, the League of Nation’s
collective inaction demonstrated the Pan-Europeanism the world’s major nations, as they
were once again able to set aside their differences to agree that Africa was a continent for
European domination and exploitation. The message was clear to the intellectuals and
activists in Africa and throughout the diaspora, that if African liberation was to be
achieved, Blacks could only depend on themselves to secure their freedom. As a result,
London became the crucible for the struggle for African liberation and Pan-African
organizing in the late 1930, as Blacks in the imperial metropole were forced to form
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alliances across national, ethnic, ideological boundaries, which “would have been
unthinkable back home [Africa].”600
Following the Manchester 1945 Pan-African Congress, the movement centralized
its objectives around African independence and the vision of a unified African continent
practicing Pan-Africanism through cooperation between independent nations. Just as H.
Sylvester Williams and Marcus Garvey before them, leading this charge were West
Indian intellectual-activists like George Padmore, W. Arthur Lewis, and T. Ras
Makonnen who had been keeping the transnational networks of Black liberation
movements in Africa and the diaspora intact through their work with the International
Africa Service Bureau and the Pan-African Federation. As a result, the Pan-Africanism
placed on display in London during the 1930s and 1940s was transferred to Ghana, as
Nkrumah sought the counsel and expertise of these West Indians in his endeavors to free
the Gold Coast and to commence the Pan-African project in Ghana following
independence.
Coming to Power:
By and large, George Padmore had the most extensive influence on Nkrumah’s
development as an activist, intellectual, and statesman. It was Padmore who facilitated
Nkrumah’s placement at the fore of the Pan-African movement in London and equipped
him with the organizing strategies to build a mass nationalist movement to secure selfgovernment upon his return to the Gold Coast in 1948. Continuing “the Manchester
Program” in the Gold Coast, Nkrumah carried on the Pan-African Federation’s principle
of “Positive Action,” to assert the demands of the Ghanaian working masses to the
600 Makonnen. Pan-Africanism From Within. (1973.), 155.
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British colonial administration.601 From London, Padmore also advised Nkrumah on the
political strategies to thwart ethnic divisions and violent opposition within the Gold
Coast, as well as concept of “Tactical Action,” as he negotiated the terms of
independence with the British.
One of the reasons Padmore chose to work with Nkrumah in Ghana was because
in Ghana he saw a model African nation demonstrating for colonized Black nations in
Africa and the diaspora a method for securing their freedom. Upon independence,
Padmore oversaw the administration of Ghana’s Pan-African Policy of assisting other
African liberation movements in securing their own independence. Through his Office of
the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs, Padmore was given complete
autonomy and used conferences, media campaigns, and provided direct support to
African revolutionary groups to spread Nkrumah’s Pan-African ideologies and Ghana’s
influence with the ultimate goal of establishing a United States of Africa. In Ghana,
Padmore found the culmination of his life’s work of organizing and linking the PanAfrican and Black International networks across the globe. Additionally, the significance
of Padmore’s contributions to both Nkrumah and Ghana were canonized in number sites
bearing his name, including the George Padmore Research Library of African Affairs and
George Padmore Primary School in Tema, which school children attend to this day. Still
despite his untimely death in 1959, Padmore left Ghana with a functioning apparatus for
administering Ghana’s Pan-African Policy, which eventually manifested in the formation
of the Bureau of African Affairs.
Consolidation of Power:
601 Grilli. Nkrumaism and African Nationalism. (2018), 51.
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W. Arthur Lewis’s influence on Ghana, was central to Nkrumah’s objective of
Ghana catching up with the modernized nations of the world. Lewis was a celebrated
economist and a Pan-Africanist that possessed the ultimate goal of raising the living
standards of the people of under-developed nations. Because of his scholarship, he was
sought after to advise on economics in nations throughout the West Indies, South
America, Europe, and Asia. However, in the midst of a prolific academic career, Lewis
left his positions in academia and the British Colonial Office to work in Ghana, as
Nkrumah’s Economic Advisor. Charged with placing Ghana on the path to asserting not
only its political but its economic independence, Lewis’ largest contribution was the
Second Economic Development Plan, which carried the weight of expanding Ghana’s
industrial sector, optimizing agriculture, and inviting foreign capital to spur various
development projects.
Unfortunately, the pragmatic and fiscally responsible plan that Lewis constructed
for the nation, stood in direct opposition to the rapid development and extravagant
prestige projects that Nkrumah had envisioned for the plan. These disagreements
eventually led to Lewis’ resignation. Accordingly, Nkrumah’s gambles on the Second
Development Plan resulted in £124 billion in foreign financial commitments, which the
nation was unable to repay as the world prices for cocoa (Ghana’s primary source of
revenue) plummeted shortly after independence. Some historians have offered up Lewis
as the cause of Ghana’s economic decline, as the Second Development Plan was
attributed solely to his own labor.602 However, these suggestions disregard the

602 Douglas Rimmer. Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy, 1950-1990. (Oxford: Pergamon Press for
the World Bank, 1992), and Tony Killick. Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic
Policies in Ghana. (London: Routledge, 2010.)

314

deteriorating relationship between Lewis and Nkrumah, and the president’s regular
dismissal of sound advice from his economic advisor.
Still, while the plan was far from what he initially proposed, Lewis’ commitment
to the Pan-African project in Ghana eclipsed his desire to publicly disavow his
contributions and openly criticize Nkrumah’s nascent authoritarian turn. In his private
correspondence Lewis maintained that the Ghanaian government was extremely corrupt
and that Nkrumah was not a man of integrity; however, in public discourse he strove to
maintain the image of Nkrumah as the preeminent leader of African liberation and
characterize his time working in Ghana as highly productive and an overall success.603
As such, even with Nkrumah disregarding his advice and making political decisions
through non-democratic means, Lewis was conscious of the fact that with African and
West Indian nations coming closer to gaining independence, the image of Ghana as a
model of Africa nation needed to be maintained.
No other West Indian intellectual-activist was able to closely witness each stage
of Nkrumah’s political development, from his entrance into the Pan-African movement in
London to his removal from power, like T. Ras Makonnen. As a Pan-African
revolutionary of the “old guard,” Makonnen was called upon to apply his diverse skillsets
broadly throughout Ghanaian society from building Pan-African institutions like the
African Affairs Centre, African Affairs Committee, to advising on foreign policy with the
Bureau of African Affairs, to managing state owned corporations, like State Bakery,
Ghana Hotels and Tourism Corporation, and the Guinea Press.
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Staying on for the duration of Nkrumah’s tenure in Ghana, Makonnen was able to
view Nkrumah’s dictatorial turn, which coincided with the increasing influence of the
Soviet Union following the death of George Padmore. By the 1960s, Nkrumah had
appropriated the centralized Russian model for building a socialist society in Ghana and
stressed ideology’s ability to raise the living standards of the Ghanaian masses.
However, Makonnen observed how Nkrumah’s socialism both conflicted with traditional
Ghanaian economic systems and fostered a government more interested in state
capitalism and overspending on extravagant development plans than actually addressing
needs of the masses. Achieving political centralization with a one-party state, and
micromanaging nearly every level of governance, Makonnen observed the “power sweet”
Nkrumah surrounded by sycophants and corruption permeating throughout the Ghanaian
government. Eventually, Makonnen found that dissent and democratic governance were
no longer condoned in Ghana as his attempts to counsel Nkrumah on the endemic levels
of corruption in Ghana resulted in his swift demotion from Director of the African Affairs
Centre to overseeing State Bakeries. Here Makonnen continued to serve loyally because
of his dedication to Ghana’s Pan-African project.604
Loss of Power:
Nkrumah’s loss of power was observed firsthand by author, journalist, and
activist Jan Carew. Internationally known for his novels Black Midas and Moscow Is Not
My Mecca, as well as his Pan-African activism in London, Carew who had come of age
on the stories of Padmore and the London Pan-African movement, could not pass on the
opportunity to contribute to the Pan-Africanism being practiced in Nkrumah’s Ghana.
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Arriving in Ghana fall 1965, Carew’s skills were used as he served editor of the African
Review magazine and worked in Nkrumah’s Publicity Secretariat. He also witnessed
Nkrumah’s final months in power, which bore a stark difference to the midnight
speeches, conferences on Pan-Africanism, images of independence celebrations that had
come to characterize Ghana throughout the African diaspora.
The corruption that Makonnen observed had culminated in the locals referring to
the new Ghanaian capitalist class and politicians as “Afro-Saxons,” in whom they
observed ever-increasing salaries, embezzlement of public funds, illicit bribery, and the
hoarding of scarce imported resources.605 This label conferred upon the elites profiting
from the rampant corruption in Ghanaian society was a reflection of the disillusioned
Ghanaian working masses who suffered under Nkrumah’s Benevolent Dictatorship.
Featured in Nkrumah’s authoritarian turn was press censorship, Preventative Detention,
voter manipulation, Nkrumah’s compromising of Ghana’s judicial system, and the CPP’s
one-party government that demanded obedience and characterized any dissent or
criticism of the government or Nkrumah as a potential threat to the nation. Subsequently,
not only were these policies implemented to further his political objects, they were also
necessitated Nkrumah’s need to protect himself following a number of failed
assassination attempts on his life.
In Ghana, Carew found the open society that once featured Nkrumah walking
amongst his people daily, had become a closed society with its president either held up in
his office passing down directives to party officials or traveling abroad on international
peace keeping missions. From an economic standpoint, by the end of 1965 world cocoa
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prices were still in decline. Consequently, as Ghana’s national budget deficit swelled, its
foreign reserves originally totaling £150 million had dwindled down to £500,000. It was
then apparent that Nkrumah’s choice to gamble on Ghana’s economic future in lieu of
heeding Lewis’ sound advice in 1959 had resulted the nation essentially going bankrupt.
Further contributing to Nkrumah’s recluse and distant disposition was his
alienation of the armed forces, which coincided with the implication of senior military
and police officers in a number of assassination attempts and conspiracies in the mid1960s. After forming multiple parallel military units for his own personal security, and
the passing of legislature expanding Nkrumah’s control and authority over the police and
the regular army, the military was primed to stage a coup d’état at the opportune moment.
Observing these conditions, Carew pled with Nkrumah to postpone his peace mission in
Vietnam and refocus his attention on the Ghanaian home front. However, just as with
Lewis and Makonnen before him, Carew’s sound counsel was dismissed, resulting in
Nkrumah’s removal from power in February 1966.
Pan-Africanism, Praxis, and Cosmopolitanism
Whereas other studies of Ghana look at the economics and politics that facilitated
Nkrumah’s rise and fall, this dissertation has examined the praxis of Pan-Africanism with
West Indians in Ghana, as well as the social, economic, and political issues that
manifested in Ghanaian society as a result of their presence. With Nkrumah’s removal
from power, the Pan-African project in Ghana had ended; however, it was apparent that
West Indians were extensively involved in directly influencing the trajectory of the
nation-building process in Ghana. Just as West Indians were pioneers in the Pan-African
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movement in the early twentieth century, in Ghana Padmore, Lewis, Makonnen, and
Carew, were at the helm of the next phase of movement.
In Ghana, a Black government had emerged with a Pan-African leader that
declared its independence meant nothing without the independence of the rest of the
African continent. Furthermore, from the time he was introduced to the Pan-African
movement, Nkrumah possessed as his undeviating aim, the emancipation of the people of
Africa; however, he always regarded those in “the West Indies as our brothers, for they
have strong ties of kinship with us here in Africa. They, like us, have suffered and are
still suffering the inequities of colonial oppression.”606 As a result, these Pan-Africanists
also viewed Africa’s liberation as inextricably linked to decolonization in the West Indies
and because of their shared diasporic experience viewed themselves and Africans on the
continent as one and the same people.
They were able to adopt this racial essentialism particularly because of their
diasporic experience as West Indians. The West Indian identity is predicated on the
direct socio-historical implications of trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism, which
cultivated a creolized cultural mix of African, Indigenous, and Asian traits. As a result,
West Indian societies were described by Stuart Hall as “by definition cosmopolitan’ since
‘everybody who is there came from somewhere else.”607 This fundamental openness to
strangers and difference was a vital dimension of the cosmopolitanism that shapes West
Indian identity. It also served as a catalyst to the racial essentialism required for the
conceptions of Pan-Africanism in the early twentieth century. As a result, the West

606

“Africa’s liberation and Unity an Address by Osagyefo.” Dabu Gizenga Collection On Kwame
Nkrumah, box 128-19 folder 416/417.
607
Stuart Hall, and Pnina Werbner. “Cosmopolitanism, Globalisation and Diaspora.” in Anthropology and
the New Cosmopolitanism, edited by Pnina Werbner, (Oxford: Berg, 2008.), 351.

319

Indies was a true diasporic society, which cultivated amongst its inhabitants an openness
to strangers and a willingness to rely on social networks to engage in migrations
throughout the Americas, Europe, and Africa. Most studies of the West Indies –
including my own – have demonstrated migrations played a key role in the development
of West Indian identity, from the intra West Indian slave trade to the patterns of migrant
labor that problematized notions of citizenship and identity for West Indians and African
Americans in the early twentieth century.608
This same negation of stranger hood and openness to difference facilitated the
embrace of Pan-Africanism in early twentieth century London as Blacks began flock to
Britain. In the British metropole, the diasporic experiences of racial discrimination and
colonial subjectivity forced people of African descent to overlook their ethnic and
national identities. This resulted in the formation of a Pan-African identity based on their
shared experiences and objectives of the liberation of people of African descent
regardless of their spatial locales. For Nkrumah, who’s political outlook was molded in
large part by the influence of West Indians, he understood this cosmopolitan component
of Pan-Africanism and sought to implement this in his embrace of the African diaspora in
Ghana. However, for West Indians like Padmore, Lewis, Makonnen, and Carew, their
status as diaspora blacks and outsiders presented a barrier to the embrace of the PanAfrican project being undertaken in Ghana.
Nkrumah’s over site of the significance of ethnic identity and the persistence of
tribalism in Ghana, as compared to cosmopolitanism of West Indian identity he observed
from his own experiences in the diaspora, presented one of the largest barriers to the
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praxis of Pan-Africanism in Ghana. There existed in Ghana a feeling that the CPP and
Ghanaian government possessed too many outsiders. The experiences of Padmore,
Lewis, Makonnen, and Carew display a particular aversion to foreign blacks possessing
too much influence and power in Ghana. This was demonstrated early on as the issue of
Africanization of the Civil Service had become a reoccurring topic of debate in Ghanaian
parliament sessions, where it was suggested that continental Africans should be
functioning in these position Nkrumah had designated for West Indian Pan-Africanists.
Nkrumah was well aware of what his nation’s potential, as well as the nationbuilding skills it lacked. As a result, based on their expertise in various capacities, these
West Indian Intellectual-activists were recruited specifically because they possessed a
number of skillsets that would further Nkrumah’s Pan-African agenda. While Ghana had
its own history of anti-colonial organizations and Pan-Africanists, no one in the nation
shared the extensive knowledge of Pan-African socialist political philosophy, the
experience in Pan-African organizing, nor the international Black activist network of
Padmore. Although men from the Gold Coast had been traveling to London to attend
universities, Lewis, having taught the first courses on Colonial Economics at London
School of Economics and being one of the foremost experts in Development Economics,
was brought to Ghana not only to advised Nkrumah on how to spur economic
development and industrialization but to also train younger Ghanaian economist to
ultimately take his place.
Having developed a strong business acumen with extensive experience in PanAfrican organizing, few other than Padmore possessed the skillsets necessary for
organizing the All-African Peoples’ Conferences, establishing state institutions like the
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African Affairs Centre, and molding an apparatus to implement Nkrumah’s Pan-African
policy with the attentiveness and urgency that Makonnen displayed. In the case of Carew,
his international notoriety as an author and Pan-African activist with connections
throughout the West Indies, Europe, and the United States, made him an ideal candidate
for the role of Editor of the African Review. He was also qualified for his role as
Nkrumah’s advisor to the Publicity Secretariat based on his service in a similar capacity
to Cheddi Jagan’s government in British Guiana in 1962. As such, the skillsets and
expertise of these West Indian Intellectual-activists were at the root of their selection for
their service based on Ghana’s needs. Furthermore, Nkrumah understood that these men
were qualified for their positions based on their past experiences as political strategists,
academics, organizers, and editors in the Pan-African movement.
As a result, several Ghanaian ministers, members of parliament, and even CPP
members like A.K. Barden, grudgingly accepted these West Indian outsiders. Still as the
ecstasy of independence began to fade and economic crisis, social unrest, and
authoritarian measures ensued, these West Indian outsiders became the target of envy and
a focus of the skepticism within the government.609 In spite of providing invaluable
advice to Nkrumah as he secured independence, their contributions to nation-building,
and in Makonnen’s case marrying a Ghanaian woman, these West Indians were still
subject to Ghanaian chauvinism, media smear campaigns, and threats of deportation.
Additionally, Nkrumah and his West Indian compatriots, overlooked the
magnitude of not only continental and diasporic African divisions, but also the
persistence of ethnic divisions within Ghana. This tribalism was a challenge for the
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duration of Nkrumah’s time in power from the founding of the National Liberation
Movement in the Ashanti region to thwart the CPP’s plans for independence, to the
passing of the Avoidance of Discrimination Act (ADA) in December 1957. Nkrumah
even engaged in tribalism in his own recruitment of men that shared his Nzima and Fanti
ethnic ties for his Special Intelligence Unit following multiple assassination attempts.
These ethnic divisions in Ghana demonstrate the shortcomings of broad applications of
Benedict Anderson’s concept of Imagined Communities, which suggests that the nation
and nationalism be regarded as a mode of understanding that constitutes a phenomenon
of belonging, comparable to kinship or religion. This ignores the social structures and
colonial histories that created the conditions of ethnic sub-nationalism and tribalism in
African nations like Ghana.610
The predicament of subverting ethnic identity for national identity gives
credibility to Samora Machel’s assertation that in order “for the nation to live, the tribe
must die.”611 In the case of Ghana, Nkrumah’s calls for the immediate embrace of a
national Ghanaian identity that transcended ethnic loyalties proved unfeasible as being
Ghanaian carried no meaning at the time. Ethnic sub-nationalisms and tribalism were
never mitigated by Nkrumah’s extensive use of print media, romanticized African
history, and calls for both national and continental unity. Ghanaians were able to more
readily identify with their familial ethnic ties and the extensive traditions and histories
that defined those identities. This resulted in Nkrumah deriding of those that clung to
preexisting ethnic identities as tribalists, that were plagued by the remnants of a colonial
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mentality and constituted a potential threat to the nationalist objectives of the Ghanaian
government.612 In Ghana national consciousness was unable to be formed at the rapid
pace that Nkrumah desired. At the time, this made it difficult to cultivate a true sense of
Ghanaian nationhood and nationalism, let alone a Pan-Africanism that extended beyond
the continent to include all people of African descent.
Prior to independence, notions of Pan-Africanism (continental unity) were
reconcilable with African nationalism, as the ideology of African nationalism was less
about establishing shared identities and belongingness and more concerned with
independence and anti-colonialism. Furthermore, while Nkrumah declared PanAfricanism as a fundamental component of Ghana’s political philosophies, these
sentiments where not shared by all Ghanaians. This was placed on display in a 1965
session of Ghanaian parliament in which a member expressed the “common view” that:
Many people cannot see our connection with Uganda, Kenya, southern Rhodesia and
other states far away. They know Bondouckou is in the Ivory Coast, that is, our
immediate neighbour. We know that our people will support us physically and morally,
but if they see something in a concrete from, they will be in a better position to pray
for unity to come quickly. If we tell them that we are going to have unity with the UAR
they ask ‘where is it?’ If one speaks to them about Morocco or Ethiopia, they ask ‘are
they in Aburokyiri? (Europe) If one speaks about East Africa they think that is [sic] a
far-away place, probably at the end of the world. When our people think of Africa, they
think of the man in Bondoukou, Abidjan, Togo and other towns in neighbouring
states.613
Thus, while Nkrumah’s Pan-African rhetoric of continental unity and anti-colonialism
was effective in mobilizing national support before independence, by the end of
Nkrumah’s tenure as President this was no longer the case. By the mid-1960s mmany
Ghanaians believed that he was investing too much in Pan-African liberation instead of
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focusing his resources on properly developing the nation, which caused Ghanaians to ask:
“Why should you give it [money] to African people [outside of Ghana] They should take
care of themselves. We should take care of ourselves.”614 Consequently, as Ghana faced
a declining economy and Ghanaians witness the nation funding African liberation
movements throughout African and inviting revolutionaries to congregate in Ghana for
extravagant conferences, the suggestion of focusing the nation’s resources on the
domestic front was not an irrational notion.
As such, the praxis of Pan-Africanism in Ghanaian governance and nationbuilding faltered not because of a flaw in the concept of Pan-Africanism, but rather,
because Nkrumah moved too quickly in his application of a Pan-African identity to a new
nation that needed his attention before the rest of the African world. Had Nkrumah
focused his initial energies on developing a strong Ghanaian identity, quelling ethnic
divisions in local politics, and ensuring the improved living standards of the Ghanaian
people, perhaps then Ghana could have taken the same aggressive approach to spurring
Pan-African liberation in Africa. Such an approach may have been reconcilable with the
tempered Pan-Africanisms of Lewis and Carew. Conversely, it would have stood in
opposition to the radical purist Pan-Africanisms of Padmore and Makonnen, both of
whom at the time saw the immediate liberation of African continent as their sole
objective.
These diverging notions and applications of Pan-Africanism demonstrate the
plurality in conceptions of Pan-Africanism. In order to gain more wholistic
understandings of Pan-Africanism and its praxis, it is imperative that scholars consider a

614

Ahlman. Living with Nkrumahism. (2017), 132.

325

number of topics in future studies. The most imperative would be the role and
contributions of women to Pan-Africanism. Black women, like Amy Ashwood Garvey,
Claudia Jones, and Adelaide Casely Hayford were essential to the Pan-African movement
in the Americas, Europe, and Africa. While this dissertation examined the contributions
of male West Indian intellectual-activists from the British empire, a limitation manifests
in its scarcity of women and gender analyses of the practice of Pan-Africanism in
Ghanaian society. This must be addressed in future research.
One of the things that bound Africans and West Indians together in their diasporic
experiences was their shared conditions as British colonial subjects. While they shared
this condition, the African and West Indian colonial experiences possessed a number of
diverging social and political worldviews. These differences would have shaped a
number of assumptions that influenced social interactions between Africans and West
Indians operating in each other’s homelands. Thus, as the discourse on Black
Internationalism expands, it must include in depth examinations of the trans-oceanic
histories of British colonialism, which exacerbated tensions and stereotypes not only
between West Indians and Ghanaians, but also the ethnic sub-nationalisms that furthered
the tribalism that caused divisions amongst Africans in their respective nations.
Additionally, future studies of Black Internationalism must continue explorations
of the international contexts in which Black social movements took place, as well as the
discursive continuity facilitating the transnational transfer of political ideologies, critical
analyses, and divergent conceptions of race that influenced these social movements.
Finally, Pan-Africanism can no longer be studied merely as a movement, ideology, nor a
mobilizing principle for activism. Rather its ultimate political objective, Black self-
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governed nations, must be closely examined in case studies of nations that placed the
ideology into practice in governance to assess its achievements and shortcomings.
Thus, while Nkrumah must bear some responsibility for the failures of Ghana,
these failures should not be viewed as those of an individual personality. Rather it must
be viewed within the contexts of the difficulties of being the first independent SubSaharan African nation attempting to establish a viable government to bring order to the
chaos left behind by European colonialism. In spite of his missteps, it would be unwise
to discard his accomplishments and significance to the larger African liberation
movement. Returning to the Gold Coast in 1948, it took Nkrumah less than a decade to
secure independence for his nation. As a result, until this day, the name Kwame
Nkrumah, still commands respect and stands as a symbol of African freedom; however,
his significance to African liberation movement were underscored by the influence of the
West Indians that nurtured his political development in the tradition of Pan-African
activism during his time in the African diaspora and as head of state in Ghana.
Following his removal from power, Nkrumah took refuge in Guinea, where he
served as Co-President with Sekou Toure. In Guinea, where Nkrumah reflected and
wrote about his time in power as well as the future of Africa, his experience with these
West Indian intellectual-activists came full circle, as he became a mentor to Trinidadian
Black Power intellectual-activist, Kwame Ture.615 The now exiled Nkrumah passed on
the very principles of Pan-Africanism that he received at Padmore’s kitchen table in
1945. In doing so, Nkrumah ensured the future of Pan-Africanism as Ture carried the
movement and its revolutionary principles into the twenty-first century.
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